Revolutionary insurgencies, paradigmatic cases

This essay will examine and compare the production of women's writing during and after the Nicaraguan and Cuban Revolutions, a corpus that includes novels, poetry, and testimonies, but also features considerable generic hybridity. Since both revolutions are separated by some twenty years, each must be understood in the context of the specific ideological conditions that framed women’s participation in culture and revolution, and must also be considered in light of evolving gender discourses, both national and international. As such, these texts respond to both local and transnational paradigms of feminine subjectivity, and highlight the particular problems that arise from women’s insertion into the revolution and its representation in literature. These writers also have to negotiate the evolving context of revolution itself, with its moments of euphoria and disenchantment – and it is here that the greatest contrasts can be found between the two revolutionary instances and their political features: whilst Cuba’s revolutionary process has somehow survived economic crisis and created a level of political stability and continuity (not without its own problems), the Nicaraguan case is characterised by ruptures and resentments which are clearly reflected in the work of writers before, during, and after the Sandinista revolution, and which continue to the present day. This chapter will address the work of the most prominent woman writer of the Nicaraguan revolution, Gioconda Belli, whose main work reflects her involvement in the Sandinista struggle; ex-commander Mónica Baltodano has recently compiled a four volume piece with testimonials of men and women who participated in the organization and actions led by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, former president of Nicaragua, who has recently co-authored an autobiography. There are other women poets to consider, especially under the auspices of the Asociación de Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza, such as Vidaluz Meneses, Michele Najlis and Daisy Zamora. The testimonios compiled by Margaret Randall are also important pieces to consider for both Nicaragua and Cuba. The most important voices of the Cuban revolution still resident on the island are poet Nancy Morejón and writers Mirta Yáñez and Aida Bahr, with younger writers such as Adelaida Fernández de Juan and Marilyn Bobes representing a more recent generation.

The origins of small wars: from special operations to ideological insurgencies

This edited volume explores the origins of the term small wars and traces it to special operations. In the 17th century, such "guerrilla/petite guerre" special operations grew out of training and winter operations of the regular forces as practiced in the 16th century. In the 18th century, they fused with a tradition going back to Antiquity, of employing special ethnic groups (such as the Hungarian Hussars) for special operations. Side by side with these special operations, however, there was the even older genealogy of uprisings and insurgencies, which since the Spanish Guerrilla of 1808-1812 has been associated with this term. All three traditions have influenced each other.

National experiences with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies: are there “National styles”?

There are clearly identifiable patterns in the way in which insurgents operate in certain geographic areas and cultures, and in which states deal with them. These have been stressed by writing about national "ways of war", strategic culture, or national styles. Nevertheless, there have been important ruptures and changes in some of these, so that for Britain, for example, three successive phases corresponding to patterns can be identified. For France, two pronounced rivaling traditions coincided over two centuries. Algerians by contrast changed fundamentally in their fighting style with the different political ideologies they were following. Palestinian insurgency against Israel is also marked by change in approach. Russia and China possibly show the longest continuity in their handling of insurgencies.

Insurgencies and counterinsurgency strategies: patterns and dilemmas

The roots of insurgencies and counterinsurgency go back to Antiquity, and consistent patterns can be traced. These include the state's use of its own armed forces against insurgents who tend to be inferior in terms of armaments, and states' attempts to delegitimize violent aimed to overthrow it, and the need for insurgents to recur to illegal means to challenge the state's power. Very often insurgents have to team up with criminal networks in order to do so, undermining their ability to claim legitimacy.

Small wars and insurgencies in theory and practice, 1500-1850

In early modern times, warfare in Europe took on many diverse and overlapping forms. Our modern notions of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ warfare, of ‘major war’ and ‘small war’, have their roots in much greater diversity than such binary notions allow for. While insurgencies go back to time immemorial, they have become conceptually fused with ‘small wars’. This is a term first used to denote special operations, often carried out by military companies formed from special ethnic groups and then recruited into larger armies. In its Spanish form, guerrilla, the term ‘small war’ came to stand for an ideologically-motivated insurgency against the state authorities or occupying forces of another power. There is much overlap between the phenomena of irregular warfare in the sense of special operations alongside regular operations, and irregular warfare of insurgents against the regular forces of a state. This book demonstrates how long the two phenomena were in flux and fed on each other, from the raiding operations of the 16th century to the ‘small wars’ or special operations conducted by special units in the 19th century, which existed alongside and could merge with a popular insurgency. This book is based on a special issue of the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies.

