The Risk Management of Minimum Return Guarantees

Contracts paying a guaranteed minimum rate of return and a fraction of a positive excess rate, which is specified relative to a benchmark portfolio, are closely related to unit-linked life-insurance products and can be considered as alternatives to direct investment in the underlying benchmark. They contain an embedded power option, and the key issue is the tractable and realistic hedging of this option, in order to rigorously justify valuation by arbitrage arguments and prevent the guarantees from becoming uncontrollable liabilities to the issuer. We show how to determine the contract parameters conservatively and implement robust risk-management strategies.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Inseparable, incapable, or invisible: Why public organizations award no-bid contracts

No-bid contracting is a highly prevalent practice in public procurement of technology services. Alt-hough no-bid contracting is a substantial problem since it reduces competition and welfare, the litera-ture lacks theoretical explanations and empirical tests for why public organizations award no-bid con-tracts. In this paper, we propose three theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting, drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational learning, and institutional theory. We also present how we test these explanations using a comprehensive sample of public procurement transactions. We expect to contribute theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting and practical implications for policy-makers.

Contractual Difficulties in Environmental Management and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Case of Conservation and Mitigation Banking

This paper offers a principal-agent model of feasible private contracting in mitigation and conservation banking aimed at the protection of natural habitat and bio-diversity of US wetlands and uplands. It is shown that while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract, such a contract may not achieve the federally mandated objective of no net loss of habitat. This is because the minimum payment required as an economic incentive to private agents may be greater than what they should receive for the habitat values that they actually created in the field. This possible problem is shown to derive from nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the biological value of land as natural habitat and in non-habitat uses such as in urban development. The paper concludes with a consideration of several institutional devises that may promote the convergence of private contracting and the attainment of no net loss. These include the payment of subsidies, greater accuracy in the identification of actual quality by the principal, and the use of several incentive alignment devises.

Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.

A dual-band priority assignment algorithm for dynamic QoS resource management

Future high-quality consumer electronics will contain a number of applications running in a highly dynamic environment, and their execution will need to be efficiently arbitrated by the underlying platform software. The multimedia applications that currently execute in such similar contexts face frequent run-time variations in their resource demands, originated by the greedy nature of the multimedia processing itself. Changes in resource demands are triggered by numerous reasons (e.g. a switch in the input media compression format). Such situations require real-time adaptation mechanisms to adjust the system operation to the new requirements, and this must be done seamlessly to satisfy the user experience. One solution for efficiently managing application execution is to apply quality of service resource management techniques, based on assigning and enforcing resource contracts to applications. Most resource management solutions provide temporal isolation by enforcing resource assignments and avoiding any resource overruns. However, this has a clear limitation over the cost-effective resource usage. This paper presents a simple priority assignment scheme based on uniform priority bands to allow that greedy multimedia tasks incur in safe overruns that increase resource usage and do not threaten the timely execution of non-overrunning tasks. Experimental results show that the proposed priority assignment scheme in combination with a resource accounting mechanism preserves timely multimedia execution and delivery, achieves a higher cost-effective processor usage, and guarantees the execution isolation of non-overrunning tasks.

Assessment of irrigators’ preferences for different water supply risk management tools: option contract and insurance.

Irrigators face the risk of not having enough water to meet their crops’ demand. There are different mechanisms to cope with this risk, including water markets (option contracts) or insurance. A farmer will purchase them when the expected utility change derived from the tool is positive. This paper presents a theoretical assessment of the farmer’s expected utility under two different option contracts, a drought insurance and a combination of an option contract and the insurance. We analyze the conditions that determine farmer’s reference for one instrument or the other and perform a numerical application that is relevant for a Spanish region.

Water option contracts for reducing water supply risks: an application to the Tagus-Segura Transfer

