The relationship between counterfactual thinking and emotional reactions to event outcomes: Does one account fit all?

By enabling a comparison between what is and what might have been, counterfactual thoughts amplify our emotional responses to bad outcomes. Well-known demonstrations such as the action effect (the tendency to attribute most regret to a character whose actions brought about a bad outcome) and the temporal order effect (the tendency to undo the last in a series of events leading up to a bad outcome) are often explained in this way. An important difference between these effects is that outcomes are due to decisions in the action effect, whereas in the temporal order effect outcomes are achieved by chance. In Experiment 1, we showed that imposing time pressure leads to a significant reduction in the action but not in the temporal order effect. In Experiment 2, we found that asking participants to evaluate the protagonists (

The role of relevant information in functional counterfactual thinking

Although counterfactual thinking is typically activated by a negative outcome, it can have positive effects by helping to regulate and improve future behavior. Known as the content-specific pathway, these counterfactual ruminations use relevant information (i.e., information that is directly related to the problem at hand) to elicit insights about the problem, create a connection between the counterfactual and the desired behavior, and strengthen relevant behavioral intentions. The current research examines how changing the type of relevant information provided (i.e., so that it is either concrete and detailed or general and abstract) influences the relationship between counterfactual thinking and behavioral intentions. Experiments 1 and 2 found that counterfactual thinking facilitated relevant intentions when these statements involved detailed information (Experiment 1) or specific behaviors (Experiment 2) compared to general information (Experiment 1), categories of behavior, or traits (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 found that counterfactuals containing a category of behavior facilitated specific behavioral intentions, relative to counterfactuals focusing on a trait. However, counterfactuals only facilitated intentions that included specific behaviors, but not when intentions focused on categories of behaviors or traits (Experiment 4). Finally, this effect generalized to other relevant specific behaviors; a counterfactual based on one relevant specific behavior facilitated an intention based on another relevant specific behavior (Experiment 5). Together, these studies further clarify our understanding of the content-specific pathway and provide a more comprehensive understanding of functional counterfactual thinking.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Entrepreneurial intention and entrepreneurial behaviour:a social psychological perspective

Increasing the supply of entrepreneurs reduces unemployment and accelerates economic growth (Acs, 2006; Audretsch, 2007; Santarelli et el. 2009; Campbell, 1996; Carree & Thurik, 1996). The supply of entrepreneurs depends on the entrepreneurial intention and activity of the people (Kruger & Brazeal, 1994). Existing behavioural theories explain that entrepreneurial activity is an attitude driven process which is mediated by intention and regulated by behavioural control. These theories are: Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; 2002, 2012); Entrepreneurial Event Model (Shapiro & Shokol, 1982), and Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1977; 1986; 2012). Meta-analysis of existing behavioural theories in different fields found that the theories are more effective to analyse behavioural intention and habitual behaviour, but less effective to analyse long-term and risky behaviour (McEachan et al., 2011). The objective of this dissertation is to improve entrepreneurship behaviour theory to advance our understanding of the determinants of the entrepreneurial intention and activity. To achieve this objective we asked three compelling questions in our research. These are: Firstly, why do differences exist in entrepreneurship among age groups. Secondly, how can we improve the theory to analyse entrepreneurial intention and behaviour? And, thirdly, is there any relationship between counterfactual or regretful thinking and entrepreneurial intention? We address these three questions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the dissertation. Earlier studies have identified that there is an inverse U shaped relationship between age and entrepreneurship (Parker, 2004; Hart et al., 2004). In our study, we explain the reasons for this inverse U shape (Chapter 2). To analyse the reasons we use Cognitive Life Cycle theory and Disuse theory. We assume that the stage in the life cycle of an individual moderates the influence of opportunity identification and skill to start a business. In our study, we analyse the moderation effect in early stage entrepreneurship and in serial entrepreneurship. In Chapter 3, the limitations of existing psychological theories are discussed, and a competency value theory of entrepreneurship (CVTE) is proposed to overcome the limitations and extend existing theories. We use a ‘weighted competency’ variable instead of a ‘perceived behavioural control’ variable for the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) and self-efficacy variable for social cognitive theory. Weighted competency is the perceived competency ranking assigned by an individual for his total competencies to be an entrepreneur. The proposed theory was tested in a pilot survey in the UK and in a national adult population survey in a South Asian Country. The results show a significant relationship between competencies and entrepreneurial intention, and weighted competencies and entrepreneurial behaviour as per CVTE. To improve the theory further, in Chapter 4, we test the relationship between counterfactual thinking and entrepreneurial intention. Studies in cognitive psychology identify that ‘upward counterfactual thinking’ influences intention and behaviour (Epstude & Rose, 2008; Smallman & Roese, 2009). Upward counterfactual thinking is regretful thinking for missed opportunities of a problem. This study addresses the question of how an individual’s regretful thinking affects his or her future entrepreneurial career intention. To do so, we conducted a study among students in a business school in the UK, and we found that counterfactual thinking modifies the influence of attitude and opportunity identification in entrepreneurial career intention.

Examining moderators of the hindsight bias in the context of civil legal decision -making: Counterfactuals, causal proximity, and self -referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. ^ In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. ^ Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.^

Examining Moderators of the Hindsight Bias in the Context of Civil Legal Decision-Making: Counterfactuals, Causal Proximity, and Self-Referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.