Behavior and interactions of children in cooperative groups in lower and middle elementary grades

The study investigated the behaviors and interactions of children in structured and unstructured groups as they worked together on a 6-week social studies activity each term for 3 school terms. Two hundred and twelve children in Grade 1 and 184 children in Grade 3 participated in the study. Stratified random assignment occurred so that each gender-balanced group consisted of 1 high-, 2 medium-, and 1 low-ability student. The results show that the children in the structured groups were consistently more cooperative and they provided more elaborated and nonelaborated help than did their peers in the unstructured groups. The children in the structured groups in Grade 3 obtained higher reading and learning outcome scores than their peers in the unstructured groups.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.

Children's cooperative behavior and interactions in trained and untrained work groups in regular classrooms

This study examined group and individual factors that facilitate changes in cooperation and learning outcomes in trained and untrained work groups of elementary school-age children. The study had two foci. The first was to determine if the cooperative behaviors and interactions of children in classroom groups who were trained in cooperative learning skins were different from those of children who were given no training, and the second was to investigate small group interactions and achievement in these groups over time. The results showed that there were observable differences between student interactions in the two conditions and these differences were maintained over time. Compared with children in the untrained groups, those in the trained groups were consistently more cooperative and helpful to each other; they actively tried to involve each other in the learning task by using language which was more inclusive (e.g., frequent use of ''we''), and they gave more explanations to assist each other as they worked together. It appeared that as the children worked together over time, they became more responsive to the learning needs of each other. Furthermore, the children in the trained groups performed significantly better on the learning outcomes questionnaire than those in the untrained groups. (C) 1997 Society for the Study of School Psychology. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.

The residual effects of cooperative-learning experiences: A two-year follow-up

The author investigated how training in small-group and interpersonal behaviors affected children's behavior and interactions as they worked in small groups 2 years later. The authors assigned 52 fifth graders, who had been trained 2 years previously in cooperative group behaviors, to the trained condition and 36 fifth graders, who had not previously been trained, to the untrained condition. Both were reconstituted from the pool of students who had participated previously in group activities. The results showed a residual training effect, with the children in the trained groups being more cooperative and helpful than their untrained peers.

How to teach mathematics with MOODLE

The aim of this article is to present a Project in the Oporto’s Institute of Accounting and Administration, which pretends to contribute for a change in the way of teaching and learning Mathematics. One of the main objectives of this project is to innovate the teaching and learning processes, exploring technologies as a pedagogical resource and to induce higher motivation to students, improve the rate of success and make available to students a set of materials adapted to their needs. This concern is justified due to the fact that students have a weak preparation, without consolidated basis. Since the year 2007/2008 the courses were adjusted to the Bologna process, which requires several changes in teacher’s and student’s roles, methodologies and assessment. The number of weekly classes has been reduced, so it was necessary to develop new strategies and methodologies to support the student. With the implementation of the Bologna Process in the Accounting degree, we felt a great need to provide other types of activities to students. To complement our theoretical and practical classes we have developed a project called MatActiva based on the Moodle platform offered by PAOL - Projecto de Apoio On-Line (Online Support Project). Moodle allows us to use the language TEX to create materials that use mathematical symbols. Using this functionality, we created a set of easy to use interactive resources. In MatActiva project, the students have access to a variety of different materials. We have followed a strategy that makes the project compatible with the theoretical and practical subjects/classes, complementing them. To do so, we created some resources, for instance multiple-choice tests, which are the most accessed by the students. These tests can be realized and corrected on-line and for each wrong answer there is a feedback with the resolution. We can find other types of resources: diagnostic tests, theoretical notes. There are not only the pre-requirements for subjects mathematics, but also materials to help students follow up the programs. We also developed several lessons. This activity consists of a number of pages, where each page has contents and leads to other pages, based on the student's progress. The teacher creates the choices and determines the next page that the student will see, based upon their knowledge. There is also an area of doubts, where the students can place all the mathematical doubts they have, and a teacher gives the answers or clues to help them in their work. MatActiva also offers an area where we can find some humour, curiosities, contests and games including mathematical contents to test the math skills, as well as links to pages about mathematical contents that could be useful for the study. Since ISCAP receives ERASMUS students and some of them attend mathematics, we developed some materials in English, so they can also use MatActiva. The main objectives of our project are not only to bring success in the subjects of mathematics, but also to motivate the students, encourage them to overcome theirs difficulties through an auto-study giving them more confidence and improve their relationship with the mathematics as well as the communication between students and teachers and among students.