El agua es un recurso cada vez más escaso y valioso. Por ello, los recursos hídricos disponibles deben asignarse de una forma eficiente entre los diferentes usos. El cambio climático aumentará la frecuencia y severidad de los eventos extremos, y podría incrementar la demanda de agua de los cultivos. El empleo de mecanismos flexibles de asignación de agua puede ser imprescindible para hacer frente a este aumento en la variabilidad del balance hídrico y para asegurar que los riesgos de suministro, y no solo los recursos, son compartidos de manera eficiente entre los usuarios. Los mercados de agua permiten la reasignación de los recursos hídricos, favoreciendo su transferencia desde los usos de menor a los de mayor valor. Diferentes tipos de mercados de agua se han establecido en diferentes partes del mundo, ayudando a los participantes a afrontar los problemas de escasez de agua en esas zonas. En España, los intercambios de agua están permitidos desde 1999, aunque la participación de los usuarios en el mercado ha sido limitada. Hay varios aspectos de los mercados de agua en España que deben mejorarse. Esta tesis, además de proponer una serie de cambios en el marco regulatorio, propone la introducción de contratos de opción de agua como una posible mejora. La principal ventaja de este tipo de contratos es la estabilidad legal e institucional que éstos proporcionan tanto a compradores como vendedores. Para apoyar esta propuesta, se han llevado a cabo diferentes análisis que muestran el potencial de los contratos de opción como herramienta de reducción del riesgo asociado a una oferta de agua inestable. La Cuenca del Segura (Sureste de España), la Cuenca del Tajo y el Acueducto Tajo- Segura han sido seleccionados como casos de estudio. Tres análisis distintos aplicados a dicha región se presentan en esta tesis: a) una evaluación de los contratos de opción como mecanismo para reducir los riesgos de disponibilidad de agua sufridos por los regantes en la Cuenca del Segura; b) un marco teórico para analizar las preferencias de los regantes por diferentes mecanismos de gestión del riesgo de disponibilidad de agua, su disposición a pagar por ellos y los precios aproximados de estos instrumentos (seguro de sequía y contratos de opción de agua); y c) una evaluación del papel de los contratos de opción en las decisiones de aprovisionamiento de agua de una comunidad de regantes ante una oferta de agua incierta. Los resultados muestran el potencial de reducción del riesgo de los contratos de opción para regantes en España, pero pueden ser extrapolados a otros sectores o regiones. Las principales conclusiones de esta tesis son: a) la agricultura será uno de los sectores más afectados por el cambio climático. Si los precios del agua aumentan, la rentabilidad de los cultivos puede caer hasta niveles negativos, lo que podría dar lugar al abandono de cultivos de regadío en algunas zonas de España. Las políticas de cambio climático y de agua deben estar estrechamente coordinadas para asegurar un uso de agua eficiente y la rentabilidad de la agricultura; b) aunque los mercados de agua han ayudado a algunos usuarios a afrontar problemas de disponibilidad del recurso en momentos de escasez, hay varios aspectos que deben mejorarse; c) es necesario desarrollar mercados de agua más flexibles y estables para garantizar una asignación eficiente de los recursos entre los usuarios de agua; d) los resultados muestran los beneficios derivados del establecimiento de un contrato de opción entre usuarios de agua del Tajo y del Segura para reducir el riesgo de disponibilidad de agua en la cuenca receptora; e) la disposición a pagar de los regantes por un contrato de opción de agua o un seguro de sequía hidrológica, que representa el valor que tienen estos mecanismos para aquellos usuarios de agua que se enfrentan a riesgos relacionados con la disponibilidad del recurso, es consistente con los resultados obtenidos en estudios previos y superior al precio de mercado de estos instrumentos, lo que favorece la viabilidad de estos mecanismos de gestión del riesgo ; y f) los contratos de opción podrían ayudar a optimizar las decisiones de aprovisionamiento de agua bajo incertidumbre, proporcionando más estabilidad y flexibilidad que los mercados temporales de agua. ABSTRACT Water is becoming increasingly scarce and valuable. Thus, existing water resources need to be efficiently allocated among users. Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of extreme events, and it may also increase irrigated crops' water demand. The implementation of flexible allocation mechanisms could be essential to cope with this increased variability of the water balance and ensure that supply risks, and not only water resources, are also efficiently shared and managed. Water markets allow for the reallocation of water resources from low to high value uses. Different water trading mechanisms have been created in different parts of the world and have helped users to alleviate water scarcity problems in those areas. In Spain, water trading is allowed since 1999, although market activity has been limited. There are several issues in the Spanish water market that should be improved. This thesis, besides proposing several changes in the legislative framework, proposes the introduction of water option contracts as a potential improvement. The main advantage for both buyer and seller derived from an option contract is the institutional and legal stability it provides. To support this proposal, different analyses have been carried out that show the potential of option contracts as a risk reduction tool to manage water supply instability. The Segura Basin (Southeast Spain), the Tagus Basin and the Tagus-Segura inter-basin Transfer have been selected as the case study. Three different analyses applied to this region are presented in this thesis: a) an evaluation of option contracts as a mechanisms to reduce water supply availability risks in the Segura Basin; b) a theoretical framework for analyzing farmer’s preferences for different water supply risk management tools and farmers’ willingness to pay for them, together with the assessment of the prices of these mechanisms (drought insurance and water option contracts); and c) an evaluation of the role of option contracts in water procurement decisions under uncertainty. Results show the risk-reduction potential of option contracts for the agricultural sector in Spain, but these results can be extrapolated to other sectors or regions. The main conclusions of the thesis are: a) agriculture would be one of the most affected sectors by climate change. With higher water tariffs, crop’s profitability can drop to negative levels, which may result in the abandoning of the crop in many areas. Climate change and water policies must be closely coordinated to ensure efficient water use and crops’ profitability; b) although Spanish water markets have alleviated water availability problems for some users during water scarcity periods, there are several issues that should be improved; c) more flexible and stable water market mechanisms are needed to allocate water resources and water supply risks among competing users; d) results show the benefits derived from the establishment of an inter-basin option contract between water users in the Tagus and the Segura basins for reducing water supply availability risks in the recipient area; e) irrigators’ willingness to pay for option contracts or drought insurance, that represent the value that this kind of trading mechanisms has for water users facing water supply reliability problems, are consistent with results obtained in previous works and higher than the prices of this risk management tools, which shows the feasibility of these mechanisms; and f) option contracts would help to optimize water procurement decisions under uncertainty, providing more flexibility and stability than the spot market.

