Essays on competition and returns of inside money

In an early paper, Cavalcanti and Wallace (2001) showed, using a computable version of Cavalcanti-Wallace model (CW-1999), that optimal regulation induces banks to pay interests, instead of contracting the money supply in an inside money allocation. Here, we generalize CW in two fashions, assuming inside money allocations, so that banks are supposed to issue money as they find a potential producer wishing to produce. The first generalization allows for seasonality due to real shocks on preferences with persistence and for monetary policy improvement. We found an asymmetric path for interest rates when constraints matter, even when shocks are independent. The second generalization allows for bank competition, in the sense that banks can choose between two different banking nets. We proof the existence of simple stable and unstable equilibria and also verify the existence of multiple equilibria.

A model of competition and interbank network formation

This work aims to understand the interaction between competition and network formation in the banking market. Combining Matutes and Padilla (1994) and Matutes and Vives (2000), we build a model of imperfect bank competition for deposits in which an interbank relationship network is a key strategic decision: it affects banks’ profit and risk position. The competition level exerts influence in the banking network structure since it affects the network outcomes. As result, we have that different competition levels imply different network topologies. Specifically, greater competition imply denser networks. Finally, when we allow for the possibility of collusion, the denser network can come out in the least competitive environment.

Bank efficiency in Brazil: the importance for economic sustainability

Studies on efficiency achieved greater relevance in organisations within an open market framework, which in Brazil began around 1990. The objective of this paper, applying the data envelopment analysis methodology, is to analyse the efficiency of banks operating in the country using the database termed 'the biggest banks', periodically divulged by the Central Bank of Brazil in 2010-2012. The methodology was applied to the 26 largest banking organisations via two approaches, one was financial intermediation and the other was results. In the financial intermediation approach, the efficiency increase was the highest among banks specialised in credit from 2010 to 2012. Retail banks, especially the large ones, felt most intensely the reaction of 2011, a year considered as the sector's low performance year. In the results approach, the efficiency increase was higher among retail banks. Factors such as retractions in the SELIC rate and bank spreads impacted all banks, regardless of the segment.

The relationship between banking market competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter?

This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking "stability inefficiency" derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

BYGUM – a new tool for BarnYard Grass Understanding and Management

Weed management has become increasingly challenging for cotton growers in Australia in the last decade. Glyphosate, the cornerstone of weed management in the industry, is waning in effectiveness as a result of the evolution of resistance in several species. One of these, awnless barnyard grass, is very common in Australian cotton fields, and is a prime example of the new difficulties facing growers in choosing effective and affordable management strategies. RIM (Ryegrass Integrated Management) is a computer-based decision support tool developed for the south-western Australian grains industry. It is commonly used there as a tool for grower engagement in weed management thinking and strategy development. We used RIM as the basis for a new tool that can fulfil the same types of functions for subtropical Australian cotton-grains farming systems. The new tool, BYGUM, provides growers with a robust means to evaluate five-year rotations including testing the economic value of fallows and fallow weed management, winter and summer cropping, cover crops, tillage, different herbicide options, herbicide resistance management, and more. The new model includes several northernregion- specific enhancements: winter and summer fallows, subtropical crop choices, barnyard grass seed bank, competition, and ecology parameters, and more freedom in weed control applications. We anticipate that BYGUM will become a key tool for teaching and driving the changes that will be needed to maintain sound weed management in cotton in the near future.

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Banif Bank: Value creation in the Maltese market

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Improving Millennium Bank's personal finance manager

Double Degree

On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

Bank Income Diversification and its Impact on Profitability and Risk: Evidence from Nordic Markets

Financial industry has recently encountered many changes in the business environment. Increased regulation together with growing competition is forcing commercial banks to rethink their business models. In order to maintain profitability in the new environment, banks are focusing more into activities that yield noninterest income. This is a shift away from the traditional intermediation function of banks. This study aims to answer the question if the shift from traditional income yielding activities to more innovative noninterest activities is logical in terms of profitability and risk in Nordics. This study also aims to answer the question if diversification within the noninterest income categories has impact on profitability and risk and if there are certain categories of noninterest income that are better than others in terms of profitability and risk in Nordics. Results show that diversification between interest and noninterest activities and increase in the share of noninterest income have a negative impact on the risk adjusted returns and risk profile. Results also show that further diversification within the noninterest income categories has negative impact on risk adjusted profitability and risk while an increase of the share of commission and fee income category of total noninterest income has a positive impact on risk adjusted profitability and risk. Results are logical and in line with previous research (De Young & Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004). Results provide useful information to banks and help them better evaluate outcomes of different income diversification strategies.

Media bias and central bank response. Evidence from the nominal exchange rate behavior in Colombia

Since 1991 Colombia has had a market-determined Peso - US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate (NER), after more than 20 years of controlled and multiple exchange rates. The behavior (revaluation / devaluation) of the NER is constantly reported in news, editorials and op-eds of major newspapers of the nation with particular attention to revaluation. The uneven reporting of revaluation episodes can be explained by the existence of an interest group particulary affected by revaluation, looking to increase awareness and sympathy for help from public institutions. Using the number of news and op-eds from a major Colombian newspaper, it is shown that there is an over-reporting of revaluation episodes in contrast to devaluation ones. Secondly, using text analysis upon the content of the news, it is also shown that the words devaluation and revaluation are far apart in the distribution of words within the news; and revaluation is highly correlated with words related to: public institutions, exporters and the need of assistance. Finally it is also shown that the probability of the central bank buying US dollars to lessen revaluation effects increases with the number of news; even though the central bank allegedly intervenes in the exchange rate market only to tame volatility or accumulate international reserves.

Money with Bank Networks

Rio de Janeiro

Assessing competition in banking industry: a multiproduct approach

This paper aims to investigate the competition aspects of banking multiproduct operation. Based on an extension of Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s test to the case of a multiproduct banking firm, we take advantage of a new dataset constructed to Brazilian banking conglomerates to infer the impact of conglomeration on market power. We find that banks offering classic (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other bank products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than the ones which offer only classic products. Results suggest a positive bias on the traditional estimates of competition in which the multioutput actions are not taken into account.

Assessing competition in the banking industry: a multi-product approach

This paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi-product banking operations. Extending Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s model to the case of a multi-product banking firm, we show that the higher the economies of scope in multi-product banking are, the lower Panzar-Rosse’s measure of competition in the banking sector is. To test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi-production/conglomeration on market power, we use a new dataset on Brazilian banking conglomerates. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that banks offering classic banking products (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other banking products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi-output actions are not considered.