Meaningful engagement with music composition

Musical value cannot be experienced without direct knowledge of music, and engagement with the interactive elements of materials, expressive character and structure. Through these channels something is communicated, something is transmitted, some residue of ‘meaning’ is left with us. When a work of art stirs us it is more than simply sensory stimulation or some kind of emotional indulgence. We are gaining knowledge and expanding our experience... contributing to knowledge of ourselves and of the world.

'Doing-things-with-music'-the newest arm of the industry

Even though revenues from recorded music have fallen dramatically over the past fifteen years, people across the world are not listening to less music. Actually, they listen to more recorded music than ever before. Recorded music permeates throughout almost every aspect of our daily lives...

Stochastic differential games with multiple modes

We have studied two person stochastic differential games with multiple modes. For the zero-sum game we have established the existence of optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero-sum case we have proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium.

Evolutionary games with two timescales

We consider a two timescale model of learning by economic agents wherein active or 'ontogenetic' learning by individuals takes place on a fast scale and passive or 'phylogenetic' learning by society as a whole on a slow scale, each affecting the evolution of the other. The former is modelled by the Monte Carlo dynamics of physics, while the latter is modelled by the replicator dynamics of evolutionary biology. Various qualitative aspects of the dynamics are studied in some simple cases, both analytically and numerically, and its role as a useful modelling device is emphasized.

Multicriterion differential games with applications to combat problems

In this paper a theory for two-person zero sum multicriterion differential games is presented. Various solution concepts based upon the notions of Pareto optimality (efficiency), security and equilibrium are defined. These are shown to have interesting applications in the formulation and analysis of two target or combat differential games. The methods for obtaining outcome regions in the state space, feedback strategies for the players and the mode of play has been discussed in the framework of bicriterion zero sum differential games. The treatment is conceptual rather than rigorous.

Bicriterion differential games with qualitative outcomes

Combat games are studied as bicriterion differential games with qualitative outcomes determined by threshold values on the criterion functions. Survival and capture strategies of the players are defined using the notion of security levels. Closest approach survival strategies (CASS) and minimum risk capture strategies (MRCS) are important strategies for the players identified as solutions to four optimization problems involving security levels. These are used, in combination with the preference orderings of the qualitative outcomes by the players, to delineate the win regions and the secured draw and mutual kill regions for the players. It is shown that the secured draw regions and the secured mutual kill regions for the two players are not necessarily the same. Simple illustrative examples are given.

Denumerable state stochastic games with limiting average payoff

We study stochastic games with countable state space, compact action spaces, and limiting average payoff. ForN-person games, the existence of an equilibrium in stationary strategies is established under a certain Liapunov stability condition. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of a value and optimal strategies for both players are established under the same stability condition.

Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Partial Information and Average Payoff

We consider a discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we present a pair of optimal strategies for both the players.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

Playing games with words cultural transfer in David Lynch's Blue Velvet

Eguíluz, Federico; Merino, Raquel; Olsen, Vickie; Pajares, Eterio; Santamaría, José Miguel (eds.)

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

The influence of video games with apocalyptic content in adolescents

The aim of this study is the dissertation and analysis of the influence (sociological, psychological and cultural) exerted on adolescents by the concept of Apocalypse. Become a key thought of visual culture, the called doomsday theory achieves one of its highest expressions in video games, possibly the favorite entertainment for young people in their leisure time. The results obtained in this research represent a first approach to the subject through the selected samples, two secondary schools from the city of Seville with disparate locations and divergent socioeconomic backgrounds. To reinforce the comparative study, we have included issues related to parental control, principal gaming platforms used by respondents or the number of hours dedicated to this type of entertainment. The conclusions demonstrate an irremediable attraction from our youth towards apocalyptic universes, plotter consciously with leisure and entertainment as escape from their routine of everyday life.