Unbundling tolls from contracts: a new road PPP model

Considerable evidence from different countries has revealed important shortcomings in most road public-private partnership (PPP) models. In this paper a new PPP model is presented that overcomes some of the problems found in PPP road contracts. The new model is based on separating user tolls from the fees paid to PPP contractors and setting up new institutional arrangements to oversee PPPs.

Option contracts for allocating water in inter-basin transfers: the case of the Tagus-Segura Basin in Spain

Users in the Mediterranean region face significant water supply risks. Water markets mechanisms can provide flexibility to water systems run in tight situations. The largest water infrastructure in the Iberian Peninsula connects the Segura and Tagus Basins. Stakeholders and politicians in the Tagus Basin have asked that water transfers between the two basins be eventually phased out. The need to increase the statutory minimum environmental flow in the middle Tagus and to meet new urban demands is going to result in a redefinition of the Transfer?s management rules, leading to a reduction in the transferable volumes. To minimise the consequences of such restrictions to irrigators in the Segura Basin who depend on the transferred volumes, we propose the establishment of water option contracts between both basins that represents an institutional innovation with respect to previous inter-basin spot market experiences. Based on the draft of the new Tagus Basin Plan, we propose both a modification of the Transfer?s management rule and an innovative inter-basin option contract. The main goal of the paper is to define this contract and evaluate it with respect to non-market scenarios. We also assess the resulting impact on environmental flows in the Tagus River and water availability for users in the Segura Basin, together with the economic impacts of such contract on both basins. Our results show that the proposed option contract would reduce the impact of a change in the transfer?s management rule, and reduce the supply risks of the recipient area.

El análisis de la construcción sin pérdidas (Lean Construction) y su relación con el Project & Construction Management : propuesta de regulación en España y su inclusión en la ley de la ordenación de la edificación