Distribution center consolidation games

We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)), but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.

On games corresponding to sequencing situations with precedence relations

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an "active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Walras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a countable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takes. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

A Note on Shapley's convex measure games

L. S. Shapley, in his paper 'Cores of Convex Games', introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players

LEVERAGING SANDBOX IMMERSIVE 3D VIRTUAL WORLDS TO DEVELOP DO-IT- YOURSELF TEACHING GAMES: IMPLEMENTATION TO MARKETING CASE STUDY TEACHING IN SECOND LIFE

Games are powerful and engaging. On average, one billion people spend at least 1 hour a day playing computer and videogames. This is even more true with the younger generations. Our students have become the < digital natives >, the < gamers >, the < virtual generation >. Research shows that those who are most at risk for failure in the traditional classroom setting, also spend more time than their counterparts, using video games. They might strive, given a different learning environment. Educators have the responsibility to align their teaching style to these younger generation learning styles. However, many academics resist the use of computer-assisted learning that has been "created elsewhere". This can be extrapolated to game-based teaching: even if educational games were more widely authored, their adoption would still be limited to the educators who feel a match between the authored games and their own beliefs and practices. Consequently, game-based teaching would be much more widespread if teachers could develop their own games, or at least customize them. Yet, the development and customization of teaching games are complex and costly. This research uses a design science methodology, leveraging gamification techniques, active and cooperative learning theories, as well as immersive sandbox 3D virtual worlds, to develop a method which allows management instructors to transform any off-the-shelf case study into an engaging collaborative gamified experience. This method is applied to marketing case studies, and uses the sandbox virtual world of Second Life. -- Les jeux sont puissants et motivants, En moyenne, un milliard de personnes passent au moins 1 heure par jour jouer à des jeux vidéo sur ordinateur. Ceci se vérifie encore plus avec les jeunes générations, Nos étudiants sont nés à l'ère du numérique, certains les appellent des < gamers >, d'autres la < génération virtuelle >. Les études montrent que les élèves qui se trouvent en échec scolaire dans les salles de classes traditionnelles, passent aussi plus de temps que leurs homologues à jouer à des jeux vidéo. lls pourraient potentiellement briller, si on leur proposait un autre environnement d'apprentissage. Les enseignants ont la responsabilité d'adapter leur style d'enseignement aux styles d'apprentissage de ces jeunes générations. Toutefois, de nombreux professeurs résistent lorsqu'il s'agit d'utiliser des contenus d'apprentissage assisté par ordinateur, développés par d'autres. Ceci peut être extrapolé à l'enseignement par les jeux : même si un plus grand nombre de jeux éducatifs était créé, leur adoption se limiterait tout de même aux éducateurs qui perçoivent une bonne adéquation entre ces jeux et leurs propres convictions et pratiques. Par conséquent, I'enseignement par les jeux serait bien plus répandu si les enseignants pouvaient développer leurs propres jeux, ou au moins les customiser. Mais le développement de jeux pédagogiques est complexe et coûteux. Cette recherche utilise une méthodologie Design Science pour développer, en s'appuyant sur des techniques de ludification, sur les théories de pédagogie active et d'apprentissage coopératif, ainsi que sur les mondes virtuels immersifs < bac à sable > en 3D, une méthode qui permet aux enseignants et formateurs de management, de transformer n'importe quelle étude de cas, provenant par exemple d'une centrale de cas, en une expérience ludique, collaborative et motivante. Cette méthode est appliquée aux études de cas Marketing dans le monde virtuel de Second Life.