Typology of the Tools of EC Communications Regulation

The present article is an abridged version of a chapter to the book EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law (London: Cameron May 2007). It explores in a neutral manner the pros and cons of the currently applied toolkit of European Community communications law, i.e. the generic competition law rules and the sector specific regulatory framework. A number of criteria are introduced and these tools are then tested as to their efficiency and efficacy.

Electronic Communications as a Distinct and Unique Object of Regulation

The present paper is an abridged version of the first chapter to the book EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law (London: Cameron May, 2007). It is intended to pinpoint the contours of the communications sector as an object of regulation - an exercise that is essential to any thoughts on appropriate regulatory design. The communications sector is defined through its salient features of being (i) network-bound; (ii) dynamic; (iii) converging; (iv) sensitive to regulation and society���s reactions; and as one (v) with special societal role and as (vi) part of the new economy.

Human rights and international trade

Economic globalization and respect for human rights are both highly topical issues. In theory, more trade should increase economic welfare and protection of human rights should ensure individual dignity. Both fields of law protect certain freedoms: economic development should lead to higher human rights standards, and UN embargoes are used to secure compliance with human rights agreements. However the interaction between trade liberalisation and human rights protection is complex, and recently, tension has arisen between these two areas. Do WTO obligations covering intellectual property prevent governments from implementing their human rights obligations, including rights to food or health? Is it fair to accord the benefits of trade subject to a clean human rights record? This book first examines the theoretical framework of the interaction between the disciplines of international trade law and human rights. It builds upon the well-known debate between Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, who construes trade obligations as human rights, and Professor Philip Alston, who warns of a merger and acquisition of human rights by trade law. From this starting point, further chapters explore the differing legal matrices of the two fields and examine how cooperation between them might be improved, both in international law-making and institutions,in dispute settlement. The interaction between trade and human rights is then explored through seven case studies:freedom of expression and competition law; IP protection and health; agricultural trade and the right to food; trade restrictions on conflict WHO convention on tobacco control; and, finally, human rights conditionalities in preferential trade schemes.

Disciplining Investment Incentives: A Lost Cause?

An E15 Initiative think piece: Investment incentives rank among the most important policy instruments governments employ to influence the locational decisions of multinational firms. In the wake of the recent increase in locational competition and the growing impact of investment incentives and support measures for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the need for enhanced disciplines on investment incentives has gained political and academic salience. This think piece explores the evolution of investment incentives from a development and rule-making perspective. It summarises the existing literature and examines current practices and recent trends in FDI flows and the use of various investment incentives. This is followed by a discussion of the reasons for the observed stalemate in attempts at disciplinary rule-making. The paper concludes by putting forth recommendations for data gathering and transparency that could further the move toward improved global governance founded on the increasing complementarities of trade, investment, and competition law and policy as the core pillars of a more open, inclusive, and just world economy.

Poder da marca: intera����es entre direito antitruste e direito industrial

O presente trabalho busca analisar os diferentes tratamentos dispensados �� marca no ��mbito do controle preventivo e no controle repressivo de condutas. A an��lise da fun����o social das marcas demonstrou que esta �� uma propriedade que se realiza na concorr��ncia e pela concorr��ncia. Nesse sentido, n��o h�� d��vidas de que est�� sujeita aos princ��pios do Direito Concorrencial. Todavia, a maneira como esses princ��pios balizam a marca no controle de atos de concentra����o, de um lado, e no controle repressivo de condutas, de outro, difere. No ��mbito do controle de atos de concentra����o, a atua����o da autoridade concorrencial �� orientada por uma variante do princ��pio da precau����o, o que a autoriza a tomar decis��es e impor restri����es aos direitos marc��rios mesmo em um contexto de incerteza. No ��mbito do controle repressivo de condutas, todavia, a interven����o do CADE est�� sujeita aos princ��pios do Processo Administrativo Sancionador. Neste contexto, as condutas que envolvem o uso de direitos de propriedade intelectual, incluindo as marcas, devem ser analisadas �� luz do princ��pio da estrita legalidade. Um crit��rio jur��dico objetivo �� necess��rio para distinguir o l��cito do il��cito, sobretudo em um cen��rio no qual est��o em jogo duas pol��ticas p��blicas distintas: a de prote����o �� concorr��ncia e a de prote����o �� direitos de propriedade industrial. Sendo essas duas pol��ticas instrumentais e parciais, voltadas a um fim maior de pol��tica econ��mica, devem harmonizar-se, e n��o sobrepor-se uma a outra. Ademais, o escopo de atua����o da autoridade concorrencial em processos que investiguem o uso abusivo de direitos marc��rios e atos de concorr��ncia desleal deve ser esclarecido. O direito concorrencial, enquanto ramo aut��nomo do direito, com princ��pios e m��todos interpretativos pr��prios, pode analisar institutos e figuras de outros ramos que com ele guardem rela����o sem ter de ficar adstrito ao posicionamento de outras inst��ncias.

