199 resultados para Meditations
Resumo:
A következőkben arra teszünk kísérletet, hogy összegezzük a közép- és a kelet-európai rendszerváltozások és az ezt tanulmányozók fordulatos történetét az elmúlt két évtizedben. Bemutatjuk, hogy a közgazdaságtan egy kevéssé fejlett ága miképp szembesült a tudományág egésze szempontjából is talán legnehezebb értelmezési és alkalmazási kérdéseket fölvető történelmi folyamattal. Megpróbáljuk feloldani azt a rejtvényt, hogy a főáramú megközelítés megismerése és alkalmazása miért nem hozott átütő eredményt sem a térség gazdaságainak, sem magának a tudományszaknak. Megvizsgáljuk a fokozatosság és a reformok kritikus tömege viszonyát. Végül kísérletet teszünk arra, hogy e sajátos szakterület elemzéséből adódó, tartósnak bizonyuló tételeket beépítsük a fenntartható fejlődés szélesebben értelmezett, immár főáramú megközelítéseibe. ___________ The article attempts to give an account of the changes of system in Central and Eastern Europe and of those who studied them in the last two decades. It shows how a less devel-oped branch of economics faced a historical process that posed possibly the most difficult questions of interpretation and application for the whole discipline. An attempt is made to discover why recognition and application of the mainstream approach failed to bring resounding success for the economies of the region or for economics itself. The author examines the relation between continuity and the critical weight of reforms. Finally, an attempt is made to advance durable propositions based on analysis of this specific field through now mainstream approaches in terms of sustainable development.
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Poetry expresses the physical and spiritual worlds that other kinds of writing cannot. Travelling open our minds and frees our spirit. Creative writings and meditations on life, spirit, grace and relationships, art and nature weave their way through these lyrical poems. Some poems are suitable for study in the Australian Curriculum.
Resumo:
Empty Heavens. Georges Bataille and the Question of Religion. The dissertation explores the question of religion in the texts of Georges Bataille (1897 1962), the controversial French avant-garde writer and philosopher. Passionate about religion throughout his life, Bataille devoted to it both critical analyses and personal meditations. In this study, Bataille s multifaceted relationship to religion is interpreted as expressing a passion for radical otherness. Bataille is approached as a characteristically modern thinker who, nevertheless, questions some landmarks of modernity insofar as modernity is interpreted as a triumph of secularization. The dissertation is situated at the intersection of comparative religion and philosophy of religion. Methodologically, the study resorts to theoretical contextualization and concept analysis. Acknowledging that Bataille s writings challenge the assumptions about coherent meaning taken for granted in traditional philosophical analysis, the study also pays attention to the literary means and, in general, the performative level of Bataille s texts. The study constructs three theoretical contexts for Bataille s question of religion first of all, the interpretation of Hegel in the mid-20th century French philosophy. In the first section of the study, Bataille s uneasy relationship with Hegel as mediated by Alexandre Kojève is explored. The motivation of his question of radical otherness is argued to arise from his struggle with the Hegelian Kojèvean notion of negativity. The second context is the dialogue with the Christian mystical tradition. Starting from the analysis of two Bataillean notions, dramatization and contestation , it is argued that, firstly, Bataille s approach to radical otherness is analogous to certain procedures of mystical texts while, secondly, the function of otherness providing no firm foundation in Bataille s texts differs from its function in mystical texts. In the third section of the study, Bataille s quest for otherness is concretized by analyzing his views on otherness of other person, on violence, and on death themes that are brought together in Bataille s lasting interest in sacrifice. Bataille s understanding of sacrifice is proportioned to social scientific and philosophical discussions on sacrifice. It is argued that the commitment to the idea of sacrifice accounts for a partial failure in the Bataillean approach to otherness, the otherness of other person remaining its (at least half) blind spot. The study presents an overview of Bataille s thought on religion. It brings out Bataille s view of the paradoxical fundamental yet impossible role of otherness in the construction of human world, as well as his understanding of religious representations as both covering over and indicating this otherness. It describes Bataille s atheological mysticism as a peculiar modern form of religiosity, as an ambivalent mourning for and exaltation of fundamental loss.
