Analysis of road safety incentives in highway concessions in Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Analysis of road safety incentives in highway concessions in Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Do Public Private Partnerships Improve Road Safety? The Case of Toll Concessions in Spain

El Transportation Research Board es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte. Aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to evaluate whether PPPs lead to an improvement in road safety, when compared with other infrastructure management systems. Second, is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPP contracts in Spain have been effective at improving safety performance. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high-capacity network covering years 2007-2009. The results showed that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not manageable by the private concessionaire such as the average annual daily traffic, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of accidents.

Analysis of road safety incentives applied in PPP road = Análisis de incentivos a la seguridad aplicados en concesiones de carreteras

En este artículo se recoge cómo se ha regulado este aspecto tradicionalmente en concesiones y cómo se viene haciendo más recientemente, comparando para tres concesiones europeas puestas en servicio en los últimos años, las bonificaciones con el beneficio social que corresponden a cada nivel de reducción de la accidentalidad en la carretera. Los resultados arrojan que los incentivos aplicados, tanto antiguamente como los más recientes, son anodinos por dos motivos: porque son muy inferiores al beneficio social derivado de ellos y porque aparentemente son muy inferiores al coste de las actuaciones de mejora de la seguridad vial. Road safety is one of the most important issues in PPP roads. At this respect, to achieve a property regulation it is necessary to introduce objective and explicit incentives in the contracts. Besides, these incentives must be focused at the net social benefit. This paper explains how road safety has been introduced traditionally in PPP road contracts and how it is been doing it nowadays, comparing for three recent concessions of Europe, the bonuses and the social benefit associated to each reduction of accidents in the roads. As a result, it can be affirmed that the incentives applied, both traditional and the most ones, are unremarkable for two reasons: because they are much lower than the social benefit derived from them and because they apparently are well below the cost of measures to improve road safety.

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