First-mover Advantage

Tämän tutkielman tarkoitus oli tutkia yrityksen markkinoille tai alalle tulon ajoitukseen pohjautuvaa kilpailuetua –erityisesti niin kutsuttua ensimmäisen toimijan etua - eli etua jonka yritys voi saavuttaa tullessaan markkinoille tiettyyn aikaan suhteessa muihin markkinoille tulijoihin. Tutkielma on luonteeltaan kirjallisuuskatsaus. Yleisesti ottaen ei voida sanoa että jokin tietty markkinoille tai alalle tulo strategia –esimerkiksi ensimmäisenä toimiminen – olisi yritykselle aina kannattavaa. On oletettavaa että yrityksen toimintaympäristö, erityisesti toimiala jolla se toimii, määrittää kyseenomaiseen kilpailuetuun liittyvät mahdollisuudet, ja että yrityksen omista lähtökohdista ja toiminnasta riippuu kuinka hyvin se pystyy nämä mahdollisuudet hyödyntämään. Työssä on esitetty ehdotuksia ensimmäisen toimijan edun jatkotutkimusta varten.

Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty in a differentiated duopoly

On a symmetric differentiated Stackelberg duopoly model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by leading and follower firms, we show that the leading firm does not necessarily have advantage over the following one. The reason for this is that the second mover can adjust its output level after observing the realized demand, while the first mover chooses its output level only with the knowledge of demand distribution.

Stackelberg duopoly with demand uncertainty

We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.

Flexibility and leadership advantages in a model with uncertain demand

We consider a differentiated Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty only for the first mover. We study the advantages of flexibility over leadership as the degree of the differentiation of the goods changes.

Flexibility in Stackelberg leadership

We consider a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty, only for the first mover. We study the advantages of leadership and flexibility with the variation of the demand uncertainty. Liu proved for demand uncertainty parameter greater than three that the follower firm can have an advantage with respect to the leading firm for some realizations of the demand intercept. Here, we prove that for demand uncertainty parameter less than three the leading firm is always in advantage.

Marketing plan for Snack Books

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Internationalization strategy: HOLOS Mobile - Angola

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Strategy definition of a new business opportunity in mobile-casual gaming: Partnership between Nmusic and Rovio Entertainment Ltd.

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation.

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence of moves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward induction provides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. We conduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data the incumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forward induction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicate that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, a theoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.

Timing of seasonal sales

We present a model of timing of seasonal sales where stores chooseseveral designs at the beginning of the season without knowingwich one, if any, will be fashionable. Fashionable designs have achance to fetch high prices in fashion markets while non-fashionableones must be sold in a discount market. In the beginning of theseason, stores charge high prices in the hope of capturing theirfashion market. As the end of the season approaches with goods stillon the shelves, stores adjust downward their expectations that theyare carrying a fashionable design, and may have sales to capture thediscount market. Having a greater number of designs induces a storeto put one of them on sales earlier to test the market. Moreover,price competition in the discount market induces stores to startsales earlier because of a greater perceived first-mover advantage incapturing the discount market. More competition, perhaps due todecreases in the cost of product innovation, makes sales occur evenearlier. These results are consistent with the observation that thetrend toward earlier sales since mid-1970's coincides with increasingproduct varieties in fashion good markets and increasing storecompetition.

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long arguedthat excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there islittle empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in thisway. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence ofmoves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward inductionprovides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. Weconduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data theincumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forwardinduction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicatethat players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without havingto pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not driveout this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, atheoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.

Market entry order and competitive advantage of the firm

A firm that wishes to launch a new product to the market is faced with a difficult task of deciding what the best moment for the launch is. Timing may also be critical when a firm plans to adopt new processes or intends to head for new markets. The critical question the firm needs to tackle is whether it will try to reach the so-called first-mover advantage by acting earlier than its rivals. The first-mover position may reward the entrant with various opportunities to gain competitive advantage over later movers. However, there are also great risks involved in the early market entry, and sometimes the very first entrant fails even before the followers enter the market. The follower, on the other hand, may be able to free-ride on the earlier entrants' investments and gain from the languished uncertainties that characterize the new markets. According to the current understanding the occurrence of entry order advantages depends not only on the mechanism and attributes in the firm's environment that provide the initial opportunities but also on the firm's ability to capitalize on these advantage opportunities. This study contributes to this discussion by analyzing the linkages between the asset base of the firm, characteristics of the operating environment and the firm's entry timing orientation. To shed light on the relationship between the entry timing strategy and competitive advantage, this study utilizes the concept of entry timing orientation. The rationale for choosing this type of approach arises from the inability of previously employed research tools to reach the underlying factors that result in entry timing advantage. The work consists of an introductory theoretical discussion on entry timing advantages and of four research publication. The empirical findings support the understanding that entry timing advantage is related to the characteristics of the firm's operating environment but may also be related to firm-specific factors. This in turn suggests that some of the traditional ways of detecting and measuring first-mover advantage - which to some extent ignore these dimensions - may be outdated.

A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game

We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (Q J Econ 119(3):861-898, 2004)-where players have different levels of reasoning-to Huck et al. (Games Econ Behav 38:240-264, 2002) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ Behav 2:29-46, 1990) action commitment game-a duopoly with endogenous timing of entry. We show that, for an empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, the model rules out Stackelberg equilibria, generates Cournot outcomes including delay, and outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader. We show that a cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses can explain the most important features of the experimental data on the action commitment game in (2002). In order to gauge the success of the model in fitting the data, we compare it to a noisy Nash model. We find that the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses fits the data better than the noisy Nash model.

Entornos políticos favorables y liderazgo en la acción colectiva. Estudio de caso: Barrio Juan XXIII

Este trabajo analiza la relación de complementariedad que existe entre el liderazgo en la acción colectiva y el aprovechamiento de los entornos políticos favorables, a partir de la experiencia de consolidación urbana del barrio Juan XXIII en Bogotá.

El Outsourcing en la dinámica de sistemas hacia mercados extranjeros

Este trabajo recopila literatura académica relevante sobre estrategias de entrada y metodologías para la toma de decisión sobre la contratación de servicios de Outsourcing para el caso de empresas que planean expandirse hacia mercados extranjeros. La manera en que una empresa planifica su entrada a un mercado extranjero, y realiza la consideración y evaluación de información relevante y el diseño de la estrategia, determina el éxito o no de la misma. De otro lado, las metodologías consideradas se concentran en el nivel estratégico de la pirámide organizacional. Se parte de métodos simples para llegar a aquellos basados en la Teoría de Decisión Multicriterio, tanto individuales como híbridos. Finalmente, se presenta la Dinámica de Sistemas como herramienta valiosa en el proceso, por cuanto puede combinarse con métodos multicriterio.