The iatrogenic reflex and belief that repression can coercively suppress asymmetric coercive violence : does very robust action by the government decrease functional support for insurgents?

Non-state insurgent actors are too weak to compel powerful adversaries to their will, so they use violence to coerce. A principal objective is to grow and sustain violent resistance to the point that it either militarily challenges the state, or more commonly, generates unacceptable political costs. To survive, insurgents must shift popular support away from the state and to grow they must secure it. State actor policies and actions perceived as illegitimate and oppressive by the insurgent constituency can generate these shifts. A promising insurgent strategy is to attack states in ways that lead angry publics and leaders to discount the historically established risks and take flawed but popular decisions to use repressive measures. Such decisions may be enabled by a visceral belief in the power of coercion and selective use of examples of where robust measures have indeed suppressed resistance. To avoid such counterproductive behaviours the cases of apparent 'successful repression' must be understood. This thesis tests whether robust state action is correlated with reduced support for insurgents, analyses the causal mechanisms of such shifts and examines whether such reduction is because of compulsion or coercion? The approach is founded on prior research by the RAND Corporation which analysed the 30 insurgencies most recently resolved worldwide to determine factors of counterinsurgent success. This new study first re-analyses their data at a finer resolution with new queries that investigate the relationship between repression and insurgent active support. Having determined that, in general, repression does not correlate with decreased insurgent support, this study then analyses two cases in which the data suggests repression seems likely to be reducing insurgent support: the PKK in Turkey and the insurgency against the Vietnamese-sponsored regime after their ousting of the Khmer Rouge. It applies 'structured-focused' case analysis with questions partly built from the insurgency model of Leites and Wolf, who are associated with the advocacy of US robust means in Vietnam. This is thus a test of 'most difficult' cases using a 'least likely' test model. Nevertheless, the findings refute the deterrence argument of 'iron fist' advocates. Robust approaches may physically prevent effective support of insurgents but they do not coercively deter people from being willing to actively support the insurgency.

Hizballah

Gunning, Jeroen. Hizballah and the logic of political participation, In: 'Terror, Insurgency and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts', Heiberg, Marianne, O'Leary, Brendan & Tirman, John (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), p.157-188, 2007. RAE2008

Análisis de la incorporación del Patrimonio Cultural Inmaterial en el Ordenamiento Territorial. Una propuesta de mecanismos de diálogo e inclusión para el caso de la Semana Santa de Popayán

Presenta el análisis de la incorporación de una práctica cultural declarada Patrimonio Cultural Inmaterial (PCI) de la Humanidad en las estructuras formales del ordenamiento territorial. Analiza también la necesidad de reconocer una serie de valores que la comunidad le ha otorgado a la práctica y que soportan la articulación con el ordenamiento territorial, pasando por los beneficios económicos, políticos y sociales que traería este proceso.

Insurgency in a time of terrorism

Is it possible to separate terrorism from armed insurgency? Are all armed manifestations terrorism? Is terrorism a method of action or a logic for action? This article purports to analyze insurgency in the midst of the anti-terrorist era of the new century. By using Vietnam as an example, the author points out how armed insurgency has as of lately been called “terrorist”, yet stresses that this concept should be carefully and strategically looked through in order to better understand the violent nature of two very different phenomena: transactional and trans-national insurgencies-----¿Se puede escindir el terrorismo de la insurgencia armada? ¿Toda expresión armada es terrorismo? ¿El territorio es un método de acción o una lógica de acción? Este artículo presenta un análisis de la insurgencia a la luz de la era antiterrorista del nuevo siglo. Con la utilización del ejemplo de Vietnam el autor señala cómo la insurgencia armada ha sido señalada de “terrorista”; sin embargo, debe revisarse detenidamente de manera estratégica este concepto para entender mejor la naturaleza de la violencia de dos fenómenos diferentes: la insurgencia transnacional y el terrorismo transnacional.

