Performance management framework: the fit between PM framework adopted in Portuguese local government and the Otley’s framework

Purpose/objectives: This paper seeks to investigate whether performance management (PM) framework adopted in Portuguese local government (PLG) fit the Otley’s PM framework (1999). In particularly, the research questions are (1) whether PM framework adopted in PLG (SIADAP) fit the Otley´s framework, and (2) how local politicians (aldermen) see the operation of performance management systems (PMS) in PLG (focusing on the goal-setting process and incentive and reward structures). Theoretical positioning/contributions: With this paper we intend to contribute to literature on how the Otley’s PM framework can guide empirical research about the operation of PMS. In particular, the paper contributes to understand the fit between PMS implemented in PLG and the Otley´s PM framework. The analysis of this fit can be a good contribution to understand if PMS are used in PLG as a management tool or as a strategic response to external pressures (based on interviews conducted to aldermen). We believe that the Otley’s PM framework, as well as the extended PM framework presented by Ferreira and Otley (2009), can provide a useful research tool to understand the operation of PMS in PLG. Research method: The first research question is the central issue in this paper and is analyzed based on the main reforms introduced by Portuguese government on PM of public organizations (like municipalities). On the other hand, interviews conducted on three larger Portuguese municipalities (Oporto, Braga, and Matosinhos) show how aldermen see the operation of PMS in PLG, highlighting the goals setting process with targets associated and the existing of incentive and reward structures linked with performance. Findings: Generally we find that formal and regulated PM frameworks in PLG fit the main issues of the Otley’s PM framework. However, regarding the aldermen perceptions about PMS in practice we find a gap between theory and practice, especially regarding difficulties associated with the lack of a culture of goals and targets setting and the lack of incentive and reward structures linked with performance.

Contemporary issues in the government and administration of Latin American megacities

This paper is the first to systematically analyze and compare the structures of city governance and administration for seven major cities in Latin America, four of which are megacities (population of over 10 million), and three others are large national capitals. U.S. and U. K. models of city administration are reviewed as baseline models against which differences in Latin American may be explored. Structures of Government in Latin America show several important features and trends: 1) the lack of metropolitan (cross jurisdictional) authority; 2) the existence of strong mayors and weak councils"; 3) high levels of partisanship; 4) overlapping rather than interlocking bureaucracies; 5) pressures towards the privatization of city services, but continuing tension over the desirability of public versus private control; 6) greater fiscal responsibility and autonomy; and 7), a continuing marginalization of public participation in megacity governance.In spite of these features, many cities throughout the region (regardless of whether they are megacity size or national capitals), are actively intensifying their efforts to develop more effective, accountable and democratic governance structures.

Electronic government policies in Brazil: context, ICT management and outcomes

The State Reform processes combined with the emergence and use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) originated electronic government policies and initiatives in Brazil. This paper dwells on Brazilian e-government by investigating the institutional design it assumed in the state's public sphere, and how it contributed to outcomes related to e-gov possibilities. The analyses were carried out under an interpretativist perspective by making use of Institutional Theory. From the analyses of interviews with relevant actors in the public sphere, such as state secretaries and presidents of public ICT companies, conclusions point towards low institutionalization of e-gov policies. The institutional design of Brazilian e-gov limits the use of ICT to provide integrated public services, to amplify participation and transparency, and to improve public policies management.

How logrolling can explain the failure of the government coalition in Brazil

This article presents an analysis of the behavior of federal representatives in the Brazilian House of Representatives between 1995 and 1998, when a series of constitutional amendments were presented by the president to be voted on by Congress. The objective is to show that the lack of a stable government coalition resulted in costs to society that were not anticipated by the government. The study argues that a logroll - a trade of votes - was the strategy used by the government in order to guarantee the number of votes necessary to approve the amendments. This strategy created a vicious system in which representatives would only vote with the government if they had benefits in return.

Inovação aberta na gestão pública: análise do plano de ação brasileiro para a Open Government Partnership

Este estudo objetivou analisar o Plano de Ação brasileiro para o Governo Aberto, baseado na teoria da inovação aberta na gestão pública. Utilizou-se de uma pesquisa documental, com vistas a aprofundar o conhecimento do fenômeno em questão. O documento foi escolhido intencionalmente, por ser exemplo basilar das políticas públicas relacionadas à inovação aberta brasileira. Os resultados mostram que os compromissos firmados pelo governo brasileiro estão consoantes com o processo de inovação aberta pública. As ações previstas no Plano estão especificamente relacionadas a transparência, abertura de dados e preparação do corpo estatal para o processo aberto de inovação.

Accountability and co-production of information and control: social observatories and their relationship with government agencies

Abstract:Through the development of a proposal to categorize accountability into four stages - classical, cross-sectional, systemic, and diffused -, this article aims to identify characteristics of co-production of information and socio-political control of public administration in the work of Brazilian social observatories in relationship with government control agencies. The study analyses data from 20 social observatories and, particularly, three experiences of co-production of information and control, based on a systemic perspective on accountability and a model with four categories: Political and cultural; valuing; systemic-organizational, and production. The conclusions summarize characteristics of these practices, specific phases in the accountability processes, as well as the potentialities and challenges of co-production of information and control, which not only influences, but it is also influenced by the accountability system.

Análise comparativa entre a promoção para arrendamento e venda de imóveis de habitação

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Civil na Área de Especialização de Edificações

Music and drama in primary schools in the Madeira Island - Narratives of ownership and leadership

Este artigo foi uma das publicações resultantes do projeto financiado pela FCT "Música e Drama no 1º ciclo do Ensino básico – o caso da Região Autónoma da Madeira" (PTDC/CED/72112/2006).

The Cornerstones of Modern Government Maps, Weights and Measures and Census in Liberal Portugal (19th century)

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor in History and Civilisation from the European University Institute

Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.

Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by considering a (sequential) Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm. Furthermore, we compare our results with the ones previously published by an other author obtained in a (simultaneous) Cournot duopoly.

EcoTerra Model - application of environmental fiscal reform in local government financing in Portugal

Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International and Comparative Perspectives: Volume VI, 699-715

O imperativo das tecnologias do estado. Estratégias de e-government para empresas em Portugal

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais, área de especialização em Ciência Política

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.