955 resultados para Judicial Review
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This thesis is a study of -Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment : Judicial Perspectives on Backwardness. This study is an attempt to evaluate the concept of backwardness and equality of opportunity in employment and to assess the judicial perspectives in relation to them. The study reveals that the recent review petition of the Constitution Bench did not assess the decision of Chakradhar and its import. The study reveals that the Indian judiciary could successfully locate and apply the above principles. It was-Justice Subba Rao's nascent attempt in Devadasan which marked the starting point of such a jurisprudential enquiry. Later Thomas developed the thoughts by a reading new meaning and content to equality provisions of the Constitution which included the elimination of inequalities as the positive content of Articles 14 and 16(1) and elevated reservation provision to the same status of equality principles under the Constitution. Soshit, Vasanth Kumar and Mandal supplemented further to the jurisprudential contents. In this process, the courts were guided by the theories of John Rawls, David Miller, Ronald Dworkin, Max Weber and Roscoe Pound. Thus there was a slow and steady process of transformation of the reservation provision. From an anti-meritarian, unenforceable and enabling provision, it reached a stage of equally relevant and explanatory part of fundamental right to equality. Mandal viewed it as a part of sharing of State power. Though this can be seen by rereading and re-joining thoughts of judges in this regard, the judicial approach lacks coherence and concerted efforts in evolving a jurisprudential basis for protective discrimination. The deliberations of the framers of the Constitution reveals that there was much confusion and indeterminacy with regard to the concept of Backwardness. The study shows that the judiciary has been keeping intact the framers’ expectation of having a reasonable quantum of reservation, preventing the undeserved sections from enjoying the benefit, avoiding its abuse and evolving a new criteria and rejecting the old ones.
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RESUMEN INTRODUCCION Los desórdenes musculoesqueléticos constituyen uno de los más comunes y costosos problemas de salud en el trabajo en todo el mundo. La detección a tiempo de síntomas iniciales debe ser una prioridad de los sistemas de vigilancia epidemiológica. El objetivo de este trabajo de investigación fue determinar la prevalencia de los desórdenes musculoesqueléticos (DME) en la población de funcionarios del cuerpo de policía judicial de Bogotá en el año 2014. MATERIALES Y METODOS Estudio de corte transversal con una muestra de 300 trabajadores a los que se les aplico el cuestionario Nórdico de Síntomas musculoesqueléticos. RESULTADOS Se encuesto al 33,9% de los trabajadores pertenecientes al cuerpo técnico de Policía Judicial de la Fiscalía General de la Nación en la ciudad de Bogotá. Los trabajadores evaluados tienen una edad promedio de 41,9 años, con un predominio del género femenino (54%), encontrándose que la mayoría de los que respondieron al cuestionario 87,66% (n=263) habían presentado algún síntoma musculoesqueléticos en los últimos 12 meses. Un hallazgo significativo fue la afectación cervical en el 53% (n=159) de los que reportaron sintomatología musculo esquelética. CONCLUSIONES La población perteneciente a la Policía Técnica Judicial en la ciudad de Bogotá presenta una alta prevalencia (87,66%) de síntomas que afectan al sistema musculoesquelético, principalmente comprometiendo las regiones de columna cervical, parte baja de la espalda y parte alta de la espalda, con una mayor afectación a las personas de género femenino.
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La presente investigación tiene como objeto analizar la influencia de la estrategia de guerra jurídica de las Farc en la autonomía del sistema judicial colombiano. Así mismo, se busca desarrollar un análisis de la VIII Conferencia Nacional Guerrillera de las Farc, con el fin de dar cuenta de la evolución de sus planes estratégicos, que han llevado a la inserción en nuevos teatros de operaciones. Lo anterior irá enfocado en la importancia que tiene para la guerrilla de las Farc el paso de la guerra de guerrillas a la guerra asimétrica; y en ésta última será posible encontrar el sustento teórico necesario para realizar el presente estudio. Por último, se pretende resaltar que la evolución del plan ha conllevado a una inseguridad jurídica perjudicial para los principales fines del Estado, causando con esto un debilitamiento de las instituciones.
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Truth commissions and criminal trials have come to be perceived as complementary transitional justice mechanisms. However, where effective prosecutions are dependent on the exchange of information and transfer of suspects between states under existing mutual legal assistance and extradition arrangements, the operation of a truth commission in the state of territoriality may act as an obstacle to international cooperation. At the same time, requests for assistance from a third state pursuing prosecutions may impact negatively on the truth commission process in the requested state by inhibiting those reluctant to become involved in criminal proceedings from offering testimony. This article demonstrates a practical discord between these bodies when they operate in different states and questions whether they can truly be considered “complementary”.
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This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.
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Fil: Calandria, María Sol. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.
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Fil: Calandria, María Sol. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.
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This paper reviews the literature on the prevalence of constitutional review across the world, and particularly in emerging democracies, during the last two decades. Two major questions should be addressed in this regard. First, why has the judiciary been empowered and what factors affect judicial activism? Second, does constitutional review ensure an effective self-enforcing function? In sum, the literature shows that constitutional review can make democracy self-enforcing if there is sufficient competition among political parties or between the legislature and the executive branch of government. In a more sophisticated case, political balance within the court can also ensure the observance of court decisions.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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At head of title: (From the Concord (Middlesex) Gazette.).
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Fil: Calandria, María Sol. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.
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The Textual Analysis of Discourse has its origin in Text Linguistics and it aims at studying the co(n)text meaning production based on the analysis of concrete texts by offering elements to the understanding of the text as a discourse practice throughout the plans or levels of linguistic analysis. In this perspective, we intend to investigate the enunciative responsibility phenomenon in the sentencing court judgment. To do so, we review the theoretical contributions of Textual Analysis of Discourse (ADAM, 2011) and the Enunciative Linguistics from various authors, among them, Rabatel (1998, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010), Nølke (2001, 2005, 2009, 2013), Nølke, Fløttum and Norén (2004), Guentchéva (1994, 1996) and Guentchéva et al. (1994). In this direction, we investigate the enunciative responsibility through a range that comprises the phenomenon from four gradations, each one with a kind of point of view (PoV) and with links that may mark the assumption or the distance from the point of view. Regarding the legal approach of the thesis, our theoretical anchoring follows several authors, among them, Petri (1994), Soto (2001), Alvarez (2002), Alves (2003), Cornu (2005), Albi (2007), Bittar (2010), Asensio and Polanco (2011), López Samaniego (2006), López Montolío and Samaniego (2008), Montolío (2002, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), Sterling (2010), Prieto (2013), Lawrence and Rodrigues (2013) and Rodrigues, Passeggi and Silva Neto (2014). Our corpus is composed of 13 sentences from criminal cases arising from the district of Currais Novos-RN, completed in 2012. The results reveal how the judge, from various enunciative instances, builds the court decision, which allowed us to understand the configuration of (non) assumption of enunciative responsibility in the sentencing court judgment discourse genre. In conclusion, we perceive that the discourse units are envisaged or through the assumption, or the non assumption of PoV by the enunciative instances, what guides the producer organization argumentative text and his (her) communicative purposes. With that, the judge creates and/or modifies values and beliefs, induces and/or guides his (her) interlocutor by being able to demonstrate objectivity and/or preventing his (her) face through the mediated constructions or engage through the assumption of the enunciative responsibility of the propositional content of an utterance. In short, we reaffirm our belief that the (non) assumption of the enunciative responsibility configures as an argumentative mechanism strongly marked by the producer of the text with a view to their communicative purposes. The sentence, therefore, is constructed in this game of taking and/or not taking of statements according to argumentative orientation and the objectives of the text producer.