REACH: A killer whale for SMEs? CEPS Policy Brief No. 307, 9 December 2013

REACH is a very demanding system for any business either large or small, yet right from the start one of the more serious concerns was whether and how SMEs could cope with the Regulation. After all, some 27,600 companies in EU chemistry are SMEs (95% of all firms). Seven years down the line, many of these fears are materialising. Assuming no significant changes are introduced to REACH, this paper suggests the following recommendations: Above all, we strongly encourage SMEs to start early and develop a strategy for REACH compliance well before 2018. Address the potential competition law implications of current SIEF arrangements, e.g. through a Guidance document from DG Competition by 2014 (in time for 2018) Facilitate the exchange of information along the value chain by adopting pragmatic approach to the content and format of Safety Data Sheets. More can be done on the IT front as well, for instance by developing tools that generate compliant Safety Data Sheets. Improve the communication of REACH and its intended goals, that is, the health and environmental benefits, to the wider public. SMEs regret the unawareness of the public in the light of the enormous efforts they have to undertake. In the event of a later review of REACH, the logic should be risk-based rather than hazard-based.

Commitments or prohibition? The EU antitrust dilemma. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/01, 31 January 2014

The issue: Excluding cartels, most investigations into suspected infringements of European Union competition law are resolved with ���commitment decisions���. The European Commission drops the case in exchange for a commitment from the company under investigation to implement measures to stop the presumed anti-competitive behaviour. Commitment decisions are considered speedier than formal sanctions (prohibition decisions) in restoring normal competitive market conditions. They have a cost, however: commitments are voluntary and are unlikely to be subject to judicial review. This reduces the European Commission���s incentive to build a robust case. Because commitment decisions do not establish any legal precedent, they provide for little guidance on the interpretation of the law. Policy challenge: The European Commission relies increasingly on commitment decisions. More transparency on the substance of allegations, and the establishment of a higher number of legal precedents, are however necessary. This applies in particular to cases that tackle antitrust issues in new areas, such as markets for digital goods, in which companies might find it difficult to assess if a certain behaviour constitutes a violation of competition rules. To ensure greater transparency and mitigate some of the drawbacks of commitment decisions, while retaining their main benefits, the full detail of the objections addressed by the European Commission to defendants should be published.

Antitrust, regulatory capture and economic integration. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/11, JULY 2015

There is growing worldwide concern about bias in the enforcement of competition law in favour of domestic firms. Even seemingly neutral antitrust laws can lead discrimination if they are enforced selectively. - Authors investigate the distortions that national competition authorities generate when they pursue non-competition goals in favour of domestic firms, and discuss ways to address this negative policy development in a globalised world. - The distortions identified in the paper would dissipate if governments agreed that the sole objective of competition law ought to be the protection of consumer welfare that competition-law institutions ought to be protected against capture. - A realistic and effective way to prompt international convergence towards independent enforcement of competition laws is through the inclusion of competition clauses in bilateral trade agreements and the development of dispute-resolution mechanisms.

Drug Reformulation Regulatory Gaming in Pharmaceuticals: Enforcement & Innovation Implications

This article examines drug reformulation regulatory gaming as a vehicle for analyzing the way in which European courts and the Commission are currently approaching innovation issues in the pharmaceutical sector. First, the economics literature regarding pharmaceutical innovation is briefly summarized. Next, the phenomenon of regulatory gaming is introduced, followed by an analysis of the two primary theories of harm being used to address drug reformulations as a competition concern. In comparing the recent General Court decision in AstraZeneca to earlier U.S. court cases addressing similar conduct, it is asserted that these approaches differ in significant ways with regards to preservation of innovation incentives as well as on the basis of institutional and evidentiary concerns. Finally, this discussion is then placed into the broader context of the ongoing debate regarding pharmaceutical innovation that first surfaced in the Syfait cases���in particular, the desirability of sector-specific competition law analysis of pharmaceutical innovation.

