TAKING ORGANIZATIONS SERIOUSLY: RESPONSIBLE AGENCY, ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

In the post-Enlightenment period, Anglo-American criminal law has been applied with increased force, and an ever expanding scope, to collective actors like corporations and other organizations. Recent scholarship has focused on developing “truly organizational” bases of liability that break with the conventional approach of imputing individual conduct to an organization and instead analyze culpable conduct and intent in a way that reflects the distinct and independent capacity of organizations to pursue their interests or goals collaboratively. In 2004, Canada enacted amendments inspired by these ideas in the hope they would lead to more effective criminal enforcement against organizations. Twelve years later, however, the promise of Bill C-45 is largely unfulfilled. In this thesis, I explore how much of this failure of law reform to deliver transformational change is attributable to an individualist bias that permeates how we think about what it means to be responsible and how this then shapes the responsibility ascription process. Using an analytical framework that combines criminal law theory with selected aspects of rational-structural theory and organization culture, I suggest that a promising way forward may lie in reframing the essential qualities required to be a subject of the criminal law in a way that captures the unique attributes that make organizations different from individuals. The resulting organizational concept of responsible agency allows for an integration of organizational reality into how we assess organizational culpability while keeping the ambit of criminal liability within the limits of what is practicable and fair. This better aligns with the spirit of Bill C-45: to impose criminal liability in a way that takes organizations – and their crimes – seriously.

La gestión colectiva: Una estrategia para las holdings. Estudio comparativo entre derecho francés y derecho colombiano

Originalmente presentada en francés como proyecto de grado para la Maestría en Derecho Bancario y Financiero de la Universidad de Estrasburgo, la presente monografía tiene por objetivo analizar la Gestión Colectiva como estrategia para las Holdings. La Gestión Colectiva es un término francés empleado para designar al intermediario financiero que convierte el ahorro individual en portafolios colectivos. En Colombia, la Gestión Colectiva es conocida como Carteras Colectivas o Fondos de Inversión Colectiva, (su nombre más reciente). Este vehículo financiero, es en cierto modo una democratización de las finanzas, ya que canaliza el ahorro de la población hacia las principales industrias, permitiendo que las empresas hagan del ahorro individual una fuente de financiación para sus proyectos, y que la mayor parte de la población tenga acceso a las finanzas. Es por esto, que el tema frecuentemente es abordado desde el punto de vista de la protección a los inversionistas y no, desde los vehículos que prestan dicho servicio. Sin embargo, la presente Monografía estudia la Gestión Colectiva como una posible estrategia para las Holdings, analizando desde este punto de vista, la pertinencia de implementar la Gestión Colectiva como estrategia para reunir fondos para las Holdings. De ahí que el derecho comparado sea de gran ayuda para comprender si dicha estrategia es viable en todos los países en general o si, por el contrario, como lo vemos en Derecho Bancario, unos países sean más favorables que otros. El presente, es un estudio multidisciplinario en el cual se tienen en cuenta variables de tipo legal, económico y político, y se implementan teorías económicas aplicables al estudio del Derecho como Law & Economics. En una primera parte nos centramos en un análisis comparado de las legislaciones de dos países con niveles de desarrollo diferente, a saber, Francia y Colombia. Y, en la segunda parte analizamos el rol de la Gestión Colectiva en las Holdings, así como sus ventajas y desventajas según la legislación aplicable.

Perspectivas para uma teoria geral dos novos direitos: uma leitura crítica sobre a biodiversidade e os conhecimentos tradicionais associados

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Bogeymen, lunatics and fanatics: collective actions and the private enforcement of European competition law

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.

Autonomous collective agreements as a regulatory device in European labour law:How to read Article 139 EC

This article discusses whether European social partners can derive the competence to autonomously devise European collective labour agreements from Article 139 EC (equals Article III-212 Constitution of Europe). Placing the question in the context of discussions of EU governance and private lawmaking in general, the author starts with a comparative overview of legal conceptions for collective labour agreements in Europe, focusing on three Member States' orders where their effects are not or only partly regulated by state legislation. Based on this comparison, she analyses Article 139(2) and offers a new interpretation of its provisions concerning autonomous implementation of European social partner agreements. She concludes that European social partners do have the competence to agree on a basic agreement stating the rules for European collective bargaining autonomously.

The law governing labor disputes and collective bargaining,

Paged continuously. Spine title: Labor disputes and collective bargaining.