SIR Analysis and Interference Cancellation in Uplink OFDMA with Large Carrier Frequency/Timing Offsets

In uplink orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA), large timing offsets (TO) and/or carrier frequency offsets (CFO) of other users with respect to a desired user can cause significant multiuser interference (MUI). In this letter, we analytically characterize the degradation in the average output signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) due to the combined effect of both TOs as well as CFOs in uplink OFDMA. Specifically, we derive closed-form expressions for the average SIR at the DFT output in the presence of large CFOs and TOs. The analyticalexpressions derived for the signal and various interference terms at the DFT output are used to devise an interference cancelling receiver to mitigate the effect of CFO/TO-induced interferences.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Nuori konservatiivi : Tuure Junnila ja hänen poliittinen toimintansa vuoteen 1956

Tuure Junnila, PhD (1910-1999) was one of Finland's most renowned conservative politicians of the post-war period. Junnila is remembered primarily as a persistent opponent of Urho Kekkonen, a long-term Member of Parliament, a conspicuous opposition member and a prolific political writer. Junnila's ideologies and political views were conservative, and he is one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the National Coalition Party. Junnila also made an extensive career outside of politics, first as an economist and then as an executive of Finland's leading commercial bank Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. The Young Conservative is a partial biography written using traditional historical research methods, which examines Junnila's personal history and his activity in public life up to 1956. The study begins by investigating Junnila's background through his childhood, school years, university studies and early professional career. It also looks at Junnila's work as an economist and practical banker. Particular attention is paid to Junnila's political work, constantly focusing on the following five often overlapping areas: (1) economic policy, (2) domestic policy, (3) foreign and security policy, (4) Junnila and Urho Kekkonen, (5) Junnila, the Coalition Party and Finnish conservatism. In his economic policy, Junnila emphasised the importance of economic stability, opposed socialisation and the growth of public expenditure, defended the free market system and private entrepreneurship, and demanded tax cuts. This policy was very popular within the Coalition Party during the early 1950s, making Junnila the leading conservative economic politician of the time. In terms of domestic policy, Junnila demanded as early as the 1940s that a "third force" should be established in Finland to counterbalance the agrarian and labour parties by uniting conservative and liberal ideologies under the same roof. Foreign and security policy is the area of Junnila's political activity which is most clearly situated after the mid-1950s. However, Junnila's early speeches and writings already show a striving towards the unconditional neutrality modelled by Switzerland and Sweden and a strong emphasis on Finland's right to internal self-determination. Junnila, as did the Coalition Party as a whole, adopted a consistently critical approach towards Urho Kekkonen between 1951 and 1956, but this attitude was not as bluntly negative and all-round antagonistic as many previous studies have implied. Junnila was one of the leading Finnish conservatives of the early 1950s and in all essence his views were analogous to the general alignment of the Coalition Party at the time: conservative in ideology and general policy, and liberal in economic policy.

Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

Pest-damage relationships for Helicoverpa armigera (Hübner) (Lepidoptera: Noctuidae) on soybean (Glycine max) and dry bean (Phaseolus vulgaris) during pod-fill.

The response of soybean (Glycine max) and dry bean (Phaseolus vulgaris) to feeding by Helicoverpa armigera during the pod-fill stage was studied in irrigated field cages over three seasons to determine the relationship between larval density and yield loss, and to develop economic injury levels. H. armigera intensity was calculated in Helicoverpa injury equivalent (HIE) units, where 1 HIE was the consumption of one larva from the start of the infestation period to pupation. In the dry bean experiment, yield loss occurred at a rate 6.00 ± 1.29 g/HIE while the rates of loss in the three soybean experiments were 4.39 ± 0.96 g/HIE, 3.70 ± 1.21 g/HIE and 2.12 ± 0.71 g/HIE. These three slopes were not statistically different (P > 0.05) and the pooled estimate of the rate of yield loss was 3.21 ± 0.55 g/HIE. The first soybean experiment also showed a split-line form of damage curve with a rate of yield loss of 26.27 ± 2.92 g/HIE beyond 8.0 HIE and a rapid decline to zero yield. In dry bean, H. armigera feeding reduced total and undamaged pod numbers by 4.10 ± 1.18 pods/HIE and 12.88 ± 1.57 pods/HIE respectively, while undamaged seed numbers were reduced by 35.64 ± 7.25 seeds/HIE. In soybean, total pod numbers were not affected by H. armigera infestation (out to 8.23 HIE in Experiment 1) but seed numbers (in Experiments 1 and 2) and the number of seeds/pod (in all experiments) were adversely affected. Seed size increased with increases in H. armigera density in two of the three soybean experiments, indicating plant compensatory responses to H. armigera feeding. Analysis of canopy pod profiles indicated that loss of pods occurred from the top of the plant downwards, but with an increase in pod numbers close to the ground at higher pest densities as the plant attempted to compensate for damage. Based on these results, the economic injury levels for H. armigera on dry bean and soybean are approximately 0.74 HIE and 2.31 HIE/m2, respectively (0.67 and 2.1 HIE/row-m for 91 cm rows).

Judge Max Frankenbach of Berlin hiking with his wife Grete Frankenbach nee Bernstein; Sassal-Massone Portraits Couples

Digital Image

Stenotaphrum secundatum, Buffalo Grass 'Sir James'

Spontaneous mutation: discovered in February 2001 as a superior plant growing among “Common” buffalo grass growing on the breeder’s property at Saltash in the Hunter Valley (NSW). The selected material has smaller (finer) leaves and showed better growth and colour than the parent variety with minimal inputs (water, fertiliser) under stressful climatic conditions. Subsequently, it also showed better leaf colour retention than the parent variety during winter. A vegetative plug taken from the original plant has now undergone four subsequent vegetative divisions to expand the original material for performance trials in NSW and Queensland without showing any discernible off types. Main selection criteria: winter colour retention, small leaves, low fertiliser requirement. Propagation: vegetative. Breeder: Brent Redman, Maitland North, NSW. PBR Certificate Number 2715, Application Number 2002/283, granted 18 March 2005.

Max and Martha Liebermann with unidentified group at a celebration for Max Liebermann at the Akademie der Kunste, Berlin Portraits; Groups

Verso: "Liebermann Feierlichkeiten in der Akademie der Kuenste. In der Mitte: Max Liebermann und Frau. Becker."

Portrait of Max Meyerhof.

Max Meyerhof was a distinguished opthamologist, author, medical historian. He died in Cairo where he helped establish the Egyptian medical service.

Newspaper obituary for Max Molling in the Hannoverscher Anzeiger; Hannover, Germany.

Digital Image

Newspaper obituary for Max Molling in the Hannoverscher Anzeiger by the personel of M. Molling & Co.; Hannover, Germany.

Digital Image

Reproduction of newspaper obituary for Max Molling in the Hannoverscher Anzeiger.

Digital Image

Reproduction of newspaper obituary for Max Molling in the Hannoverscher Anzeiger.

Digital Image