Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion


Autoria(s): Page Junior, Frank H.; Monteiro, P. K.; Svaiter, Benar Fux
Data(s)

13/05/2008

13/05/2008

01/03/2004

Resumo

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.

Identificador

01048910

http://hdl.handle.net/10438/641

Idioma(s)

en_US

Publicador

Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV

Relação

Ensaios Econômicos;537

Palavras-Chave #Optimal auctions #Type exclusion #Multidimensional types #Economia #Leilões - Modelos econômicos
Tipo

Working Paper