Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of internal job markets.

Essays on Development Policy and the Political Economy of Conflict

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups. Despite a large body of work documenting how electoral systems affect policy outcomes, less is known about their impact on leader selection. We study this by comparing two types of participatory decision making in Ugandan community groups: (i) vote by secret ballot and (ii) open discussion with consensus. Random assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the rules on leader types and social service delivery. Vote groups are found to elect leaders more similar to the average member while discussion group leaders are positively selected on socio-economic characteristics. Further, dropout rates are significantly higher in discussion groups, particularly for poorer members. After 3.5 years, vote groups are larger in size and their members save less and get smaller loans. We conclude that the secret ballot vote creates more inclusive groups while open discussion groups favor the already economically successful. Preparing for Genocide: Community Meetings in Rwanda. How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure. The practice was highly politicized and, according to anecdotal evidence, regularly used by the political elites for spreading propaganda in the years before the genocide. This paper presents the first quantitative evidence of this abuse of the community meetings. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. Selection into Borrowing: Survey Evidence from Uganda. In this paper, I study how changes to the standard credit contract affect loan demand and selection into borrowing, using a representative sample of urban micro enterprises, most with no borrowing experience. Hypothetical loan demand questions are used to test whether firm owners respond to changes in loans' contractual terms and whether take-up varies by firms' risk type and other firm owner characteristics. The results indicate that contracts with lower interest rates and less stringent collateral requirements attract less risky borrowers, suggesting that there is scope for improvement of standard financial contract terms. Credit Contract Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. We study the effects of credit contract structure on firm outcomes among small and medium sized firms. A randomized control trial was carried out to distinguish between some of the key constraints to efficient credit use connected to the firms' business environment and production function, namely (i) backloaded returns (ii) uncertain returns and (iii) indivisible fixed costs. Each firm was followed for the 1-year loan cycle. We describe the experiment and present preliminary results from the first 754 out of 2,340 firms to have completed the loan cycle. Firms offered a grace period have higher profits and higher household income than firms receiving a rebate later on as well as the control group. They also increased the number of paid employees  and reduced the number of unpaid employees, an effect also found among firms that received a cash subsidy at the beginning of the loan cycle. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these effects.

Credit derivatives in emerging markets

Credit Derivatives are securities that offer protection against credit or default risk ofbonds or loans. The credit derivatives emerging market has grown rapidly and creditderivatives are widely used. This paper describes the emerging credit derivativesmarket structure. The current market activity is analyzed through elementary pricingdynamics and the study of the term structure of default risk. Focusing on theperformance of credit derivatives in stress situation, including legal and market risks,we discuss the potential consequences of a debt restructuring in a large emergingmarket borrower. The contribution of credit derivatives to the risk sharing in emergingmarkets is also examined.

How does contract design affect the uptake of microcredit among the ultra-poor? : experimental evidence from the river islands of Northern Bangladesh

Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of dwellers could be categorized as ultra-poor due to cyclic floods. We randomly offered four types of loans to such dwellers: regular small cash loans with one-year maturity, large cash loans with three-year maturity both with and without a one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock loans with three-year maturity and a one-year grace period. We compared uptake rates as well as the determinants of uptake and found that the uptake rate is the lowest for the regular contract, followed by the in-kind contract. Contrary to prior belief, we also found that the microcredit demand by the ultra-poor is not necessarily small, and in particular the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join a microcredit program than the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to a large amount of credit, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind. This paper provides evidence that a typical microcredit contract with one-year maturity and without a grace period is not attractive to the ultra-poor. Microfinance institutions may need to design better credit contracts to address the poor's needs.

Capital structure, risk and asymmetric information : theory and evidence

This paper proposes a principal-agent model between banks and firms with risk and asymmetric information. A mixed form of finance to firms is assumed. The capital structure of firms is a relevant cause for the final aggregate level of investment in the economy. In the model analyzed, there may be a separating equilibrium, which is not economically efficient, because aggregate investments fall short of the first-best level. Based on European firm-level data, an empirical model is presented which validates the result of the relevance of the capital structure of firms. The relative magnitude of equity in the capital structure makes a real difference to the profits obtained by firms in the economy.

