Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, finite dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compatibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder’s expected utilities. Thus for example we may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting application of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence.

Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private valoues

We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.

kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups

A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder’s expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.

Optimal procurement and contracting with research and development

Government procurement of a new good or service is a process that usually includes basic research, development, and production. Empirical evidences indicate that investments in research and development (R and D) before production are significant in many defense procurements. Thus, optimal procurement policy should not be only to select the most efficient producer, but also to induce the contractors to design the best product and to develop the best technology. It is difficult to apply the current economic theory of optimal procurement and contracting, which has emphasized production, but ignored R and D, to many cases of procurement.

In this thesis, I provide basic models of both R and D and production in the procurement process where a number of firms invest in private R and D and compete for a government contract. R and D is modeled as a stochastic cost-reduction process. The government is considered both as a profit-maximizer and a procurement cost minimizer. In comparison to the literature, the following results derived from my models are significant. First, R and D matters in procurement contracting. When offering the optimal contract the government will be better off if it correctly takes into account costly private R and D investment. Second, competition matters. The optimal contract and the total equilibrium R and D expenditures vary with the number of firms. The government usually does not prefer infinite competition among firms. Instead, it prefers free entry of firms. Third, under a R and D technology with the constant marginal returns-to-scale, it is socially optimal to have only one firm to conduct all of the R and D and production. Fourth, in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral firms, an informed government should select one of four standard auction procedures with an appropriate announced reserve price, acting as if it does not have any private information.

Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.

Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities

We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider applicability of this concept we present two examples showing how to extend the classical models of Mussa and Rosen and Baron and Myerson for arbitrary distributions

Auctions with options for re-auction

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

Land use planning for privatized airports

Problem, research strategy, and findings: The privatization of airports in Australia included airport property development rights, regulated only by federal, not local, land use control. Airports then developed commercial and retail centers outside local community plans, resulting in a history of poor coordination of planning and reflecting strong differences between public and private values in the role of the airport. Private owners embraced the concept of an Airport City, envisioning the airport as a portal of global infrastructure, whereas public planning agencies are struggling with infrastructure coordination and the development of real estate outside of the local planning regulations. Stakeholder workshops were conducted in each of the cases where key stakeholders from airports, regulating agencies, state and local governments participated in identifying key issues impacting the planning in and around airports. This research demonstrates that if modes of infrastructure provision change significantly (such as through privatization of public services), that transformation would best be accompanied by comprehensive changes in planning regimes to accommodate metropolitan and airport interdependencies. Privatization has exacerbated the poor coordination of planning in the past, and a focus on coordination between public and private infrastructure planning is needed to overcome differences in values and interests. Takeaway for practice: Governance styles differ considerably between public agencies and private corporations. Planners should understand the drivers and value differences to better coordinate infrastructure delivery and effective planning. Research support: The Airport Metropolis Research Project under the Australian Research Council's Linkage Projects funding scheme (LP0775225).

Empirical Analysis of Competition in Procurement Auctions

A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize public revenue. Maximizing public revenue means minimizing the costs of procurement. Both of these goals are important from the welfare point of view. In this thesis, I analyze field data from procurement auctions and show how empirical analysis can be used to help design the auctions to maximize public revenue. In particular, I concentrate on how competition, which means the number of bidders, should be taken into account in the design of auctions. In the first chapter, the main policy question is whether the auctioneer should spend resources to induce more competition. The information paradigm is essential in analyzing the effects of competition. We talk of a private values information paradigm when the bidders know their valuations exactly. In a common value information paradigm, the information about the value of the object is dispersed among the bidders. With private values more competition always increases the public revenue but with common values the effect of competition is uncertain. I study the effects of competition in the City of Helsinki bus transit market by conducting tests for common values. I also extend an existing test by allowing bidder asymmetry. The information paradigm seems to be that of common values. The bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes are influenced more by the common value elements than those whose garages are further away. Therefore, attracting more bidders does not necessarily lower procurement costs, and thus the City should not implement costly policies to induce more competition. In the second chapter, I ask how the auctioneer can increase its revenue by changing contract characteristics like contract sizes and durations. I find that the City of Helsinki should shorten the contract duration in the bus transit auctions because that would decrease the importance of common value components and cheaply increase entry which now would have a more beneficial impact on the public revenue. Typically, cartels decrease the public revenue in a significant way. In the third chapter, I propose a new statistical method for detecting collusion and compare it with an existing test. I argue that my test is robust to unobserved heterogeneity unlike the existing test. I apply both methods to procurement auctions that contract snow removal in schools of Helsinki. According to these tests, the bidding behavior of two of the bidders seems consistent with a contract allocation scheme.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

The energy costs of sexual dimorphism in mole-rats are morphological not behavioural.