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Este trabalho tem por finalidade analisar a concepção da loucura nos livros Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas, Quincas Borba e O Alienista. A análise destas três obras pretende mostrar o empenho de Machado de Assis em desmascarar as imposturas arquitetadas pela racionalização e que foram sancionadas pelo prestígio social da ciência. O trabalho, em resumo, se dividirá em três partes: na primeira, farei uma reconstrução da fortuna crítica do autor, em seguida, discutirei a abordagem machadiana sobre a ciência e a loucura; e finalmente, focalizarei o uso da linguagem irônica nas obras, como forma de evidenciar aspectos da crítica machadiana à Ciência. Ao se traçarem tais relações, podemos contribuir para uma visão mais rica e complexa dos saberes psicológicos no Brasil no fim do séc. XIX e levantar algumas hipóteses sobre o posicionamento de Machado frente às idéias de seu tempo. Como resultado, destacamos o modo como o escritor desenvolve e articula em sua ficção a noção de inconsciente. Além disso, sua obra mostra-se um terreno privilegiado para uma representação mais complexa e unitária do ser humano, não apenas como ser psicológico, mas também como ser social, histórico, político, moral, biológico, em suma: o homem vivente. A ficção, justamente por mostrar as personagens no tempo e no espaço, revela como a consciência e os comportamentos se dão na dinâmica entre homem e mundo, e entre o homem e os outros homens. Além disso, Machado de Assis refletiu em sua obra a relação entre linguagem e a consciência. E foi mais longe ao explorar os limites da linguagem para se descrever a interioridade humana
Resumo:
Haycock, Marged, 'Sy abl fodd Sibli fain: Sibyl in Medieval Wales', In: Heroic Poets and Poetic Heroes in Celtic Tradition, Joseph Falaky Nagy and Leslie Ellen Jones (eds), (Dublin: Four Courts Press), pp.115-130, 2005 RAE2008
Resumo:
The thesis as a whole argues that Spinoza’s Ethics in both method and content is aimed at the normal, partly rational person. Chapter 1 is on Spinoza’s writing style, finding that rather than being arid and technical, it aims to convince the reader by means of various rhetorical techniques, so does not assume an already rational reader. The following chapters of Part 1 examine whether the Ethics’ use of the synthetic geometric method exposes it to Descartes’ critique of that method in the “Second Replies” to his Meditations, that it is not suitable for pedagogy. This involves a consideration of the role of the TIE, finding in that early text not the analytic wing of a two-part analytic-synthetic method, but rather a defence and necessitation of a stand-alone synthetic method. Part 2 of the thesis develops this study of Spinoza’s writing for the common man to consider whether he is writing about the common man. This is done by examining one of the seemingly most abstract propositions in the Ethics, 4P72, which claims that a free man will not deceive even to save his own life. The study examines who exactly is this “free man” and what is his role in the Ethics. The study looks at the examples of free men in the TTP and at the concept of the model in the Ethics, and finds that rather than the free man being an impossible ideal which we can aim at but never achieve, everyone is free to some extent, and that even normal people are at times “the free man”.
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The aim of this study was to record experiences of three meditation conditions: Ratio Breathing, Transcendental Meditation and Zazen, with special reference to sport, health, neuro-physiology and sense of coherence. The participants (N=9), seven males and two females were all British, actively competing across a range of individual and team sports, with no experience of using meditation techniques or practices in their sporting or daily lives. Their mean age was 31.56 years with an age range of 22 to 44 years. The study employed a within-subjects, repeated measures design, with each participant practising each meditation condition in a randomly counterbalanced order. Integrative findings support the value of all three meditation conditions for health and to a lesser extent for sport, especially with regard to their effect on focus. All three meditation conditions were associated with a decrease in respiration. The differential effect of the meditations was apparent. Participants valued Ratio breathing for its effect on concentration, Transcendental Meditation for its depth of meditation and Zazen for its effect on self and removal of external distractions. These qualitative findings were associated with differentially significant quantitative effects on lowered respiration rate in the Ratio Breathing group, increased physical relaxation and alpha activity in the Transcendental Meditation group, and increases in both alpha and theta activity in the Zazen group.
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O presente relatório de estágio de qualificação profissional surge como forma de explanar o trabalho desenvolvido ao longo da prática pedagógica, pois o período de estágio apresenta-se como uma oportunidade fulcral para o desenvolvimento e experimentação de métodos e estratégias que colocam, muitas vezes, em questão conceções e preconceitos inerentes ao processo de ensino-aprendizagem. Sendo que os estagiários necessitam de oportunidades que contribuam “para a construção da sua própria aprendizagem” (Portugal, 2012, p. 100). Este contém análises e reflexões das práticas desenvolvidas e opções tomadas durante o estágio, tendo por base uma metodologia de investigação-ação na medida em que o trabalho realizado direcionou-se para a necessidade de transformação social. Neste sentido fomentou-se o questionamento reflexivo para melhoramento das práticas. Este estágio foi realizado em díade e apoiado em estratégias como as narrativas colaborativas, as planificações semanais, a avaliação reguladora e a supervisão. O presente encontra-se dividido em duas componentes, uma mais teórica, à qual se convoca autores e documentos legais para fundamentar a componente seguinte que é mais prática, onde se analisa as práticas desenvolvidas ao longo do ano letivo.
Resumo:
This study explored the concept of a spiritual retreat for frontline employees of a large corporate call centre. During a 1 day retreat, 4 call centre employees were introduced to various meditation and retreat activities. Follovsdng the retreat the participants were asked to incorporate the various meditations and activities into their workplace. The participants kept journals throughout the study in an effort to determine what occurred when these practices were transferred from the retreat setting to the workplace. This study examined how a working spirituality enhances one's sense of fulfillment, defined by certain critical elements: relationship, awareness, ritual, internal commitment, and choice. Although the retreat was a successful means of exploring these elements, the degree to which each employee could benefit from them was determined by the extent of their internal commitment not only to themselves, but also to their jobs.