El presente trabajo se basa en la filosofía de la Construcción sin Pérdidas (“Lean Construction”), analizando la situación de esta filosofía en el sector de la edificación en el contexto internacional y español, respondiendo las siguientes preguntas: 1. ¿Cómo surge el “Lean Construction”? 2. ¿Cuáles son sus actividades, funciones y cometidos? 3. ¿Existe regulación del ¨Lean Construction” en otros países? 4. ¿Existe demanda del ¨Lean Construction” en España? 5. ¿Existe regulación del ¨Lean Construction” en España? 6. ¿Cómo debería ser la regulación ¨Lean Construction” en España? 7. ¿Cuál es la relación del “Lean Construction” con el “Project & Construction Management”? 8. ¿Cómo debería ser la regulación de “Lean Construction” en España considerando su relación con el “Project & Construction Management”? Las preguntas indicadas las hemos respondido detalladamente en el presente trabajo, a continuación se resume las respuestas a dichas preguntas: 1. El “Lean Construction” surge en agosto de 1992, cuando el investigador finlandés Lauri Koskela publicó en la Universidad de Stanford el reporte TECHNICAL REPORT N° 72 titulado “Application of the New Production Philosophy to Construction”. Un año más tarde el Dr. Koskela invitó a un grupo de especialistas en construcción al primer workshop de esta materia en Finlandia, dando origen al International Group for Lean Construction (IGLC) lo que ha permitido extender la filosofía a EEUU, Europa, América, Asia, Oceanía y África. “Lean Construction” es un sistema basado en el enfoque “Lean Production” desarrollado en Japón por Toyota Motors a partir de los años cincuenta, sistema que permitió a sus fábricas producir unidades con mayor eficiencia que las industrias americanas, con menores recursos, en menor tiempo, y con un número menor de errores de fabricación. 2. El sistema “Lean Construction” busca maximizar el valor y disminuir las pérdidas de los proyectos generando una coordinación eficiente entre los involucrados, manejando un proyecto como un sistema de producción, estrechando la colaboración entre los participantes de los proyectos, capacitándoles y empoderándoles, fomentando una cultura de cambio. Su propósito es desarrollar un proceso de construcción en el que no hayan accidentes, ni daños a equipos, instalaciones, entorno y comunidad, que se realice en conformidad con los requerimientos contractuales, sin defectos, en el plazo requerido, respetando los costes presupuestados y con un claro enfoque en la eliminación o reducción de las pérdidas, es decir, las actividades que no generen beneficios. El “Last Planner System”, o “Sistema del Último Planificador”, es un sistema del “Lean Construction” que por su propia naturaleza protege a la planificación y, por ende, ayuda a maximizar el valor y minimizar las pérdidas, optimizando de manera sustancial los sistemas de seguridad y salud. El “Lean Construction” se inició como un concepto enfocado a la ejecución de las obras, posteriormente se aplicó la filosofía a todas las etapas del proyecto. Actualmente considera el desarrollo total de un proyecto, desde que nace la idea hasta la culminación de la obra y puesta en marcha, considerando el ciclo de vida completo del proyecto. Es una filosofía de gestión, metodologías de trabajo y una cultura empresarial orientada a la eficiencia de los procesos y flujos. La filosofía “Lean Construction” se está expandiendo en todo el mundo, además está creciendo en su alcance, influyendo en la gestión contractual de los proyectos. Su primera evolución consistió en la creación del sistema “Lean Project Delivery System”, que es el concepto global de desarrollo de proyectos. Posteriormente, se proponen el “Target Value Design”, que consiste en diseñar de forma colaborativa para alcanzar los costes y el valor requerido, y el “Integrated Project Delivery”, en relación con sistemas de contratos relacionales (colaborativos) integrados, distintos a los contratos convencionales. 3. Se verificó que no existe regulación específica del ¨Lean Construction” en otros países, en otras palabras, no existe el agente con el nombre específico de “Especialista en Lean Construction” o similar, en consecuencia, es un agente adicional en el proyecto de la edificación, cuyas funciones y cometidos se pueden solapar con los del “Project Manager”, “Construction Manager”, “Contract Manager”, “Safety Manager”, entre otros. Sin embargo, se comprobó la existencia de formatos privados de contratos colaborativos de Integrated Project Delivery, los cuales podrían ser tomados como unas primeras referencias para futuras regulaciones. 4. Se verificó que sí existe demanda del ¨Lean Construction” en el desarrollo del presente trabajo, aunque aún su uso es incipiente, cada día existe más interesados en el tema. 5. No existe regulación del ¨Lean Construction” en España. 6. Uno de los objetivos fundamentales de esta tesis es el de regular esta figura cuando actúe en un proyecto, definir y realizar una estructura de Agente de la Edificación, según la Ley de Ordenación de la Edificación (LOE), y de esta manera poder introducirla dentro de la Legislación Española, protegiéndola de eventuales responsabilidades civiles. En España existe jurisprudencia (sentencias de los tribunales de justicia españoles) con jurisdicción civil basada en la LOE para absolver o condenar a agentes de la edificación que son definidos en los tribunales como “gestores constructivos” o similares. Por este motivo, en un futuro los tribunales podrían dictaminar responsabilidades solidarias entre el especialista “Lean Construction” y otros agentes del proyecto, dependiendo de sus actuaciones, y según se implemente el “Lean Project Delivery System”, el “Target Value Design” y el “Integrated Project Delivery”. Por otro lado, es posible que el nivel de actuación del especialista “Lean Construcción” pueda abarcar la gestión del diseño, la gestión de la ejecución material (construcción), la gestión de contratos, o la gestión integral de todo el proyecto de edificación, esto último, en concordancia con la última Norma ISO 21500:2012 o UNE-ISO 21500:2013 Directrices para la dirección y gestión de proyectos. En consecuencia, se debería incorporar adecuadamente a uno o más agentes de la edificación en la LOE de acuerdo a sus funciones y responsabilidades según los niveles de actuación del “Especialista en Lean Construction”. Se propone la creación de los siguientes agentes: Gestor del Diseño, Gestor Constructivo y Gestor de Contratos, cuyas definiciones están desarrolladas en este trabajo. Estas figuras son definidas de manera general, puesto que cualquier “Project Manager” o “DIPE”, gestor BIM (Building Information Modeling), o similar, puede actuar como uno o varios de ellos. También se propone la creación del agente “Gestor de la Construcción sin Pérdidas”, como aquel agente que asume las actuaciones del “gestor de diseño”, “gestor constructivo” y “gestor de contratos” con un enfoque en los principios del Lean Production. 7. En la tesis se demuestra, por medio del uso de la ISO 21500, que ambos sistemas son complementarios, de manera que los proyectos pueden tener ambos enfoques y ser compatibilizados. Un proyecto que use el “Project & Construction Management” puede perfectamente apoyarse en las herramientas y técnicas del “Lean Construction” para asegurar la eliminación o reducción de las pérdidas, es decir, las actividades que no generen valor, diseñando el sistema de producción, el sistema de diseño o el sistema de contratos. 8. Se debería incorporar adecuadamente al agente de la edificación “Especialista en Lean Construction” o similar y al agente ¨Especialista en Project & Construction Management” o DIPE en la Ley de Ordenación de la Edificación (LOE) de acuerdo a sus funciones y responsabilidades, puesto que la jurisprudencia se ha basado para absolver o condenar en la referida Ley. Uno de los objetivos fundamentales de esta tesis es el de regular la figura del “Especialista en Lean Construction” cuando actúa simultáneamente con el DIPE, y realizar una estructura de Agente de la Edificación según la LOE, y de esta manera protegerlo de eventuales responsabilidades solidarias. Esta investigación comprueba que la propuesta de definición del agente de edificación DIPE, según la LOE, presentada en la tesis doctoral del Doctor Manuel Soler Severino es compatible con las nuevas definiciones propuestas. El agente DIPE puede asumir los roles de los diferentes gestores propuestos en esta tesis si es que se especializa en dichas materias, o, si lo estima pertinente, recomendar sus contrataciones. ABSTRACT This work is based on the Lean Construction philosophy; an analysis is made herein with regard to the situation of this philosophy in the building sector within the international and Spanish context, replying to the following questions: 1. How did the concept of Lean Construction emerge? 2. Which are the activities, functions and objectives of Lean Construction? 3. Are there regulations on Lean Construction in other countries? 4. Is there a demand for Lean Construction in Spain? 5. Are there regulations on Lean Construction in Spain? 6. How should regulations on Lean Construction be developed in Spain? 7. What is the relationship between Lean Construction and the Project & Construction Management? 8. How should regulations on Lean Construction be developed in Spain considering its relationship with the Project & Construction Management? We have answered these questions in detail here and the replies are summarized as follows: 1. The concept of Lean Construction emerged in august of 1992, when Finnish researcher Lauri Koskela published in Stanford University TECHNICAL REPORT N° 72 entitled “Application of the New Production Philosophy to Construction”. A year later, Professor Koskela invited a group of construction specialists to Finland to the first workshop conducted on this matter; thus, the International Group for Lean Construction (IGLC) was established, which has contributed to extending the philosophy to the United States, Europe, the Americas, Asia, Oceania, and Africa. Lean Construction is a system based on the Lean Production approach, which was developed in Japan by Toyota Motors in the 1950s. Thanks to this system, the Toyota plants were able to produce more units, with greater efficiency than the American industry, less resources, in less time, and with fewer manufacturing errors. 2. The Lean Construction system aims at maximizing the value of projects while reducing waste, producing an effective coordination among those involved; it manages projects as a production system, enhancing collaboration between the parties that participate in the projects while building their capacities, empowering them, and promoting a culture of change. Its purpose is to develop a construction process free of accidents, without damages to the equipment, facilities, environment and community, flawless, in accordance with contractual requirements, within the terms established, respecting budgeted costs, and with a clear approach to eliminating or reducing waste, that is, activities that do not generate benefits. The Last Planner System is a Lean Construction system, which by its own nature protects planning and, therefore, helps to maximize the value and minimize waste, optimizing substantially the safety and health systems. Lean Construction started as a concept