Processos adaptativos do tecido muscular esqueletico e tecido conjuntivo : repercussões sobre a flexibilidade

Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Controllability of control systems on complex simple lie groups and the topology of flag manifolds

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Multiseries Lie groups and asymptotic modules for characterizing and solving integrable models

A multiseries integrable model (MSIM) is defined as a family of compatible flows on an infinite-dimensional Lie group of N-tuples of formal series around N given poles on the Riemann sphere. Broad classes of solutions to a MSIM are characterized through modules over rings of rational functions, called asymptotic modules. Possible ways for constructing asymptotic modules are Riemann-Hilbert and ∂̄ problems. When MSIM's are written in terms of the group coordinates, some of them can be contracted into standard integrable models involving a small number of scalar functions only. Simple contractible MSIM's corresponding to one pole, yield the Ablowitz-Kaup-Newell-Segur (AKNS) hierarchy. Two-pole contractible MSIM's are exhibited, which lead to a hierarchy of solvable systems of nonlinear differential equations consisting of (2 + 1) -dimensional evolution equations and of quite strong differential constraints. © 1989 American Institute of Physics.

An Oka principle for equivariant isomorphisms

Let G be a reductive complex Lie group acting holomorphically on normal Stein spaces X and Y, which are locally G-biholomorphic over a common categorical quotient Q. When is there a global G-biholomorphism X → Y? If the actions of G on X and Y are what we, with justification, call generic, we prove that the obstruction to solving this local-to-global problem is topological and provide sufficient conditions for it to vanish. Our main tool is the equivariant version of Grauert's Oka principle due to Heinzner and Kutzschebauch. We prove that X and Y are G-biholomorphic if X is K-contractible, where K is a maximal compact subgroup of G, or if X and Y are smooth and there is a G-diffeomorphism ψ : X → Y over Q, which is holomorphic when restricted to each fibre of the quotient map X → Q. We prove a similar theorem when ψ is only a G-homeomorphism, but with an assumption about its action on G-finite functions. When G is abelian, we obtain stronger theorems. Our results can be interpreted as instances of the Oka principle for sections of the sheaf of G-biholomorphisms from X to Y over Q. This sheaf can be badly singular, even for a low-dimensional representation of SL2(ℂ). Our work is in part motivated by the linearisation problem for actions on ℂn. It follows from one of our main results that a holomorphic G-action on ℂn, which is locally G-biholomorphic over a common quotient to a generic linear action, is linearisable.

Formal group laws and hypergraph colorings

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Incentives and standards in agency contracts

This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multitasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multitasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multitasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are risk substitutes and are socially undesirable, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a risk-complementary role.

Rétractes Absolus de Voisinage Algébriques

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 54C55, 54H25, 55M20.

On the Optimal Allocations in Economy with Fixed Total Resources

Здравко Д. Славов - В тази статия се разглежда математически модел на икономика с фиксирани общи ресурси, както и краен брой агенти и блага. Обсъжда се ролята на някои предположения за отношенията на предпочитание на икономическите агенти, които влияят на характеристиките на оптимално разпределените дялове. Доказва се, че множеството на оптимално разпределените дялове е свиваемо и притежава свойството на неподвижната точка.