The rocky road ahead to peace : the Arab Uprisings and the conflict in Libya

Peer reviewed

Road to Proscription: The EU and Hezbollah since the Arab Spring. EU Diplomacy Paper 07/2013

The European Union (EU) has traditionally taken a rather nuanced view of the activities of Hezbollah. Despite historic links to violent activity, Europe always remained reluctant to place the Lebanese militant group on its list of terrorist organisations. Internal divergences among member states, as well as the strategic-realist goals of the EU in both Lebanon and the Middle East more generally meant that such a listing never materialised. This remained the case even in the initial turmoil following the Arab uprisings, when Hezbollah’s relatively moderating objectives were viewed as a force for stability. However, the EU shifted policy in July 2013 by listing the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist entity. This paper will investigate the reasons behind this decision, as well as the likely implications and effectiveness of the new policy. Two principal catalysts were behind the decision. The first was a Hezbollah-linked bombing in Bulgaria which provided the focal point around which a consensus of the EU member states could emerge in the Council. Secondly, the escalation both of the Syrian conflict and Hezbollah’s role in it provided a more political and strategic impetus for the decision. This paper maintains that although a change in policy was somewhat necessary, it is questionable whether the artificial separation of Hezbollah’s political and military wings and the symbolic proscription of the latter is the most propitious choice to achieve European objectives.

Social media and political change: The case of the 2011 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt

Throughout the past decade, social media have come on the scene of various popular revolts. Their role as tools of information and coordination of social movements, from the Iranian Green Movement in 2009 to the Arab uprisings in 2011, has been widely debated. In most cases, online activism through blogs, Facebook, Twitter or other forms of social media has allowed citizens to be part of a social networking exercise and to engage in a public sphere that would have otherwise been unreachable to them due to severe repression. In Tunisia and Egypt, social media helped protests start and expand thanks to their ability to coordinate and disseminate information quickly. The new information and communication tools were an influential factor in accelerating the revolutionary processes across the Arab world, albeit they cannot be seen as neither the spur nor the drivers of any revolution.

Análisis de la incidencia de las redes sociales en la construcción de un movimiento. La Ola Verde en las elecciones presidenciales de 2010

Esta monografía pretende revisar la incidencia de las redes sociales, tanto tradicionales como virtuales, en el proceso de construcción del movimiento "la Ola Verde" en las elecciones presidenciales de 2010. Este movimiento se constituyó en un fenómeno político y social efímero que en pocos meses logró competir contra maquinarias políticas ya consolidadas pero que no logró la victoria electoral anhelada. Este trabajo de grado está estructurado en tres secciones las cuales nacieron a partir de una caracterización de tres etapas que atravesó la Ola Verde, estos son: la génesis, el crecimiento y el declive del movimiento. De igual manera, la presente monografía analiza el rol de las emociones en las redes sociales tradicionales y en las redes sociales virtuales (Facebook y Twitter).

New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry

The competing powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to redress and reverse the strategic imbalance and direction of the Middle East’s regional politics. The 1979 Iranian Revolution catapulted these two states into an embittered rivalry. The fall of Saddam Hussein following the 2003 U.S. led invasion, the establishment of a Shi’ite Iraq and the 2011 Arab Uprisings have further inflamed tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not confronted each other militarily, but rather have divided the region into two armed camps on the basis of political and religious ideology in seeking regional allies and promulgating sectarianism as they continue to exploit the region’s weak states in a series of proxy wars ranging from conflicts in Iraq to Lebanon. The Saudi-Iranian strategic and geopolitical rivalry is further complicated by a religious and ideological rivalry, as tensions represent two opposing aspirations for Islamic leadership with two vastly differing political systems. The conflict is between Saudi Arabia, representing Sunni Islam via Wahhabism, and Iran, representing Shi’ite Islam through Khomeinism. The nature of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has led many Middle East experts to identify their rivalry as a “New Middle East Cold War.” The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has important implications for regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the question: Is a cold war framework applicable when analyzing the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship?

Policy Lessons for Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. CEPS Policy Brief No. 308, 13 December 2013

This Policy Brief attempts to draw lessons from the combination of the global financial crisis and the Arab uprisings focusing on the domains related to fiscal, monetary and financial policies. It does so by answering the following questions: What has been the impact of the crisis and the uprisings on the fiscal, monetary and financial policies of the SEMCs? What have been the crisis management actions? And what policy lessons can be drawn for crisis management in the future? And how can the EU contribute to this within the Euro-Med Partnership?

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

Scenarios Assessment and Transitions towards a Sustainable Euro-Mediterranean in 2030. MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 9, July 2013

In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, the region has reached a turning point in its history, presenting as many opportunities as challenges. The European Union itself is facing challenging conditions following the financial and economic crises that have hit its periphery. This MEDPRO Policy Paper examines and assesses various possible scenarios that could play out in EU-Mediterranean relations over the next two decades and offers recommendations towards long-term sustainable socio-economic development in the region.

Report on democracy assistance from the European Union to the Middle East and North Africa. EUSpring Report, 18 May 2016

Since the Arab uprisings of 2011, European Union (EU) assistance has nominally targeted more resources to supporting democracy movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The EU has better equipped itself institutionally, financially and conceptually, by strengthening its bottom up grassroots approach to democracy support; resources earmarked for supporting civil society have been increased, the budget for the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has been beefed up, and the strengthened EU Delegations have be come more empowered to reach out to groups at the local grass roots level behind democracy activities; The European Endowment for Democracy (EED) was created with the mandate to support individuals and organizations in neighbouring countries that work for democracy. Whether this translates into a more effective strategy for democracy support, however, remains to be seen. In this report, Rosa Balfour, Francesca Fabbri and Richard Youngs present a detailed overview of the support given to civil society in the MENA region by the EU, with a special focus on the various financial instruments used.

