1000 resultados para ética kantiana
Resumo:
This work aims to present the foundations of Kantian ethics concerning to moral judgments about sexual practices. It shows that the sexual act, for the philosopher, inevitably degrades individuals who are taking part of it, given its objectifying nature, manifested in the usage of individuals as mere means to obtain pleasure. To solve this quandary of nature since humanity is an end in itself, by the virtue of being bearer of rationality and cannot, therefore, be treated as mere means Kant claims that marriage is morally the appropriate locus for the exercise of sexuality, given the reciprocity forged there, preventing degradation. In marriage, the bond established between the impulse of nature to the conservation of the species achieved through the sexual intercourse opened to procreation and the duty of man in regarding himself as an animal being preserving the species without degrading the person is accomplished in a fully moral way. This text clarifies that the justification for the assumption of this solution is fixed at two developments of the categorical imperative: the formulas of the law of nature and humanity. Despite the fact the first brings significant contributions to human relations through the concept of reciprocity, the second establishes a normative role for the teleological argument of sexuality, becoming an obstacle in kantian's practical philosophy. To overcome that obstacle, we outline a critics which relies on the studies of Michel Foucault about sex and the power techniques related to them, producer of a scientia sexualis in the Western, demonstrating that the moral of the philosopher from Königsberg is also present in this project somehow. Finally, in a foucaultian's reading of kantian Aufklärung, we recognize that, to propose new ethical possibilities of the experience of sexuality, it is necessary to think and create new relational spaces in which the subject takes autonomously the government of self.
Resumo:
Resumen basado en el de la publicación
Resumo:
L'objectiu de l'article és analitzar quin sentit té el kantisme a la filosofia de Llorens i Barba. S'ha afirmat sovint que potser Llorens es va distanciar de Kant al final de la seva vida. Aquesta qüestió ens pot ocultar quelcom més important: el veritable significat dels elements d'ètica kantiana dins de la filosofia de Llorens. Mostrarem que la influència de Kant és clara, però que cal tenir present que deriva igualment de la principal font de Llorens, el filòsof escocès William Hamilton. Per assolir aquesta conclusió analitzarem la presència de la noció de sentit comú en Kant i considerarem de quina manera l'ètica complementa la metafísica en Kant, Hamilton i Llorens.
Resumo:
Este artigo trata da formação moral do homem segundo Kant. Para ele, "o homem, afetado por tantas inclinações, é na verdade capaz de conceber a idéia de uma razão pura prática, mas não é tão facilmente dotado da força necessária para a tornar eficaz in concreto no seu comportamento". Deste modo, para implementar nossas máximas de comportamento Kant elabora seu estudo sobre a formação do homem para leva-lo a uma vida livre e moral.
Resumo:
Resumen basado en el de la publicación
Resumo:
Resumen basado en el de la publicaci??n
Resumo:
Made from the bases of metaphysics, this dissertation is related do Kant‟s moral philosophy. But the itinerary to reach the main speculation used to develop this current understanding of Kant‟s thoughts, it is nothing but an attempt to make the formal rigor more flexible, which has always been associated to Kantian ethics‟ perspectives. From the awareness of what this formalism could be, while a moral arrangement, it is how we will be able to come upon a teleological Kant. That is the fundamental element to comprehend some of the significant aspects in that ethical system, which necessarily comes through the effort to demonstrate the proximity between reason and sensibility, as well as nature and liberty. In this environment, the journey to achieve the autonomy, as the bedrock of liberty and morality, evokes the support of education in Kantian patterns, which enables a course of improvement of the human being, as an individual e, more significantly, as specie. This evolution progress, which tents to reveal the destiny of the humanity, is evolved in the relationship between necessity and finality, as a condition to make the structure of a project to humanity possible. We should mention that it is a rational, an educational and a moral project to be developed in the course of history. As a consequence, the amount of all these elements permits the development of the man‟s natural disposition as a creature that looks for self knowledge , becoming, afterward, dignified to be qualified as a human being. Finally, this study intent to figure out the necessity of the human being inclusion to nature, which happens throughout the acquirement of the individuals‟ conscience
