All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries

We study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the parameter αi may vary across bidders. In this game, asymmetries are exogenously given. Next, a two-stage game where asymmetries are endogenously generated is studied. At the first stage, each bidder chooses the level of an observable, costly, value-enhancing action. The second stage is the bidding sub-game, whose equilibrium is simply the equilibrium of the, previously analyzed, game with exogenous asymmetries. Finally, natural applications of the all pay-auction in the context of political lobbying are considered: the effects of excluding bidders, as well as, the impact of caps on bids.

Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in interdependent values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. In this case, non-monotonic equilibria might happen. When the necessary and sufficient conditions are not satisfied, there are ties with positive probability. In such case, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule. As a direct implication of these results, we obtain a generalization of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. From the robustness of equilibrium existence for all-pay auctions in multidimensional setting, an interpretation of our results can give a new justification to the use of tournaments in practice.

Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private valoues

We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.

Corporate commitment to sustainability : is it all hot air? An Australian review of the linkage between executive pay and sustainable performance

Across time, companies have increasingly made public commitments to sustainable development and to reducing their impacts on climate change. Management remuneration plans (MRPs) are a key mechanism to motivate managers to achieve corporate goals. We review the MRPs negotiated with key management personnel in a sample of large Australian carbon-intensive companies. Our results show that, as in past decades, the companies in our sample have MRPs in place that continue to fixate on financial performance. We argue that this provides evidence of a disconnection, or ‘decoupling’, between the sustainability-related rhetoric of the sample companies, and their ‘real’ organisational practices and priorities.

A Nash Bargaining Approach to Retention Enhancing Bid Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions with Discrete Bids

Bid optimization is now becoming quite popular in sponsored search auctions on the Web. Given a keyword and the maximum willingness to pay of each advertiser interested in the keyword, the bid optimizer generates a profile of bids for the advertisers with the objective of maximizing customer retention without compromising the revenue of the search engine. In this paper, we present a bid optimization algorithm that is based on a Nash bargaining model where the first player is the search engine and the second player is a virtual agent representing all the bidders. We make the realistic assumption that each bidder specifies a maximum willingness to pay values and a discrete, finite set of bid values. We show that the Nash bargaining solution for this problem always lies on a certain edge of the convex hull such that one end point of the edge is the vector of maximum willingness to pay of all the bidders. We show that the other endpoint of this edge can be computed as a solution of a linear programming problem. We also show how the solution can be transformed to a bid profile of the advertisers.

Corporate commitment to sustainability – is it all hot air? A review of the linkage between executive pay and sustainable performance

Across time, companies are increasingly making public commitments to sustainable development and to reducing their impacts on climate change. Management remuneration plans (MRPs) are a key mechanism to motivate managers to achieve corporate goals. We review the MRPs negotiated with key management personnel in a sample of large Australian carbon-intensive companies. Our results show that, as in past decades, the companies in our sample have MRPs in place that continue to fixate on financial performance. We argue that this provides evidence of a disconnection between the sustainability-related rhetoric of the sample companies, and their ‘real’ organisational priorities.

Highway user fees: updated data needed to determine whether all users pay their fair share.

Mode of access: Internet.

Register of officers and agents, civil, military, and naval, in the service of the United States, on the ... : showing the state or territory from which each person was appointed to office, the state or country in which he was born, and the compensation, pay, and emoluments allowed to each; together with the names and compensation of all printers in any way employed by Congress, or any department or officer of the government.

Description based on: 1863.

England's improvement by sea and land : to out-do the Dutch without fighting, to pay debts without moneys, to set at work all the poor of England with the growth of our own lands : to prevent unnecessary suits in law, with the benefit of a voluntary register : directions where vast quantities of timber are to be had for the building of ships, with the advantage of making the great rivers of England navigable : rules to prevent fires in London, and other great cities : with directions how the several companies of handicraftsmen in London may always have cheap bread and drink /

Vol. 2 has title: England's improvement by sea and land. The second part : Containing, I. An account of its scituation, and the growths, and manufactures thereof. II. The benefit and necessity of a voluntary-register. III. A method for improving the Royal-navy, lessening the growing power of France, and obtaining the fishery. IV. Advantageous proposals for the city of London, for the preventing of fires therein; and for lessening the great charge of the trained bands. V. The way to make New-Haven in Sussex, fit to receive ships of burthen. VI. Seasonable discourses of the tin, iron, linnen, and woollen trades; with advantageous proposals for improving them all : Illustrated with seven large copper-plates / By Andrew Yarranton, gent. London : Printed, to be sold by Tho. Parkhurst ..., 1698.

Marchers at International Women's Day rally holding signs reading "Love doesn't pay the bills" and "All women all ages collect your wages"

Inscription: Verso: International Woman's Day rally, New York.

What will the next buyer pay? the key to investing in property

Most investors look at the initial return (or yield) that they will receive from an investment property, but this is only part of the picture. The more important issue is what capital appreciation will be achieved. Unless an investment property will deliver substantial capital appreciation, it is unlikely to be a good investment in financial terms.

Female game developers wanted low pay, long hours, inflexible work environments

Almost half of all game players are now women. However, women only represent a small proportion of game developers. There is a lack of previous research to suggest why women don't pursue careers in games and how we can attract more women to the industry. In this paper, we investigate the issues and barriers that prevent women from entering the games industry, as well as the solutions and steps that can be taken to attract more women to the industry. We draw on the lessons learned by the information technology industry and report on a program of events that was conducted at the Queensland University of Technology in 2011. These events provided some insight into the issues surrounding the lack of women in the games industry, as well as some initial steps that we can take as an industry to attract and support more female developers.

Willingness-to-pay for infrastructure investments for alternative fuel vehicles

This study investigates potential demand for infrastructure investment for alternative fuel vehicles by applying stated preference methods to a Japanese sample. The potential demand is estimated on the basis of how much people are willing to pay for alternative fuel vehicles under various refueling scenarios. Using the estimated parameters, the economic efficiency of establishing battery-exchange stations for electric vehicles is examined. The results indicate that infrastructural development of battery-exchange stations can be efficient when electric vehicle sales exceed 5.63% of all new vehicle sales. Further, we find a complementary relationship between the cruising ranges of alternative fuel vehicles and the infrastructure established.

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.