focused on the execution of works, and subsequently the philosophy was applied to all the stages of the project. At present it considers the project’s total development, since the time ideas are born until the completion and start-up of the work, taking into account the entire life cycle of the project. It is a philosophy of management, work methodologies, and entrepreneurial culture aimed at the effectiveness of processes and flows. The Lean Construction philosophy is extending all over the world and its scope is becoming broader, having greater influence on the contractual management of projects. It evolved initially through the creation of the Lean Project Delivery System, a global project development concept. Later on, the Target Value Design was developed, based on collaborative design to achieve the costs and value required, as well as the Integrated Project Delivery, in connection with integrated relational (collaborative) contract systems, as opposed to conventional contracts. 3. It was verified that no specific regulations on Lean Construction exist in other countries, in other words, there are no agents with the specific name of “Lean Construction Specialist” or other similar names; therefore, it is an additional agent in building projects, which functions and objectives can overlap those of the Project Manager, Construction Manager, Contract Manager, or Safety Manager, among others. However, the existence of private collaborative contracts of Integrated Project Delivery was confirmed, which could be considered as first references for future regulations. 4. There is a demand for Lean Construction in the development of this work; even though it is still emerging, there is a growing interest in this topic. 5. There are no regulations on Lean Construction in Spain. 6. One of the main objectives of this thesis is to regulate this role when acting in a project, and to define and develop a Building Agent structure, according to the Building Standards Law (LOE by its acronym in Spanish), in order to be able to incorporate it into the Spanish law, protecting it from civil liabilities. In Spain there is jurisprudence in civil jurisdiction based on the LOE to acquit or convict building agents, which are defined in the courts as “construction managers” or similar. For this reason, courts could establish in the future joint and several liabilities between the Lean Construction Specialist and other agents of the project, depending on their actions and based on the implementation of the Lean Project Delivery System, the Target Value Design, and the Integrated Project Delivery. On the other hand, it is possible that the level of action of the Lean Construction Specialist may comprise design management, construction management and contract management, or the integral management of the entire building project in accordance with the last ISO 21500:2012 or UNE-ISO 21500:2013, guidelines for the management of projects. Accordingly, one or more building agents should be appropriately incorporated into the LOE according to their functions and responsibilities and based on the levels of action of the Lean Construction Specialist. The creation of the following agents is proposed: Design Manager, Construction Manager, and Contract Manager, which definitions are developed in this work. These agents are defined in general, since any Project Manager or DIPE, Building Information Modeling (BIM) Manager or similar, may act as one or as many of them. The creation of the Lean Construction Manager is also proposed, as the agent that takes on the role of the Design Manager, Construction Manager and Contract Manager with a focus on the Lean Production principles. 7. In the thesis it is demonstrated that through the implementation of the ISO 21500, both systems are supplementary, so projects may have both approaches and be compatible. A project that applies the Project & Construction Management may perfectly have the support of the tools, techniques and practices of Lean Construction to ensure the elimination or reduction of losses, that is, those activities that do not generate value, thus designing the production system, the design system, or the contract system. 8. The Lean Construction Specialist or similar and the Specialist in Project & Construction Management should be incorporated appropriately into the LOE according to their functions and responsibilities, since jurisprudence has been based on such Law to acquit or convict. One of the main objectives of this thesis is the regulate the role of the Lean Construction Specialist when acting simultaneously with the DIPE, and to develop a structure of the building agent, according to the LOE, and in this way protect such agent from joint and several liabilities. This research proves that the proposal to define the DIPE building agent, according to the LOE, and presented in the doctoral dissertation of Manuel Soler Severino, Ph.D. is compatible with the new definitions proposed. The DIPE agent may assume the roles of the different managers proposed in this thesis if he specializes in those topics or, if deemed pertinent, recommends that they be engaged.

Agency for International Development needs to strengthen its management of study, research, and evaluation activities : report /

"B-133220."

Resource recovery projects : requests for proposals/contracts--summaries /

Mode of access: Internet.

Hardware/software compatibility for traffic management/IVHS systems.

Texas Department of Transportation, Austin

Highway safety research and development - better management can make it more useful. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States.

Mode of access: Internet.