Multi-Profile Intertemporal Social Choice

We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s axioms and they can be described by their corresponding collections of decisive coalitions. We review contributions that explore whether this possibility in the infinite-population context allows for a richer class of social welfare functions in an intergenerational model. Different notions of stationarity formulated for individual and for social preferences are examined. Journal of Economic Literature Classification No.: D71.

Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

Strategy-proof social choice

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.

Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of these impossibility theorems.

Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

Self-Selective Social Choice Functions

It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situation voters’ preferences on alternatives induce preferences over the voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself when it is also used in choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we in troduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes weaker and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.

Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice

Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans’ theory of impatience into Arrow’s social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. We prove that the negative implications of their stationarity axiom are more far-reaching: there is no Arrow social welfare function satisfying their stationarity axiom. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom, and show that an Arrow social welfare function satisfies this modified version if and only if it is a lexicographic dictatorship where the generations are taken into consideration in chronological order.

Extensive Social Choice and the Measurement of Group Fitness in Biological Hierarchies

Extensive social choice theory is used to study the problem of measuring group fitness in a two-level biological hierarchy. Both fixed and variable group size are considered. Axioms are identified that imply that the group measure satisfies a form of consequentialism in which group fitness only depends on the viabilities and fecundities of the individuals at the lower level in the hierarchy. This kind of consequentialism can take account of the group fitness advantages of germ-soma specialization, which is not possible with an alternative social choice framework proposed by Okasha, but which is an essential feature of the index of group fitness for a multicellular organism introduced by Michod, Viossat, Solari, Hurand, and Nedelcu to analyze the unicellular-multicellular evolutionary transition. The new framework is also used to analyze the fitness decoupling between levels that takes place during an evolutionary transition.

Population Ethics, Social Choice Theory, and Two problems in the Measurement of Economic Poverty

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Evaluating social choice techniques into intelligent environments by agent based social simulation

The primary hypothesis stated by this paper is that the use of social choice theory in Ambient Intelligence systems can improve significantly users satisfaction when accessing shared resources. A research methodology based on agent based social simulations is employed to support this hypothesis and to evaluate these benefits. The result is a six-fold contribution summarized as follows. Firstly, several considerable differences between this application case and the most prominent social choice application, political elections, have been found and described. Secondly, given these differences, a number of metrics to evaluate different voting systems in this scope have been proposed and formalized. Thirdly, given the presented application and the metrics proposed, the performance of a number of well known electoral systems is compared. Fourthly, as a result of the performance study, a novel voting algorithm capable of obtaining the best balance between the metrics reviewed is introduced. Fifthly, to improve the social welfare in the experiments, the voting methods are combined with cluster analysis techniques. Finally, the article is complemented by a free and open-source tool, VoteSim, which ensures not only the reproducibility of the experimental results presented, but also allows the interested reader to adapt the case study presented to different environments.

LA REGLA DE VOTACIÓN ADMITIDA EN LA CONVENCIÓN AMERICANA: UNA MIRADA DESDE SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

ResumenEn el presente artículo se analiza cuáles son las restricciones que impone la Convención Americanade Derechos Humanos en la construcción de un sistema de elección de representantes populares.Para ello, se tomarán herramientas de Social Choice Theory, que nos permitirán depurar y encontrarprecisamente cuales sistemas electorales no pueden ser tolerados en el Sistema Interamericano deDerechos Humanos.Palabras clave: Social Choice Theory, Derechos Políticos, Teorema de la Imposibilidad de Arrow,Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos.AbstractThis article analyzes which are the restrictions that the American Convention of Human Rights imposeson the construction of an electoral system for popular representation. To do so, tools from Social ChoiceTheory will be taken which will allow us to precise and find which exact electoral systems cannot be toleratedin the Inter-American Human Rights System.Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Political Rights, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, Inter-AmericanHuman Rights System.

Public choice of species for the ark: Phylogenetic similarity and preferred wildlife species for survival

Humans play a role in deciding the fate of species in the current extinction wave. Because of the previous Similarity Principle, physical attractiveness and likeability, it has been argued that public choice favours the survival of species that satisfy these criteria at the expense of other species. This paper empirically tests this argument by considering a hypothetical ‘Ark’ situation. Surveys of 204 members of the Australian public inquired whether they are in favour of the survival of each of 24 native mammal, bird and reptile species (prior to and after information provision about each species). The species were ranked by percentage of ‘yes’ votes received. Species composition by taxon in various fractions of the ranking was determined. If the previous Similarity Principle holds, mammals should rank highly and dominate the top fractions of animals saved in the hierarchical list. We find that although mammals would be over-represented in the ‘Ark’, birds and reptiles are unlikely to be excluded when social choice is based on numbers ‘voting’ for the survival of each species. Support for the previous Similarity Principle is apparent particularly after information provision. Public policy implications of this are noted and recommendations are given.

Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE)

The main argument developed here is the proposal of the concept of “Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation” (SMCE) as a possible useful framework for the application of social choice to the difficult policy problems of our Millennium, where, as stated by Funtowicz and Ravetz, “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”. This paper starts from the following main questions: 1. Why “Social” Multi-criteria Evaluation? 2. How such an approach should be developed? The foundations of SMCE are set up by referring to concepts coming from complex system theory and philosophy, such as reflexive complexity, post-normal science and incommensurability. To give some operational guidelines on the application of SMCE basic questions to be answered are: 1. How is it possible to deal with technical incommensurability? 2. How can we deal with the issue of social incommensurability? To answer these questions, by using theoretical considerations and lessons learned from realworld case studies, is the main objective of the present article.