Different reproductive strategies of males and females may lead to the evolution of differences in their energetic costs of reproduction, overall energetic requirements and physiological performances. Sexual dimorphism is often associated with costly behaviours (e.g. large males might have a competitive advantage in fighting, which is energetically expensive). However, few studies of mammals have directly compared the energy costs of reproductive activities between sexes. We compared the daily energy expenditure (DEE) and resting metabolic rate (RMR) of males and females of two species of mole-rat, Bathyergus janetta and Georychus capensis (the former is sexually dimorphic in body size and the latter is not) during a period of intense digging when males seek females. We hypothesized that large body size might be indicative of greater digging or fighting capabilities, and hence greater mass-independent DEE values in males of the sexually dimorphic species. In contrast to this prediction, although absolute values of DEE were greater in B. janetta males, mass-independent values were not. No differences were apparent between sexes in G. capensis. By comparison, although RMR values were greater in B. janetta than G. capensis, no differences were apparent between the sexes for either species. The energy cost of dimorphism is most likely to be the cost of maintenance of a large body size, and not the cost of behaviours performed when an individual is large.

Problems of allometric scaling analysis: examples from mammalian reproductive biology.

Biological scaling analyses employing the widely used bivariate allometric model are beset by at least four interacting problems: (1) choice of an appropriate best-fit line with due attention to the influence of outliers; (2) objective recognition of divergent subsets in the data (allometric grades); (3) potential restrictions on statistical independence resulting from phylogenetic inertia; and (4) the need for extreme caution in inferring causation from correlation. A new non-parametric line-fitting technique has been developed that eliminates requirements for normality of distribution, greatly reduces the influence of outliers and permits objective recognition of grade shifts in substantial datasets. This technique is applied in scaling analyses of mammalian gestation periods and of neonatal body mass in primates. These analyses feed into a re-examination, conducted with partial correlation analysis, of the maternal energy hypothesis relating to mammalian brain evolution, which suggests links between body size and brain size in neonates and adults, gestation period and basal metabolic rate. Much has been made of the potential problem of phylogenetic inertia as a confounding factor in scaling analyses. However, this problem may be less severe than suspected earlier because nested analyses of variance conducted on residual variation (rather than on raw values) reveals that there is considerable variance at low taxonomic levels. In fact, limited divergence in body size between closely related species is one of the prime examples of phylogenetic inertia. One common approach to eliminating perceived problems of phylogenetic inertia in allometric analyses has been calculation of 'independent contrast values'. It is demonstrated that the reasoning behind this approach is flawed in several ways. Calculation of contrast values for closely related species of similar body size is, in fact, highly questionable, particularly when there are major deviations from the best-fit line for the scaling relationship under scrutiny.

Evaluation of ozone and water vapor fields from the ECMWF reanalysis ERA-40 during 1991-1999 in comparison with UARS satellite and MOZAIC aircraft observations

[ 1] The European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) 40-year Reanalysis (ERA-40) ozone and water vapor reanalysis fields during the 1990s have been compared with independent satellite data from the Halogen Occultation Experiment (HALOE) and Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) instruments on board the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS). In addition, ERA-40 has been compared with aircraft data from the Measurements of Ozone and Water Vapour by Airbus In-Service Aircraft (MOZAIC) program. Overall, in comparison with the values derived from the independent observations, the upper stratosphere in ERA-40 has about 5 - 10% more ozone and 15 - 20% less water vapor. This dry bias in the reanalysis appears to be global and extends into the middle stratosphere down to 40 hPa. Most of the discrepancies and seasonal variations between ERA-40 and the independent observations occur within the upper troposphere over the tropics and the lower stratosphere over the high latitudes. ERA-40 reproduces a weaker Antarctic ozone hole, and of less vertical extent, than the independent observations; values in the ozone maximum in the tropical stratosphere are lower for the reanalysis. ERA-40 mixing ratios of water vapor are considerably larger than those for MOZAIC, typically by 20% in the tropical upper troposphere, and they may exceed 60% in the lower stratosphere over high latitudes. The results imply that the Brewer-Dobson circulation in the ECMWF reanalysis system is too fast, as is also evidenced by deficiencies in the way ERA-40 reproduces the water vapor "tape recorder'' signal in the tropical stratosphere. Finally, the paper examines the biases and their temporal variation during the 1990s in the way ERA-40 compares to the independent observations. We also discuss how the evaluation results depend on the instrument used, as well as on the version of the data.

Coordinated weather balloon solar radiation measurements during a solar eclipse

Solar eclipses provide a rapidly changing solar radiation environment. These changes can be studied using simple photodiode sensors, if the radiation reaching the sensors is unaffected by cloud.Transporting the sensors aloft using standard meteorological instrument packages modified to carry extra sensors, provides one promising but hitherto unexploited possibility for making solar eclipse radiation measurements. For the 20th March 2015 solar eclipse, a coordinated campaign of balloon-carried solar radiation measurements was undertaken from Reading (51.44N, 0.94W), Lerwick (60.15N, 1.13W) and Reykjavik (64.13N, 21.90W), straddling the path of the eclipse.The balloons reached sufficient altitude at the eclipse time for eclipse-induced variations in solar radiation and solar limb darkening to be measured above cloud. Because the sensor platforms were free to swing, techniques have been evaluated to correct the measurements for their changing orientation. In the swing-averaged technique, the mean value across a set of swings was used to approximate the radiation falling on a horizontal surface; in the swing-maximum technique, the direct beam was estimated by assuming the sensing surface becomes normal to the solar beam direction at a maximum swing. Both approaches, essentially independent,give values that agree with theoretical expectations for the eclipse-induced radiation changes.