948 resultados para corporate income tax
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2d 1918 ed.
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Description based on: 1987; title from cover.
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"September 28, 2005."
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"October 27, 2005."
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Considers (74) H.R. 8401, (74) H.R. 8402, (74) H.R. 8403.
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Optimal financiai strategies are criticai for long term survival in competitive international markets. Financial strategies pertaining to transfer pricing have become increasingly important as income tax authorities seek additional revenues through increased monitoring of company practices. In this first of two articles, optimal tax strategies are presented after reviewing the transfer pricing concept and the rationale underlying governments' increased focus on transfer pricing. In the second forthcoming article, we analyze the effect of government restrictions on optimal pricing strategies.
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Mestrado em Fiscalidade
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Dissertação de Mestrado apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria, sob orientação de Doutor José Campos Amorim
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Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação de Cláudia Maria Pereira Esta versão contém as críticas e sugestões dos elementos do júri.
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The income support programs are created with the purpose of fighting both, the poverty trap and the inactivity trap. The balance between both is fragile and hard to find. Thus, the goal of this work is to contribute to solve this issue by finding how income support programs, particularly the Portuguese RSI, affect transitions to employment. This is made through duration analysis, namely using Cox and Competing Risks models. A particular feature is introduced in this work as it incorporates the possibility of Defective Risks. The estimated hazard elasticity with respect to the amount of RSI received for individuals who move to employment is -0,41. More than a half of RSI receivers stays for more than a year and the probability of never leaving to employment is 44%. The results appear to indicate that RSI has affected negatively transitions to employment.
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We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.
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The 1998 Spanish reform of the Personal Income Tax eliminated the 15% deduction for private medical expenditures including payments on private health insurance (PHI) policies. To avoid an undesirable increase in the demand for publicly funded health care, tax incentives to buy PHI were not completely removed but basically shifted from individual to group employer-paid policies. In a unique fiscal experiment, at the same time that the tax relief for individually purchased policies was abolished, the government provided for tax allowances on policies taken out through employment. Using a bivariate probit model on data from National Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of said reform on the demand for PHI and the changes occurred within it. Our findings suggest that the total probability of buying PHI was not significantly affected. Indeed, the fall in the demand for individual policies (by 10% between 1997 and 2001) was offset by an increase in the demand for group employer-paid ones, so that the overall size of the market remained virtually unchanged. We also briefly discuss the welfare effects on the state budget, the industry and society at large.
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This paper investigates the importance of political ideology and opportunism in the choice of the tax structure. In particular, we examine the effects of cabinet ideology and elections on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of production and consumption for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 by employing four alternative cabinet ideology measures and by using the methodology of effective tax rates. There is evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects on tax policies. More precisely, we find that left-wing governments rely more on capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase consumption taxes. Moreover, we find that income tax rates (but not consumption taxes) tend to be reduced in preelectoral periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on selfemployed income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates.
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This paper undertakes a normative investigation of the quantitative properties of optimal tax smoothing in a business cycle model with state contingent debt, capital-skill complementarity, endogenous skill formation and stochastic shocks to public consumption as well as total factor and capital equipment productivity. Our main finding is that an empirically relevant restriction which does not allow the relative supply of skilled labour to adjust in response to aggregate shocks, signi cantly changes the cyclical properties of optimal labour taxes. Under a restricted relative skill supply, the government fi nds it optimal to adjust labour income tax rates so that the average net returns to skilled and unskilled labour hours exhibit the same dynamic behaviour as under fl exible skill supply.
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This paper examines properties of optimal poverty assistance programs under different informational environments using an income maintenanceframework. To that end, we make both the income generating ability andthe disutility of labor of individuals unobservable, and compare theresulting benefit schedules with those of programs found in the UnitedStates since Welfare Reform (1996). We find that optimal programs closelyresemble a Negative Income Tax with a Benefit Reduction rate that dependson the distribution of population characteristics. A policy of workfare(unpaid public sector work) is inefficient when disutility of labor isunobservable, but minimum work requirements (for paid work) may be usedin that same environment. The distortions to work incentives and thepresence of minimum work requirements depend on the observability andrelative importance of the population's characteristics.