Digenetic trematodes of the genus Clinostomum Leidy, 1856 (Digenea : Clinostomidae) from birds of Queensland, Australia, including C. wilsoni n. sp. from Egretta intermedia

Two species of Clinostomum previously described from Australia, C. hornum from Botaurus poiciloptilus (Australian bittern) and Nycticorax caledonicus (Nankeen night heros) and C. australiense from Pelecanus conspicillatus (Australian pelican), which have previously been synonymised with C. complanatum, are redescribed and recognised as valid species. In addition, C. complanatum is recorded from Egretta alba (large egret), E. garzetta (little egret), E. intermedia (plumed egret), N. caledonicus and Ardea novaehollandiae (white-faced heron). C. wilsoni n. sp. is described from E. intermedia from Queensland. C. wilsoni differs from the other three species in size and shape of the body and in the oral collar, oral sucker, intestinal caeca, caecal diverticula and position of testes. Taxonomic problems within the genus Clinostomum are discussed.

Relationships among climate, latitude and migration: Australian butterflies are not temperate-zone birds

We examined the distribution of butterflies over the mostly arid and semi-arid continent of Australia and analyzed the proportion of migrant species and species diversity with respect to an array of climatic and geographic variables. On a continent-wide scale, latitude explained virtually no variance in either proportion of migrants (r(2) = 0.01) or species diversity (r(2) = 0.03) in Australian butterflies. These results are in marked contrast to those for temperate-zone birds from three continents where latitude explained between 82 and 98% of the variance in frequency of migrants and also accounted for much of the variance in bird species diversity. In eastern Australia where rainfall regimes are similar to those in temperate Europe and North and South America, latitude explains 78% of the variance in frequency of butterfly migrants. In both eastern and central Australia, latitude also accounts for relatively high proportions of the variance in species diversity. Rainfall patterns and especially soil moisture are negatively associated with migration frequency in Australian butterfly faunas, both alone and in combination with other climate variables. Where moisture levels are relatively high, as in eastern Australia, measures of temperature are associated with migration frequency, a result consistent with findings for temperate-zone birds, suggesting latitude is a surrogate for temperature. The ultimate causes of migration in temperate-zone birds and Australian butterflies are the uneven temporal, and in Australia also spatial, distribution of resources. Uneven distribution is brought about primarily by temperature in temperate regions and by erratic rainfall over much of arid Australia. As a key determinant of productivity, especially in the tropics and subtropics, aridity is likely to be an important determinant of the global distributions of migrants.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the excess demand and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which set of sellers should those transfers be made is the key issue in the description of the algorithm. We assume additively separable utilities and introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with an exogenously defined quota, consuming more than one object but at most one unit of a seller`s good and having multi-dimensional payoffs. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the over-demanded sets than the constructions of these sets for the other assignment games. For this approach, our mechanism yields the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff, which equals the buyer-optimal stable payoff. The symmetry of the model allows to getting the seller-optimal stable payoff and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff can then be also derived.