Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

A lei de bases da economia social portuguesa: do projeto ao texto final

ISSN 1577-4430, com fator de impacto, calculado pelo IN-RECS (http://ec3.ugr.es/in-recj/ii/Derecho_Civil-2010.htm), Bases de dados de indexação: LATINDEX, DIALNET, ISOC, COMLUDOC e AGRIS]

Inter-sectoral health policy in Portugal : competition, cooperation and control

Comunicação apresentada na «19th International Conference on Health Promoting Hospitals and Health Services», Turku, Finlândia de 1 a 3 de Junho de 2011.

Preços de transferência – o caso português

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria, sob orientação da Mestre Gabriela Pinheiro

Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost- reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost- reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic

TOXOCARIASIS: SEROLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS BY INDIRECT ANTIBODY COMPETITION ELISA

Toxocariasis is caused by infection of man by Toxocara canis and Toxocara cati larvae, the common roundworm of dogs and cats. Because larvae are difficult to detect in tissues, diagnosis is mostly based on serology. Non specific reactions are observed mainly due to cross-reactivity with Ascaris sp antigens. This investigation aimed at developing and evaluating an indirect antibody competition ELISA (IACE) employing a specific rabbit IgG anti-Toxocara canis excretory-secretory antigens as the competition antibody, in order to improve indirect ELISA specificity performed for toxocariasis diagnosis. For that, the rabbit IgG was previously absorbed by Ascaris suum adult antigens. Sensitivity and specificity of IACE were first evaluated in 28 serum samples of mice experimentally infected with T. canis embryonated eggs. Adopting cut-off value established in this population before infection, sensitivity and specificity were 100% after 20 days post-inoculation. For human population IACE was evaluated using sera from 440 patients with clinical signs of toxocariasis and the cut-off value was established with 60 serum samples from apparently healthy individuals. Using as reference test the indirect ELISA performed by Adolfo Lutz Institute, sensitivity was 60.2%, specificity was 98% and concordance was 77.3%. Repeatability of IACE was evaluated by the inter-reactions variation coefficient (2.4%).

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Asymmetric dynamic price competition with uncertainty

We consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower) firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms, for different values of the intercept demand parameters.

Cournot duopoly with competition in the R&D expenditures

We present a new R&D investment in a Cournot Duopoly model and we analyze the different possible types of Nash R&D investments. We observe that the new production costs region can be decomposed in three economical regions, depending on the Nash R&D investment, showing the relevance of the use of patents in new technologies.

Unemployment, technological revolution and competition from developing countries

Unemployment is probably the most important social problem of our times in the rich industrial world. There are 35 million people unemployed in OECD countries(about 8,5%): the situation however differs between the USA and Europe. In this paper we will discuss the reasons for suche a difference.

Tax policy stance over the business cycle: evidence from Europe

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics