Banking crisis yet again and how to fix it. CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2016

Almost out of the blue, a combination of diverse factors has elicited a run on bank stocks and junior and senior debt, raising the spectre of a renewed systemic bank crisis within the European Union. The policy response cannot come from the European Central Bank but, instead, must consist of regulatory responses capable of dispelling the uncertainty over future prudential capital requirements while also temporarily suspending the rules on state aid cum bail-in that had ignited the crisis.

Bank-firm relationships and financial crisis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Banking crises: The impact of financial liberalization

This paper intends to study whether financial liberalization tends to increase the likelihood of systemic banking crises. I used a sample of 79 countries with data spanning from 1973 to 2005 to run a panel probit model. I found that, if anything, financial liberalization as measured across seven different dimensions tends to decrease the probability of occurrence of a systemic banking crisis. I went further and did several robustness tests – used a conditional probit model, tested for different durations of liberalization impact and reduced the sample by considering only the first crisis event for each country. Main results still verified, proving the results’ robustness.

Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 crisis

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the Europeaninterbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find thatbanks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease theircredit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger forfirms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannotcompensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, theimpact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks.Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higherhoarding of liquidity.

Relationship and transaction lending in a crisis

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending varyover the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationshipbanks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them toprovide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the servicesthey provide, operating costs of relationship-banks are higher thanthose of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-bankscompete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, butoffer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transactionbanks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit registerinformation for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers'default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banksresponded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationshipbanking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of themodel that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response tothe crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking.

Iceland's meltdown: the rise and fall of international banking in the North Atlantic

This paper shows how rapid privatization and liberalization of Iceland's small local banks around 2000, combined with well-developed crony relations among the elite, enabled a small group of financiers to leverage government-guaranteed deposits into a vast wave of mergers and acquisitions abroad, and redistribute enough of the profits back home to make the economy boom. Negative policy feedback loops were systematically undermined. The incoming left-wing government, with IMF support, has managed to protect the bulk of the population from the worst of the effects.

El papel de los principios en las fallas de los regímenes internacionales: el Fondo Monetario Internacional en la crisis económica argentina de 2001

Este trabajo de grado busca analizar el papel que juegan los principios en las fallas del Régimen Internacional de Pagos a la hora de responder a situaciones de crisis, específicamente, en la actuación del Fondo Monetario Internacional durante la crisis económica argentina de 2001. El Régimen, atado al cumplimiento de sus principios, actuó de manera tal que produjo unas fallas que terminaron exacerbando la crisis. Mediante el análisis de fuentes primarias y secundarias, y con métodos tanto cualitativos como cuantitativos se busca demostrar que efectivamente, los principios en los que se fundamentan las actuaciones de los regímenes, que son creencias, tienden a tornarse dogmáticos, por lo tanto, se hacen resistentes al cambio y no permiten a las instituciones obrar de manera que se ajuste a la realidad. Es así que los principios llegan agravar las crisis que debían solucionar, tal y como sucedió en Argentina en 2001.

Banking Union in three steps. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.

Does monetary policy stabilize the exchange rate following a currency crisis?

This paper provides evidence on the relationship between rnonetary policy and the exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises. It ana1yzes a large data set of currency crises in 80 countries in the period 1980 to 1998. The rnain question addressed is: can rnonetary policy significantly alter the probability of reversing the post-crisis undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than higher int1ation? We find that tight rnonetary policy facilitates the reversal of currency undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than inflation. When the econorny is also facing a banking crisis, depending on the specification, tight rnonetary policy rnay not have the same effect.

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking

This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

The new bail-in doctrine: A recipe for banking crises and depression in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary

This Commentary argues that the failure to recognise shared responsibility for the banking crisis in Cyprus has led to the imposition of a bail-in template that increases the risk of banking crises and economic depression in the eurozone.

The sovereign debt crisis that isn't: Or, How to turn a lending crisis into a spending crisis and pocket the spread. ACES Cases No. 2014.1

It’s a testament to the power of ideas in politics that the ongoing policy disaster in Europe is still referred to, by academic as well as popular commentators, as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. That there was a crisis in European sovereign debt markets in 2010 through the middle of 2012 is not in doubt. That is was a crisis of European sovereign debt markets generated by ‘too much spending’ should be very much in doubt. The ongoing European economic crisis is in fact a transmuted private sector banking crisis first exacerbated and then calmed by central bank policy, the costs of which have been asymmetrically distributed across European mass publics.

Banks and the political economy of the sovereign debt crisis in Italy and Spain. CES Papers - Open Forum #18, 2013-2014

This paper sets out to explain why Spain experienced a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis and had to resort to euroarea financial assistance for its banks, whereas Italy did not. It undertakes a structured comparison, dissecting the sovereign debt crisis into a banking crisis and a balance of payments crisis. It argues that the distinctive features of bank business models and of national banking systems in Italy and Spain have considerable analytical leverage in explaining the different scenarios of the crises in each country. This ‘bank-based’ analysis contributes to the flourishing literature that examines changes in banking with a view to account for the differentiated impact of the global banking crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis in the euroarea later.

Banks and sovereigns: An econometric analysis of an entangled relationship

In this discussion OLS regressions are used to study the factors that influence sovereign yield spreads and domestic bank indeces for a set of euro area countries. The results show that common factors explain changes in bank indeces better than in the yields. Moreover, although there is some country differentiation, a common pattern among all is visible. A contemporary spillover effect between banks and sovereigns emerged after bank bailouts and became stronger with the burst of the sovereign debt crisis. The vicious cycle between the two has contributed to the escalation of spreads and to painful austerity measures.

Cross sectional default probabilities in european corporate bonds

This study attempts to identify basis-trading opportunities in the European banking sector by comparing two different measures for the market’s assessment of risk: market-observed CDS spreads and model-implied Z-spreads. Using a sample of 10 banks, over a period of 3 years following the European banking crisis, it can be concluded that there were arbitrage opportunities in the sector, as evidenced by the derived negative bases.