A Theoretical Comparison Between Integrated and Realized Volatilies

In this paper, we provide both qualitative and quantitative measures of the cost of measuring the integrated volatility by the realized volatility when the frequency of observation is fixed. We start by characterizing for a general diffusion the difference between the realized and the integrated volatilities for a given frequency of observations. Then, we compute the mean and variance of this noise and the correlation between the noise and the integrated volatility in the Eigenfunction Stochastic Volatility model of Meddahi (2001a). This model has, as special examples, log-normal, affine, and GARCH diffusion models. Using some previous empirical works, we show that the standard deviation of the noise is not negligible with respect to the mean and the standard deviation of the integrated volatility, even if one considers returns at five minutes. We also propose a simple approach to capture the information about the integrated volatility contained in the returns through the leverage effect.

An Eigenfunction Approach for Volatility Modeling.

In this paper, we introduce a new approach for volatility modeling in discrete and continuous time. We follow the stochastic volatility literature by assuming that the variance is a function of a state variable. However, instead of assuming that the loading function is ad hoc (e.g., exponential or affine), we assume that it is a linear combination of the eigenfunctions of the conditional expectation (resp. infinitesimal generator) operator associated to the state variable in discrete (resp. continuous) time. Special examples are the popular log-normal and square-root models where the eigenfunctions are the Hermite and Laguerre polynomials respectively. The eigenfunction approach has at least six advantages: i) it is general since any square integrable function may be written as a linear combination of the eigenfunctions; ii) the orthogonality of the eigenfunctions leads to the traditional interpretations of the linear principal components analysis; iii) the implied dynamics of the variance and squared return processes are ARMA and, hence, simple for forecasting and inference purposes; (iv) more importantly, this generates fat tails for the variance and returns processes; v) in contrast to popular models, the variance of the variance is a flexible function of the variance; vi) these models are closed under temporal aggregation.

A Systematic Framework for Analyzing the Dynamic Effects of Permanent and Transitory Shocks.

This paper proposes a systematic framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of permanent and transitory shocks on a system of \"n\" economic variables.

Statistical Inference for Computable General Equilibrium Models with Application to a Model of the Moroccan Economy

We study the problem of measuring the uncertainty of CGE (or RBC)-type model simulations associated with parameter uncertainty. We describe two approaches for building confidence sets on model endogenous variables. The first one uses a standard Wald-type statistic. The second approach assumes that a confidence set (sampling or Bayesian) is available for the free parameters, from which confidence sets are derived by a projection technique. The latter has two advantages: first, confidence set validity is not affected by model nonlinearities; second, we can easily build simultaneous confidence intervals for an unlimited number of variables. We study conditions under which these confidence sets take the form of intervals and show they can be implemented using standard methods for solving CGE models. We present an application to a CGE model of the Moroccan economy to study the effects of policy-induced increases of transfers from Moroccan expatriates.

Paretian Quasi-Orders: Two Agents.

We characterize Paretian quasi-orders in the two-agent continuous case.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

A Systematic Framework for Analyzing the Dynamic Effects of Permanent and Transitory Shocks.

This paper proposes a systematic framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of permanent and transitory shocks on a system of n economic variables.