Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Fiscal adjustments and sovereign default in different government systems

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Empirical analysis of the lending decisions of Chinese formal financial institutions in rural areas

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Nominal and inflation-linked government bonds: An assessment of arbitrage opportunities in UK Gilt Market

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Government bond yield spreads in EMU countries: The story of an ephemeral convergence

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Determinants of the Portuguese government bond yield spread

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Measuring the impact of short and lending practices using the DGTW benchmarks

Mutual fund managers increasingly lend their holdings and/or use short sales to generate higher returns for their funds. This project presents a first look into the impact these practices on performance using the performance measures: i) Characteristic Selectivity (CS), the ability of the fund's managers to choose stocks that outperform their benchmarks; ii) Characteristic Timing (CT), the ability of the manager to time the market; iii) and Average Style (AS), the returns from funds systematically holding stocks with certain characteristics. These returns are computed through the DGTW benchmarks. The effect of other variables that have also been shown to impact fund’s returns – total net assets under management, investment styles, turnover and expense ratios – will also be analyzed. I find that managers who use short-sales do not exhibit better stock picking abilities than those who do not, while mutual funds that lend do present higher CS returns. In addition, while lending is not significant for the total performance of a fund, the employment of short-sales and of both short-sales and lending has a negative impact on the fund’s performance.

Fiscal adjustments and sovereign default in different government systems

This paper extends the model of Spolaore (2004) about adjustments in di erent government systems for the context of scal adjustments and sovereign default. We introduce asymmetry between groups in income and preferences towards scal reforms. Default a ects di erently each group and becomes a possibility if reforms are not enacted after public nance solvency shocks, in uencing the political game according to its likelihood. With the extensions, new situations which were not possible with the previous framework arise. After the exposition of the model, the Argentine default in 2001 provides an example of the political con icts addressed by the model.

Future lending income and security value

I test the Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen hypothesis that security prices incorporate expected future securities lending income. To determine whether institutional investors anticipate gains from future lending of securities, I examine their trading behavior around loan-fee increases. The evidence suggests that institutions buy shares in response to an increase in lending fees, and that this could explain the premium associated with high- lending-fee stocks. Expected future lending income affects stock prices, although the effect seems to be attenuated by the negative information that arises from short selling.

Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: in depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures

NIPE - WP 02/2016

Enquadramento para a compreensão dos impactos do Open Government Data

Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Engenharia e Gestão de Sistemas de Informação

E-government e participação política em Portugal

Dissertação de Mestrado em MPA - Administração Pública

Report to the government of Baroda on the marine zoology of Okhamandal in Kattiawar, by James Hornell ... With supplementary reports on special groups by other zoologists ...

pt. 2

Report to the government of Baroda on the marine zoology of Okhamandal in Kattiawar, by James Hornell ... With supplementary reports on special groups by other zoologists ...

pt. 1