O incumprimento do contrato de crédito ao consumo pelo consumidor

Consumer relations, established between the Consumer and the Creditor, which carry a consequent inequality of contractual positioning between the parties, have been pushing the legislator to adopt more rigid regulations with regard to lending for the purchase of goods or services of consum issues. In this sense, the Decree-Law 359/91 was approved, meanwhile repealed by the Decree-Law 133/2009, which regulates the consumer credit agreement’s regime in the portuguese legal system. Through this contract, the financier makes available to the consumer a certain amount of money, which the consumer must repay, plus the respective remuneration (interest) and other charges, according to a refund plan agreed by the parties. The consumer will be in delay if he breaches this stipulation. In case of default, the creditor, notwithstanding, can choose to wait for the performance by the debtor, promote the loss of benefit of the term or the termination of the contract. From the outset it would seem that, in one way or another, the financier, by imposing a forced shortening of the contract duration initially agreed, will lose the right to remuneration for the provision of capital agreed, but not verified. Nevertheless, unlike presently, the previous regime allowed the parties to rule otherwise, being permitted to agree to the payment of interest of outstanding installments. On the other hand, in the consumer credit contract the principle of freedom of contractual provision of the parties is strongly mitigated by the special legislation, which prevents the waiver of rights by the consumer, and by the regime of general contractual terms, which restricts the freedom of the financier to stipulate the contractual content freely and the freedom of the consumer to negotiate. For all these reasons, associated with the growing need of credit resource to satisfy their needs of consumption, it is confirm the relevance of legislative intervention on consumers protection in the context of hiring credit.

O incumprimento do contrato de crédito ao consumo pelo consumidor

Consumer relations, established between the Consumer and the Creditor, which carry a consequent inequality of contractual positioning between the parties, have been pushing the legislator to adopt more rigid regulations with regard to lending for the purchase of goods or services of consum issues. In this sense, the Decree-Law 359/91 was approved, meanwhile repealed by the Decree-Law 133/2009, which regulates the consumer credit agreement’s regime in the portuguese legal system. Through this contract, the financier makes available to the consumer a certain amount of money, which the consumer must repay, plus the respective remuneration (interest) and other charges, according to a refund plan agreed by the parties. The consumer will be in delay if he breaches this stipulation. In case of default, the creditor, notwithstanding, can choose to wait for the performance by the debtor, promote the loss of benefit of the term or the termination of the contract. From the outset it would seem that, in one way or another, the financier, by imposing a forced shortening of the contract duration initially agreed, will lose the right to remuneration for the provision of capital agreed, but not verified. Nevertheless, unlike presently, the previous regime allowed the parties to rule otherwise, being permitted to agree to the payment of interest of outstanding installments. On the other hand, in the consumer credit contract the principle of freedom of contractual provision of the parties is strongly mitigated by the special legislation, which prevents the waiver of rights by the consumer, and by the regime of general contractual terms, which restricts the freedom of the financier to stipulate the contractual content freely and the freedom of the consumer to negotiate. For all these reasons, associated with the growing need of credit resource to satisfy their needs of consumption, it is confirm the relevance of legislative intervention on consumers protection in the context of hiring credit.

A cadeia produtiva de alimentos orgânicos no vale do rio Cuiabá

Dissertação de mestrado em Estudos de Gestão

A invalidade na coligação de contratos de crédito e venda para consumo

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

Construction management contracts: law and practice

The context of construction management (CM) reveals that this method of procurement is as much a management philosophy as a contract structure. It is important to consider legal and contractual issues in this context. The interplay between management and law is complex and often misunderstood. Before considering specific issues, the use of contractual remedies in business agreements is discussed. In addition, the extent to which standardising a form of contract detracts or contributes to the success of projects is also considered. The dearth of judicial decisions, and the lack of a standard form, render it difficult to be specific about legal issues. Therefore, the main discussion of legal issues is centred around a recently completed research project which involved eliciting the views of a cross-section of experienced construction management clients, consultants and trade contractors. These interviews are used as the basis for highlighting some of the most important legal points to consider when setting up CM projects. The interviews revealed that the advantage of CM is the proximity of the client to the trade contractors and the disadvantage is that it depends on a high degree of professionalism and experience; qualities which are unfortunately difficult to find in the UK construction industry.