National, Regional, Global TV in Algeria : University students and television audience after the 2012 Algerian Media law

Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank the colleagues Saida Kheira Benammar, who helped to set up the survey in Mostaganem, and Mohamed Chihat, who helped to contact and meet researchers in Algiers, for their generous and wholehearted support. Viola Sarnelli also wishes to thank Prof. Bel Abbes Neddar, who sponsored and supervised her post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Mostaganem, and his Magistere students, for their active participation in the Media and Cultural Studies seminars.

Predicamento de seguridad yemení

Con el inicio del periodo Post-Guerra Fría el Sistema Internacional comienza a experimentar un incremento en el fortalecimiento de su componente social; la Sociedad de Estados alcanza un mayor nivel de homogenización, el estado, unidad predominante de esta, comienzan atravesar una serie de transformaciones que obedecerán a una serie de cambios y continuidades respecto al periodo anterior. Desde la perspectiva del Realismo Subalterno de las Relaciones Internacionales se destacan el proceso de construcción de estado e inserción al sistema como las variables que determinan el sentimiento de inseguridad experimentado por las elites estatales del Tercer Mundo; procesos que en el contexto de un nuevo y turbulento periodo en el sistema, tomara algunas características particulares que darán un sentido especifico al sentimiento de inseguridad y las acciones a través de las cuales las elites buscan disminuirlo. La dimensión externa del sentimiento de inseguridad, el nuevo papel que toma la resistencia popular como factor determinante del sentimiento de inseguridad y de la cooperación, así como del conflicto, entre los miembros de la Sociedad Internacional, la inserción como promotor de estrategias de construcción de Estado, son alguno de los temas puntuales, que desde la perspectiva subalterna, parecen salir a flote tras el análisis del sistema en lo que se ha considerado como el periodo Post-Guerra Fría. En este sentido Yemen, se muestra como un caso adecuado no solo para poner a prueba las postulados de la teoría subalterna, veinte años después de su obra más prominente (The third world security Predicament), escrita por M. Ayoob, sino como un caso pertinente que permite acercarse más a la comprensión del papel del Tercer Mundo al interior de la Sociedad Internacional de Estados.

Las reformas emprendidas en Túnez de la mano del FMI y el BM ¿Precedente para la revolución de los Jazmines?”(1987-2010)

El estallido de la “Revolución de los Jazmines” cuestionó el éxito de un país que por más de dos décadas fue exaltado por el Banco Mundial (BM) y el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) por los logros alcanzados gracias a un programa de restructuración económica. Las exigencias e inconformidades de los manifestantes, que iban más allá de la falta de garantías democráticas, permitieron ver que el país sufría de problemas estructurales relacionados a los altos niveles de desempleo, la precariedad de la situación laboral y la desigualdad. Esta monografía pretende evaluar el papel que tuvieron las reformas económicas y en general el modelo de desarrollo que siguió Túnez de la mano del FMI y el BM, en el surgimiento y consolidación de las condiciones que dieron lugar a la Revolución de los Jazmines a finales del año 2010.

Trajectories and outcomes of the 'Arab Spring' : comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria

Almost three years have passed since the 'Arab Spring' began in late 2010. In the major sites of popular uprisings, political conditions remain unsettled or violent. Despite similarities in their original opposition to authoritarian rule, the outcomes differed from country to country. In Tunisia and Egypt, processes of transiting from authoritarian rule produced contrasting consequences for democratic politics. Uprisings led to armed rebellion in Libya and Syria, but whereas Gaddafi was overthrown, Asad was not. What explains the different trajectories and outcomes of the Arab Spring? How were these shaped by the power structure and levels of social control of the pre-uprising regimes and their state institutions, on the one hand, and by the character of the societies and oppositional forces that rose against them? Comparing Tunisia with Egypt, and Libya with Syria, this paper discusses various factors that account for variations in the trajectories and outcomes of the Arab Spring, namely, the legacy of the previous regime, institutional and constitutional choices during "transition" from authoritarian rule, socioeconomic conditions, and the presence of absence of ethnic, sectarian and geographic diversity.

The Arab Spring: where was the EU, and what is its future in the region? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 4, February 2013

From the Introduction. In 2010 the martyring of Mohamed Bouazizi began a ripple of civil uprisings across the Middle East, and would lead to a wave of revolutions that the media would dub the Arab Spring. From North Africa to the Gulf Region, these civil uprisings made major headlines but found little intervention on behalf of world superpowers such as the United States or the European Union. Acting as more of an observer than as an active participant in these revolutions, it would seem that the European Union played a small role in preventing civil unrest, or in aiding in the policing of these oppressive governments. By example of the passive position held by Europe during these revolutions, the EU appears to be ill equipped to handle security issues such as the massive revolutionary chain witnessed across the Mediterranean. Now, however, they have a new opportunity to be involved in a post- Arab Spring Mediterranean. This paper seeks to address some reasons behind the Arab Spring, describe the institutional framework previously and currently in place, as well as to analyze the progress of Europe’s relationship with the Mediterranean by analyzing the EU’s past and current role in the Mediterranean. It will also look at critiques of the EU’s role in the Arab Spring, as well as the opportunities to be taken in the Mediterranean region.