977 resultados para Constitutional Court Portuguese Decisions
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Veja-se aliás a recente indagação formal da Procuradoria-Geral da República junto do Governo para colocar, se necessário for, em Tribunal, todos os contratos futuros swap. A maior parte dos quais com fortes prejuízos para o Estado português. Vide art.s 227º, 334º, 437º, 762º, entre outros, do Código Civil português. Abstract: See moreover the recent formal inquiry of the Attorney General's Office with the Government to place, if necessary, in court, all future swaps. Most of them with heavy losses to the Portuguese State. See art.s 227, 334, 437, 762º, among others, the Portuguese Civil Code.
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1 – Summary of the decision taken by the Portuguese Constitutional Court, of January 13, 2011; 2 – Complete text of the decision of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, of January 13, 2011, Judge Maria João ANTUNES (Reporter), Judge Carlos Pamplona de OLIVEIRA, Judge José Borges SOEIRO, Judge Gil GALVÃO, Judge Rui Manuel Moura RAMOS (President) –in terms of the tribunalconstitucional.pt, August 1, 2011; 3 – Brief annotation to the problem of the “medical act”; 3.1 – Plus some conclusions on the brief annotation to the problem of the “medical act”; 3.2 – Brief annotation to the problem of “consent”– continuation of the previous comments; 4 – Conclusions. It must never be forgotten that “consent” does not stand as the only cause of exclusion of unlawfulness.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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The quality and the sustainability of the democratic institutions established in post-independence Kosovo under the guidance of the international community depend to a large extent on the performance of its constitutional court. The considerable international investment in that court reflects this assessment. One of the reasons why Kosovo’s international supervision has recently been terminated is that such court has been deemed to be functioning well. But its performance has not yet adequately been scrutinized. This essay reviews its most significant judgments, including decisions that deposed a president, annulled a presidential election, prevented a general election, and abolished the inviolability of parliament. The analysis of the reasons and effects of such rulings leads to the conclusion that the court gravely lacks independence and is subject to heavy political interference, which also the international judges do not seem immune from. The performance of the court is both a manifestation and a cause of Kosovo’s acute governance problems, which its international supervision has failed to remedy. The international community’s approach towards the court is also an illustration of the reasons why statebuilding in Kosovo led to unsatisfactory results, despite unprecedented investment.
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"Appendix. Note A. On the subject of nudum pactum, in connexion with the Statute of frauds ... " v. 3, p. [569]-595.
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The role of Constitutional Courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial independence and impartiality. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court’s decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a judge serves on the Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.
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[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3
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No abstract.
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Includes cases from 1823-1824.
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The minimum vital of drinking water for vulnerable people isprotected by the Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence,locally and nationally. The Constitutional Court has created asolid jurisprudential line on the right to water in relation to thesuspension of water supply service for the customer’s failure topay for the service; this Court has also defined the conditionsnecessary for the companies to refrain from suspending serviceand the minimum amount necessary for survival. Compliance withthese sentences has been limited to the orders pronounced to thebenefit of the company that provides such service, including theexecution of payment agreements for accessing the water supply.The implementation of the free minimum vital of drinking water inColombia has been defined through targeting and requirements thatare set only to benefit market laws, such as payment agreements,except for Bogota that, from the point of view of human rights,has proposed the respect for the minimum vital of drinking waterfor all social strata.
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Brazil since its first republican constitution has adopted systems of laws control. The review activity was given to three state powers or functions state, Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. However, it appears that in the country along the constitutional history, has stood considerably the jurisdictional control of the most important control. Initially, back in 1891, Brazil adopted the jurisdictional control of diffuse from U.S, whose role in monitoring of standards is delivered to all organs of the judiciary, which may face a case, put on trial, ascertain whether or not the possibility of applying a law, removing its impact in case of unconstitutionality. In 1969, entered in the second legal model of judicial review, the concentrated control of constitutionality, whose inspiration comes from the positivist theory of Hans Kelsen, and was adopted by the Austrian Constitution of 1920. According to the abstract control the supervision of law is given to a Court or Constitutional Court, responsible for the analysis of the legal constitutionality independent of its application to a specific case. In Brazil the role of concentrated control was handed over exclusively to the Supreme Court, which serves as the Constitutional Court, which accumulates that function with other constitutionally provided jurisdiction. Throughout this period, from 1891 until today, Brazil has maintained a dual system of judicial control of legal constitutionality, where they coexist and harmonize the diffuse control exercised by any organ of the Judiciary, and concentrated control of competence the Supreme Court. However, one must recognize that with the advent of the Federal Constitution of 1988, the concentrated control has emerged on the national stage due to two important factors: the expansion of the legal capacity to sue and the inclusion of other ways control, besides the already known Direct Claim of Unconstitutionality. This concentrated control and projection of the Supreme Court s attempt to become a true constitutional court, led to a relative weakening of diffuse control even when performed by the Brazilian Constitutional Court. In order to become a true constitutional court, all decisions handed down by the Supreme in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction should have the same weight and the same measure, or at least bring improvement to similar effects, once is the responsible for the final word when it comes to constitutional interpretation. Thus, the writs of certiorari and stare decisis were responsible for profound changes in the diffuse control, allowing the Supreme Court can strengthen its decisions even in the diffuse control. These two institutions have substantially changed the legal status of diffuse control, allowing an extension of the effects of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court, so that you can no longer be said that the effects of this control to restrict the disputing parties in the process