Securitización en el desierto: Una respuesta al terrorismo en Malí y en Níger, 2009 - 2013.

Este es un estudio sobre las dinámicas de seguridad en Malí durante el periodo de 2009 a 2013. La investigación busca explicar de qué manera se ha dado un proceso de securitización de los grupos insurgentes frente a la amenaza generada por la proliferación de grupos armados no estatales en el territorio comprendido entre Malí y Níger. Se toma a Níger con el ánimo de ver la existencia de un subcomplejo regional de seguridad entre este país y Malí. De esta manera se afirma que el aumento de las actividades insurgentes y terroristas en la zona compuesta por Malí y Níger se da por la proliferación de actores armados no estatales, entre los cuales se encuentran los grupos seculares e insurgentes Tuareg, las agrupaciones islamistas fundamentalistas y los grupos que se componen entre rebeldes Tuareg, criminales e islamistas, éstos actores han afectado la percepción que tiene Malí sobre su seguridad.

Colonialidade e insurgência : contribuições para uma pedagogia latino-americana

Este ensaio, baseado em pressupostos da obra de Paulo Freire, propõe-se a discutir a pedagogia latino-americana e a produção de conhecimento numa perspectiva de superação da colonialidade pedagógica. A primeira parte deste estudo se dedica a situar as práticas educativas de caráter emancipatório na América Latina no contexto pedagógico atual, em movimentos sociais e na universidade, buscando identificar algumas de suas principais marcas. Em seguida, detém-se na recuperação de elementos da memória em torno da idéia de colonialidade e a superação da mesma na e com a educação. Por fim, apresentam-se algumas contribuições do tensionamento entre a colonialidade e a insurgência para a pedagogia latino-americana: a) no diálogo horizontal entre conhecimentos em busca de metodologias próprias; b) como território de resistências ou movimento de lugares e tempos diversos; e, c) na busca da latinidade negada ou o aprender nas fronteiras. José Martí, Simón Rodríguez e os zapatistas são algumas referências na busca pela memória pedagógica latino-americana e interlocutores privilegiados na problematização desta pedagogia que se compreende um processo aberto, onde superar a colonialidade a partir das tensões produzidas nas insurgências pedagógicas significa antecipar, ensaiar, as possibilidades emancipadoras, endógenas e autênticas.

Las actuales insurgencias políticas-epistémicas en las Américas: giros a la izquierda, giros anti imperiales, giros de-coloniales (Tema Central)

Este artículo esboza, a grosso modo, un análisis de la coyuntura actual mundial, haciendo un sondeo general de las insurgencias político espistémicas más importantes en América Latina. El autor hace una serie de preguntas claves a las cuales se debe hacer referencia en la tarea colectiva de construir el giro decolonial como alternativa tanto epistémica como ético-política.

Orde Wingate, 'Guerrilla' Warfare and Long-Range Penetration, 1940-44

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long-range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate's own official writings on this subject reveals that long-range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situations regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins' doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.

Small wars in the age of Clausewitz: the watershed between partisan war and people's war

Around the time of Clausewitz’s writing, a new element was introduced into partisan warfare: ideology. Previously, under the ancien régime, partisans were what today we would call special forces, light infantry or cavalry, almost always mercenaries, carrying out special operations, while the main action in war took place between regular armies. Clausewitz lectured his students on such ‘small wars’. In the American War of Independence and the resistance against Napoleon and his allies, operations carried out by such partisans merged with counter-revolutionary, nationalist insurgencies, but these Clausewitz analysed in a distinct category, ‘people's war’. Small wars, people's war, etc. should thus not be thought of as monopoly of either the political Right or the Left.