Labour costs and competitiveness in the Latin American manufacturing sector, 1990-1998

Includes bibliography

Trade Credits under Imperfect Enforcement: A Theory with a Test on Chinese Experience

It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based on original surveys conducted in P.R. of China. Our theory predicts that trade volume and trade credit are increasing function of cash held by the buyer and enforcement technology of the seller. Furthermore, if the state sector’s enforcement technology is high, it has positive external effect to expand the volumes of trade credit and trades in the whole economy. From the data, we found that government made active commitment in enforcement of trade credit contract and the government owned firms are main supplier and receivers of trade credit, which suggest that enforcement by government and state sector were effective against presumptions in the previous literatures.

In Memory of Dr. Ali Al-Gritly (1913-1982): His Views on Egypt's experience with Socialism

This essay reexamines the great contributions made by Dr. Ali Al-Gritly to Egypt. He was the finance minister for a short period at the beginning of the 1950s and later was appointed as chairman of the Bank of Alexandria. In 1966, he completed a book (Al-Gritly [1966 (1974)]) on the economic history of Egypt. However, the book was banned from publication due to irresistible circumstances. At that time, with Arab Socialism on the ascendance, his views on certain policies were not welcomed by the top political hierarchy. In 1974, the book was finally allowed to be published, and he wrote and published another book in 1977 (Al-Gritly [1977]) on the development of the Open Door Policy and the new economic policies accompanying it.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet (II). The evolution of its structure

This article has an immediate predecessor, upon which it is based and with which readers must necessarily be familiar: Towards a Theory of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (Vallverdú, Somoza and Moya, 2006). The Balance Sheet is conceptualised on the basis of the duality of a credit-based transaction; it deals with its theoretical foundations, providing evidence of a causal credit-risk duality, that is, a true causal relationship; its characteristics, properties and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed. This article, which provides a logical continuation to the previous one, studies the evolution of the structure of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet as a consequence of a business¿s dynamics in the credit area. Given the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet of a company at any given time, it attempts to estimate, by means of sequential analysis, its structural evolution, showing its usefulness in the management and control of credit and risk. To do this, it bases itself, with the necessary adaptations, on the by-now classic works of Palomba and Cutolo. The establishment of the corresponding transformation matrices allows one to move from an initial balance sheet structure to a final, future one, to understand its credit-risk situation trends, as well as to make possible its monitoring and control, basic elements in providing support for risk management.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet (II). The evolution of its structure

This article has an immediate predecessor, upon which it is based and with which readers must necessarily be familiar: Towards a Theory of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (Vallverdú, Somoza and Moya, 2006). The Balance Sheet is conceptualised on the basis of the duality of a credit-based transaction; it deals with its theoretical foundations, providing evidence of a causal credit-risk duality, that is, a true causal relationship; its characteristics, properties and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed. This article, which provides a logical continuation to the previous one, studies the evolution of the structure of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet as a consequence of a business¿s dynamics in the credit area. Given the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet of a company at any given time, it attempts to estimate, by means of sequential analysis, its structural evolution, showing its usefulness in the management and control of credit and risk. To do this, it bases itself, with the necessary adaptations, on the by-now classic works of Palomba and Cutolo. The establishment of the corresponding transformation matrices allows one to move from an initial balance sheet structure to a final, future one, to understand its credit-risk situation trends, as well as to make possible its monitoring and control, basic elements in providing support for risk management.