Resumo:
It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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Cette thèse prend pour objet le nouage entre l’autoréflexivité et la mise en forme esthétique dans la poésie de Christophe Tarkos, produite dans les années 1990. Elle met en lumière les rapports entre l’élaboration d’une théorie du langage au sein de cette œuvre poétique et ses visées esthétiques totalisantes. Il s’agit d’identifier les principes générateurs de la théorie et de fournir une analyse de ses fondements qui s’ancrent dans la crise de la représentation moderne commençant dans la deuxième moitié du dix-neuvième siècle. Les motifs de la crise revisités par Tarkos inscrivent sa poésie dans une historicité, et notre thèse tente d’interpréter cette actualisation dans une œuvre qui donne forme au monde et à la mémoire individuelle. L’hypothèse qui chapeaute notre étude est que la théorie du langage favorise l’intelligibilité de l’œuvre totalisante en lui offrant un support réflexif. Notre thèse, qui privilégie une méthode fondée sur l’analyse des textes, se divise en trois parties. La première propose une recension de la réception critique de l’œuvre, dont nous retraçons les grandes lignes d’interprétation, de Christian Prigent à Jean-Michel Espitallier. Tout en plaçant Tarkos dans le champ poétique français, cette étape nous permet de positionner notre recherche par rapport à certains lieux communs de la critique. La deuxième partie vise à étudier la théorie du langage de Tarkos à partir de ses manifestes principaux (Le Signe =, Manifeste chou, Ma langue est poétique et La poésie est une intelligence) qui révèlent plusieurs principes, pouvoirs et limites de la langue et de la poésie. Afin de montrer la spécificité du concept de la « pâte-mot » de Tarkos, nous l’étudions dans un dialogue avec la figure de la « pâte » langagière chez la poète française Danielle Collobert. La troisième partie propose une étude de la volonté et de l’esthétique totalisantes dans l’œuvre de Tarkos, qui cherche à donner forme au réel. En effet, la poésie répond à l’excès du réel par diverses stratégies. Tout en voulant représenter son caractère débordant par une énonciation logorrhéique ou en usant de procédés comme celui de la répétition, elle cherche à le maîtriser dans des formes textuelles stables comme des fragments de prose « carrés » (Carrés, Caisses), dans des listes énumératives (Anachronisme) ou dans des réseaux d’images. La volonté totalisante chez Tarkos semble également prendre origine dans un sentiment d’urgence qui concerne, en dernière instance, une bataille contre la finitude.
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Ce projet de mémoire de maîtrise portera sur Descartes et la preuve dite "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu. La présentation qui sera faite de cette preuve, de ses tenants et de ses aboutissants, tiendra compte: premièrement, du rôle et du statut de celle-ci dans l'ordre des raisons métaphysiques; deuxièmement, des relations entre la preuve "ontologique" et la preuve dite "par les effets"; et troisièmement, des différentes oeuvres de Descartes dans lesquelles il est question de l'argument ontologique. Ainsi, cette analyse permettra de noter les différences relatives qu'il pourrait y avoir chez Descartes quant au fond ou à la forme de cet argument. Nous évoquerons notamment la position différente qu'occupe cette preuve dans deux écrits, soient les Méditations métaphysiques (1641) et les Principes de la philosophie (1644). Ce genre d'analyse nous permettra de nous pencher sur le débat initié par Martial Guéroult et Henri Gouhier concernant la place de la preuve "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu au sein de l'ordre des raisons métaphysiques ainsi que ses relations avec la preuve "par les effets". La postérité de ce débat sera également considérée. Aussi, nous serons à même de poser la question à savoir s'il y a une évolution de la preuve "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu au fil des oeuvres dans la pensée de Descartes. En résumé, dans ce mémoire, nous aborderons deux problématiques: la question de l'autonomie ou de la non autonomie de la preuve "ontologique" par rapport à la preuve "par les effets", et le questionnement quant à la possibilité d'une évolution de la place et de la nature de la preuve dite "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu dans les écrits de Descartes.
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Les Méditations cartésiennes exposent sommairement le rôle de la phénoménologie dans le projet de refondation des sciences. Husserl y discutera, à partir du doute cartésien, une sortie du scepticisme vers une fondation de la connaissance. Pour cela, deux choses devront être exposées : premièrement, le principe central à la subjectivité nommé « l’ego transcendantal » qui permettra de comprendre ce qui constitue l’essence de la subjectivité. Deuxièmement, la communauté intersubjective elle-même qui, une fois atteinte, permettra la constitution d’une connaissance certaine. Ce mémoire retracera le développement fait entre la première réduction, qui semble restreindre le phénoménologue à sa propre subjectivité, à celle de l’atteinte d’une communauté intersubjective. En exposant méthodiquement l’avancée de Husserl, nous montrerons comment une réelle intersubjectivité est développée, tout en soulevant certaines objections qui limitent la portée de cette entreprise, afin de parvenir à deux choses : premièrement, une remise en contexte d’un argument complexe se laissant trop souvent réduire à une lecture idéaliste au sens classique du terme; deuxièmement, que le corps joue un rôle central dans le projet husserlien et que ce sera sur celui-ci, pris en un sens spécifique, que s’édifiera la communauté existant entre les différentes monades.