A rela����o entre o direito e a teoria econ��mica na jurisprud��ncia do cade sobre tabelas m��dicas

Disserta����o (mestrado)���Universidade de Bras��lia, Faculdade de Direito, Programa de P��s-Gradua����o em Direito, 2015.

O direito antitruste na economia digital : implica����es concorrenciais do acesso a dados

Disserta����o (mestrado)���Universidade de Bras��lia, Faculdade de Direito, Programa de P��s-Gradua����o em Direito, 2016.

Consecuencias negociales de las pr��cticas desleales contra los consumidores: relaciones entre el Derecho de contratos y el Derecho de la competencia desleal

En los ��ltimos tiempos hemos asistido a diversas situaciones en las que la contrataci��n de productos y servicios por los consumidores se encuentra fuertemente influenciada por distintas actuaciones empresariales que pueden calificarse como pr��cticas desleales por enga��osas o agresivas. Esta realidad pone de manifiesto la intensa interrelaci��n que existe entre contrato y mercado, y consecuentemente la necesidad de articular puentes de conexi��n entre el Derecho contratos y de la competencia desleal. Este trabajo aborda las conexiones entre estos sectores normativos con el fin de analizar las posibles soluciones a los problemas derivados de la contrataci��n de consumo afectada por pr��cticas desleales. Tras una breve introducci��n donde se da debida cuenta del prop��sito y justificaci��n de la investigaci��n, el trabajo inicia con la exposici��n de la tradicional situaci��n de desconexi��n entre las disciplinas contractual y concurrencial. Posteriormente, se analizan las conexiones intersectoriales en los planos axiol��gico y funcional, as�� como los distintos materiales normativos de los que se infieren esas aun incipientes conexiones. Sobre la base de lo anterior, se examinan las medidas correctoras individuales que el Derecho de la competencia desleal pone a disposici��n de los consumidores para hacer frente a las pr��cticas desleales, las propuestas de lege ferenda proporcionadas por la doctrina patria para remover los efectos contractuales de estas pr��cticas, as�� como las diversas soluciones ofrecidas por distintos Estados miembros de la UE. A continuaci��n, se analizan los nuevos materiales normativos provenientes de la UE que ahondan en el proceso de permeabilizaci��n entre el Derecho de contratos y de la competencia desleal, as�� como las iniciativas legislativas tendentes a su incorporaci��n a nuestro ordenamiento. El trabajo concluye con un conjunto de conclusiones reasuntivas entresacadas del estudio realizado, que se clausuran con la propuesta de algunas directrices para lo que entendemos ser��a una correcta incorporaci��n de la normativa comunitaria.

Abusing data dominance in the digital market. The application of merger control and article 102 TFEU to data-related conducts.

The internet and digital technologies revolutionized the economy. Regulating the digital market has become a priority for the European Union. While promoting innovation and development, EU institutions must assure that the digital market maintains a competitive structure. Among the numerous elements characterizing the digital sector, users��� data are particularly important. Digital services are centered around personal data, the accumulation of which contributed to the centralization of market power in the hands of a few large providers. As a result, data-driven mergers and data-related abuses gained a central role for the purposes of EU antitrust enforcement. In light of these considerations, this work aims at assessing whether EU competition law is well-suited to address data-driven mergers and data-related abuses of dominance. These conducts are of crucial importance to the maintenance of competition in the digital sector, insofar as the accumulation of users��� data constitutes a fundamental competitive advantage. To begin with, part 1 addresses the specific features of the digital market and their impact on the definition of the relevant market and the assessment of dominance by antitrust authorities. Secondly, part 2 analyzes the EU���s case law on data-driven mergers to verify if merger control is well-suited to address these concentrations. Thirdly, part 3 discusses abuses of dominance in the phase of data collection and the legal frameworks applicable to these conducts. Fourthly, part 4 focuses on access to ���essential��� datasets and the indirect effects of anticompetitive conducts on rivals��� ability to access users��� information. Finally, Part 5 discusses differential pricing practices implemented online and based on personal data. As it will be assessed, the combination of an efficient competition law enforcement and the auspicial adoption of a specific regulation seems to be the best solution to face the challenges raised by ���data-related dominance���.