Resumo:
Este trabajo se propone a analizar la crítica del filósofo alemán Albrecht Wellmer direccionada sobretodo a Habermas. Alumno de éste y de Adorno en la así llamada Escuela de Frankfurt, Wellmer, en su Etica del discurso (1986), se propone a neutralizar los problemas de la ética kantiana, pero sin abandonar el normativismo moral de pretensión universalista. Para Wellmer, "un principio como el imperativo categórico (kantiano) no puede nunca operar en un espacio vacío". Su foco es el a priori de la aplicación prácticas de las normas, ya que estas dependen de nuestra capacidad de captarlas en determinada situación concreta, una vez que su aplicación puede implicar una flagrante inmoralidad. Las críticas de Wellmer se dirigen al consenso normativo tan caro a Habermas: la generalización universalista oculta el olvido de contextos históricos. Así como la racionalidad de los consensos no puede ser caracterizada formalmente, tampoco la racionalidad y la verdad de los consensos tienen que necesariamente coincidir: "así como no podemos inferir de la falsedad de un consenso la falta de racionalidad del mismo, tampoco podemos inferir la verdad de los consensos de su racionalidad". Racionalidad y verdad sólo coinciden desde la perspectiva interna de los implicados
Resumo:
Este trabajo se propone a analizar la crítica del filósofo alemán Albrecht Wellmer direccionada sobretodo a Habermas. Alumno de éste y de Adorno en la así llamada Escuela de Frankfurt, Wellmer, en su Etica del discurso (1986), se propone a neutralizar los problemas de la ética kantiana, pero sin abandonar el normativismo moral de pretensión universalista. Para Wellmer, "un principio como el imperativo categórico (kantiano) no puede nunca operar en un espacio vacío". Su foco es el a priori de la aplicación prácticas de las normas, ya que estas dependen de nuestra capacidad de captarlas en determinada situación concreta, una vez que su aplicación puede implicar una flagrante inmoralidad. Las críticas de Wellmer se dirigen al consenso normativo tan caro a Habermas: la generalización universalista oculta el olvido de contextos históricos. Así como la racionalidad de los consensos no puede ser caracterizada formalmente, tampoco la racionalidad y la verdad de los consensos tienen que necesariamente coincidir: "así como no podemos inferir de la falsedad de un consenso la falta de racionalidad del mismo, tampoco podemos inferir la verdad de los consensos de su racionalidad". Racionalidad y verdad sólo coinciden desde la perspectiva interna de los implicados
Resumo:
Este trabajo se propone a analizar la crítica del filósofo alemán Albrecht Wellmer direccionada sobretodo a Habermas. Alumno de éste y de Adorno en la así llamada Escuela de Frankfurt, Wellmer, en su Etica del discurso (1986), se propone a neutralizar los problemas de la ética kantiana, pero sin abandonar el normativismo moral de pretensión universalista. Para Wellmer, "un principio como el imperativo categórico (kantiano) no puede nunca operar en un espacio vacío". Su foco es el a priori de la aplicación prácticas de las normas, ya que estas dependen de nuestra capacidad de captarlas en determinada situación concreta, una vez que su aplicación puede implicar una flagrante inmoralidad. Las críticas de Wellmer se dirigen al consenso normativo tan caro a Habermas: la generalización universalista oculta el olvido de contextos históricos. Así como la racionalidad de los consensos no puede ser caracterizada formalmente, tampoco la racionalidad y la verdad de los consensos tienen que necesariamente coincidir: "así como no podemos inferir de la falsedad de un consenso la falta de racionalidad del mismo, tampoco podemos inferir la verdad de los consensos de su racionalidad". Racionalidad y verdad sólo coinciden desde la perspectiva interna de los implicados
Resumo:
The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.
Resumo:
The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.
Resumo:
Nosso propósito, neste artigo, é aproximar dois modelos éticos distintos, o kantiano e o aristotélico, com o intuito de detectar alguns pontos comuns onde talvez possamos encontrar certo diálogo entre ambos os modelos éticos