Is there an optimal board size?

This research quantitatively examines the determinants of board size and the consequence it has on the performance of large companies in Australia. In line with international and the prevalent United States research the results suggest that there is no significant relationship between board size and their subsequent performance. In examining whether more complex operations require larger boards it was found that larger firms or firms with more lines of business tended to have more directors. Data analysis from the research supports the proposition that blockholders could affect management practices and that they enhances performance as measured by shareholder return.

Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

Corporate governance and compliance : preventative measure or just another fad?

In the wake of recent corporate collapses, 'corporate governance' has received unprecedented levels of attention. It can be narrowly defined as how a company is directed and steered. The responsibility of steering a company is entrusted with the board of directors, who become the focus of governance mechanisms.Yet this is not as straightforward as it appears - Australia has experienced massive shifts in business regulations over the past two decades. One innovation in Australian business regulation is 'enforced self-regulation' which combines the benefits of voluntary self-regulation with the coercive power of the State, implemented via a compliance program. A possible hazard of compliance system is that management might treat this responsibility as a 'box ticking' exercise. Therefore effective governance and compliance entails more than setting up internal and regulatory mechanisms; the willingness of various stakeholders to collaborate is crucial. This suggests that managing relationships between stakeholders of an organization is the key to averting corporate collapses.

Theorizing about board governance of nonprofit organizations : surveying the landscape

Leading scholars on nonprofit governance have urged that future research be more informed by theory in order to promote more rigorous analysis. The aim of this paper is to survey the major theories on board governance, including those based in the disciplines of economics, management, sociology, psychology, politics, history and theology, in order to respond to this challenge. In addition, the relevance of these theories to a critical set of board behaviors - that is, how boards monitor, judge and influence organizational performance - is examined. Gaps in the theoretical literature are identified, and implications for public policy are explored. We conclude that a multi-theory and multi-disciplinary perspective is needed if research on governance of nonprofit organizations is to be complete in scope, rich in content, and relevant.

Corporate governance, accounting and finance: a review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Corporate governance as social responsibility : a meta-regulation approach to raise social responsibility of corporate governance in a weak economy

Corporate governance (CG) denotes the rules of business decision-making and directs the internal mechanism of companies to follow the output of the rules. It includes the customs, policies, laws and institutions as a set of processes that affects the way in which a corporation is directed, administered or controlled.

New governance and CSR

New governance (NG) denotes a new approach in the governance strategies. This approach comes with a conceptual background explaining how the hardcore corporate decision-making and people-friendly business strategies have started to converge, relying on executive fiduciary duties, stakeholder engagement, and economic analysis of management incentives. It also addresses how companies incorporate stakeholder-friendly business strategies, examines the role of shareholder and board activism in pushing for social responsibility, and provides quantitative assessments of reporting practices, indexes, and ratings that link governance with responsibility (Kolk 2008; Statman 2005; Deegan 2002). It suggests models for pursuing this emerging frontier through greater involvement on behalf of the board of directors and utilizes a comparative approach to cross the border between the traditional ...

Are boards flying blind when it comes to enterprise technology governance?

Considering the sheer speed, complexity and ever changing risk in today’s technology saturated business environment, it’s hardly surprising that the call for digitally savvy directors is increasing. Emerging research suggests serious consequences for boards that continue to ignore or delegate enterprise-level technology governance.

Building project competence : developing dynamic capabilities with knowledge governance mechanisms

This research investigates the development of project competence, and particularly, three related dynamic capabilities (shifting, adapting, leveraging) that contribute to project competence development. In doing so, we make use of the emerging literature on knowledge governance and theorize how knowledge governance mechanisms can move the organization towards desired knowledge-based goals. A multiple-case study comprising 23 cases advances our understanding of the elements that trigger, enable, hamper, and drive shifting, leveraging and adapting. Finally, the paper offers a tentative framework of dynamic capability building promoting project competence development.

Towards an integrated maturity model of asset management capabilities

Asset service organisations often recognize asset management as a core competence to deliver benefits to their business. But how do organizations know whether their asset management processes are adequate? Asset management maturity models, which combine best practices and competencies, provide a useful approach to test the capacity of organisations to manage their assets. Asset management frameworks are required to meet the dynamic challenges of managing assets in contemporary society. Although existing models are subject to wide variations in their implementation and sophistication, they also display a distinct weakness in that they tend to focus primarily on the operational and technical level and neglect the levels of strategy, policy and governance as well as the social and human resources – the people elements. Moreover, asset management maturity models have to respond to the external environmental factors, including such as climate change and sustainability, stakeholders and community demand management. Drawing on five dimensions of effective asset management – spatial, temporal, organisational, statistical, and evaluation – as identified by Amadi Echendu et al. [1], this paper carries out a comprehensive comparative analysis of six existing maturity models to identify the gaps in key process areas. Results suggest incorporating these into an integrated approach to assess the maturity of asset-intensive organizations. It is contended that the adoption of an integrated asset management maturity model will enhance effective and efficient delivery of services.

The impact of organizational boundaries on (re)building capabilities

The literature concerning firm boundaries has focussed extensively on the rationale for different boundary choices and the economic efficiencies that such choices can make. There is also an acknowledged position that a firm’s boundary choices may impact the ability of a firm to maintain and even build new capabilities, though such choices may not be optimal from an economic efficiency perspective. It is in this context that we seek to investigate how firms make this potential trade-off in respect of their boundary choices and how these choices are implemented across a wide range of activities. Using qualitative data from three public sector construction oriented organizations, we observe that neither pure make nor buy decisions assisted significantly in capability building. Dual modes – where firms make and buy the same product or service simultaneously – provided firms with some opportunities to manage this paradox, but the most successful decisions seemed to occur in respect of using intermediate governance modes such as alliances. We also observed that the boundary choice was just one dimension of the capability building process and firms pursuing the same boundary choice decisions often had quite divergent outcomes on the basis of their boundary management and the ability of knowledge to move across firm boundaries.

Invisible ties : implicit contracting and its implications for the agency relationship in corporate governance research

Research that applies agency theory to boards of directors suffers from being quite narrow as it does not recognize the true legal relationships between directors, managers and shareholders. Instead, the board of directors is best conceptualized as the principal, management as agents and stockholders’ relationships as a mix of legal and implicit contracts. We propose a recast agency relationship and develop a contingency approach that proposes (1) how a corporation’s goals vary with a board’s implicit contracting and (2) a reconceptualization of the agency problem facing boards.

Enterprise Business Technology Governance: Three Competencies to Build Board Digital Leadership Capability.

The competent leadership of digital transformation needs to involve the board of directors. The reported lack of such capability in boards is becoming a pressing issue. A part of leadership in such transformation is the board of director’s competence to lead Enterprise Business Technology Governance (EBTG). In this paper we take the position that EBTG competencies are essential in boards, because competent EBTG has been shown to contribute to increased revenue, profit, and returns. We update and expand on the results of a multi-method approach to the development of a set of three board of director competencies needed for effective EBTG.