Pratt's hand book for bank directors and officers; treatise on the powers, duties and liabilities of bank directors and officers, with digest of decisions of the course and references to cases cited.

Mode of access: Internet.

The law of directors and officers of joint stock companies, their powers, duties and liabilities,

Mode of access: Internet.

Some care, little responsibility? Promoting directors'and managers' legal accountability for Occupational Health and Safety in the workplace

Health and safety at work remains a serious and under-recognised problem in Australia. This paper argues for the importance of increasing the individual responsibility and accountability of senior managers and directors of corporations for the development and maintenance of occupational health and safety (OHS) standards in the workplace. In order to do so, the paper first sets out the range of statutory and general law duties and liabilities to which directors and senior managers are subject, considers to what extent these obligations have relevance in the OHS area and argues for the extension of these duties and liabilities in some circumstances. The paper then goes on to argue for a better legislative model for the legal responsibility of managers and officers, supported by the increased prosecution of individuals in appropriate circumstances, as well as acknowledging the benefits of a broader range of non-legal strategies to improve board level commitment to OHS that will influence corporate compliance overall.

Putting the spoils of litigation into the shareholders’ pockets: when can shareholders bring a personal action against the directors of their company?

company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person with its rightsand liabilities appropriate to itself”.2 A consequence of this is the “proper plaintiff” principleestablished in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189: the proper plaintiff in an action inrespect of a wrong done to a corporation is the corporation itself.3 It is also a “hallowed rule” thatdirectors owe their duties to the company, not the shareholders,4 and so any loss accruing to thecompany as a result of the directors’ breach of their duties is recoverable only by the company.5An obvious problem with this state of affairs is that a company will be unlikely to initiateproceedings against its directors when the company is controlled by those directors.6 While there aregood economic reasons for this division of management and ownership,7 shareholders are left with acritical question: under what circumstances can they initiate proceedings to recover loss suffered as aresult of company directors’ breach of their duties? Although one writer has referred to the“expansive statutory and common law arsenals” available to aggrieved shareholders,8 it seems ratherthe case that there are few effective remedies. For shareholders have no contractual relationship withdirectors,9 and the personal rights conferred on shareholders by statute or general law are largelyprocedural10 and seem a rather ineffective basis for “scrutinising directorial performance”.

Frameworks in regulating company directors : rethinking the philosophical foundations to enhance accountability

Sets out a system of corporate governance regulation, aimed at combining legal and social methods of governing director behaviour and at creating a framework flexible enough to accommodate different business and ethical cultures. Outlines the theoretical basis of corporate governance and the broad responsibilities of directors, and discusses the extent to which they can and should be regulated. Discusses the constitution of a regulatory framework encompassing law, soft law and best practice, and ethics.

Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

Regulating non-executive directors in Australia : a socio-legal approach

Discusses the role of legislation and codes of conduct in influencing the behaviour of non-executive directors. Outlines the functions of a board of directors and considers the role on non-executive directors in particular. Traces the development of standards of skill required on non-executive directors both under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and under common law. Questions whether these have brought about a real change in behaviour. Considers whether professionalisation of directorship could be more effective.

Does Chinese traditional values matter in regulating China's company directors? Preliminary findings from surveys in Hong Kong

Much has been said about Chinese corporate governance and the new laws on companies. While most literature focuses on either the political or the legal doctrinal issues, this paper argues that Chinese traditional values do matter in Chinese corporate governance. The object of this paper is to report on the preliminary findings of a project supported by the General Research Fund in Hong Kong (HK). Thus far the survey results from HK respondents support our hypothesis. As such, traditional Chinese values should be on the agenda of the next round of company law reforms in China.

The role of the board of directors : perceptions of managerial elites

We highlight how directors and senior managers perceive the roles of a board to involve overseeing risk and compliance, strategy, governance, developing the CEO and senior management and managing stakeholders. We find that managers and directors perceive board effectiveness as linked to different combinations of these roles and that there appear to be differences in perceptions between different types of firms. We conclude that clarity around the board’s role set is critical to furthering the corporate governance research agenda, and that the relationship between board roles and perceived board effectiveness differs between managers and directors.