El Impuesto al Valor Agregado a la luz de los Principios Constitucionales de Progresividad y Proporcionalidad

El derecho tributario se encuentra regido por principios propios de esta materia, parte de aquellos son los principios de Progresividad y Proporcionalidad, sin embargo, dentro de los sistemas tributarios, particularmente el ecuatoriano, coexisten diferentes tipos de tributos, algunos de ellos, por sus peculiares características, son incluso antagónicos a los mentados principios. Me refiero, especialmente, al Impuesto al Valor Agregado, gravamen de tipo indirecto y regresivo, vigente en nuestra legislación, y que merece un exhaustivo análisis con la finalidad de determinar en qué medida es compatible con la progresividad y la proporcionalidad constitucional.Para lograr el objetivo planteado, es menester hacer un repaso de la totalidad de principios aplicables a los tributos, estos son: generalidad, eficiencia, simplicidad administrativa, suficiencia recaudatoria, irretroactividad, igualdad, equidad, transparencia, legalidad, proporcionalidad y progresividad. Así mismo, es necesario un análisis doctrinario del Impuesto al Valor Agregado, a la par de la legislación vigente sobre este gravamen, y concluir con el análisis de la relación del IVA con dos de los principios constitucionales, los de proporcionalidad y progresividad.

Efectos jurídicos de prohibir minería en ecosistemas de páramos con títulos mineros preexistentes

A raíz del impacto ambiental que produce la actividad minera sobre la biodiversidad y los recursos naturales, el sistema jurídico colombiano sustrajo de esta actividad, zonas de especial importancia ecológica y ambiental, que podrían llegar a deteriorarse en su totalidad. Sin embargo, si bien es clara la importancia de proteger estas zonas de la actividad extractiva, lo cierto es que en la actualidad se presenta un alto porcentaje de estas zonas que se superponen con títulos mineros. Circunstancia que conlleva a que entren en tensión intereses constitucionales protegidos. Por un lado, el interés general de proteger el medio ambiente y los recursos naturales y por el otro, el interés público de desarrollar la actividad minera. De acuerdo a lo anterior, a través de este trabajo de investigación, se busca describir y analizar las consecuencias en el ámbito jurídico, que se generan, al prohibir la actividad minera en zonas sobre las cuales el Estado había autorizado la realización de actividades de exploración y /o explotación minera con anterioridad al cambio regulatorio. En consecuencia, se expondrán los escenarios en que se puede encontrar un contrato de concesión, con la prohibición legal de desarrollar actividades mineras en ecosistemas de páramos. Específicamente, se analizará la situación de los títulos mineros que cuenten con licencia ambiental, títulos mineros que se encuentren en etapa de exploración y los títulos que habiendo terminado la etapa de exploración su licencia ambiental se encuentre en trámite.

Disturbi dell'informazione, nuovi media e libertà di manifestazione del pensiero

L’elaborato affronta il tema della massiccia diffusione di disinformazione tramite internet sotto il profilo del diritto costituzionale, nell’ottica di indagare se le dimensioni del fenomeno richiedano l’elaborazione di principi e soluzioni nuove ovvero se i paradigmi costituzionali enucleati dalla tradizione costituzionalistica con riferimento alla libertà d’espressione forniscano gli strumenti sufficienti per un intervento efficace. In tale ottica, il lavoro premette una ricostruzione del fenomeno della disinformazione nel tentativo di individuare il perimetro socio-cognitivo e tecnologico entro cui la medesima prolifera, descrivendo gli elementi che distinguono l’informazione diffusa dai nuovi media rispetto a quella veicolata dai media mainstream. Ciò premesso, lo studio passa a delineare lo “statuto costituzionale” del falso, indagando la rilevanza che la menzogna assume sotto il profilo costituzionale nel suo rapporto con la libertà di manifestazione del pensiero negli ordinamenti interno, europeo e statunitense. L’analisi prosegue poi con l’esame delle politiche di contrasto alla disinformazione introdotte da singoli Stati (prevalentemente Germania, Francia e Italia), Unione europea, e piattaforme, con l’obiettivo di mettere in luce vantaggi e limiti dei modelli di eteroregolamentazione, coregolamentazione e autoregolamentazione. Da ultimo, l’elaborato scompone alcune delle azioni e misure passate in rassegna e le analizza con la lente d’ingrandimento della libertà di manifestazione del pensiero, ordinandone i contenuti secondo la specifica propensione a comprimere la libertà d’espressione. L’indagine si conclude con alcuni brevi spunti conclusivi che evidenziano l’esigenza, in base ai principi costituzionali analizzati, che eventuali interventi normativi siano se del caso volti alla regolazione delle piattaforme, ovvero dei “contenitori”, lasciano i contenuti al libero scambio delle idee.

The government class book : designed for the instruction of youth in the principles of constitutional government and the rights and duties of citizens /

Mode of access: Internet.

Constitutional security to the citizens' rights of property : and the principles of public faith.

Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 18580.2.

The general principles of constitutional law in the United States of America.

"Constitution of the United States of America": p.[xxiii]-xxxix.

Liberty under law, an interpretation of the principles of our constitutional government,

Mode of access: Internet.

Constitutional law, federal and state : being a clear and complete analysis of the constitution, together with a summary of the leading decisions and basic principles which go to make up the fundamental law of the state and nation /

Mode of access: Internet.

Constitutional law; an introductory treatise designed for use in the United States naval academy, and in other schools where the principles of the Constitution are studied,

Mode of access: Internet.

Judicial Creativity in Constitutional Interpretation

The focus of study in this thesis is on the necessity and extent of judicial creativity in interpreting provisions in certain crucial areas in the Constitution of India. Judicial innovation was essential to adapt the constitutional provisions to modern changed context. Creativity of the Court has been mainly in the creation and introduction of certain new concepts not found in any specific provision of the Constitution which, but were essential for its meaningful interpretation.Independence of the judiciary, basic structure and certain elements of social justice cherished as ideal by the makers of the Constitution are some such concepts infused into the Constitution by the judiciary. The second aspect of creativity lies in the attempt of the Court to construe provisions in the Constitution with a view to upholding and maintaining the concepts so infused into the Constitution. Introduction of those concepts into the Constitution was necessary and is justified. all important features of the Constitution like democratic form of government, federal structure, judicial review, independence of judiciary and rule of law were thus included in the doctrine to prevent their alteration by amendments.As a result of such a construction, the nature of those directive principles itself has changed. They ceased to be mere directives for state action but became mandate for it. If left to legislative or executive will for their implementation, the directives would have remained enforceable as ordinary right.To conclude, notwithstanding the errors committed by the Supreme Court in construing the provisions in the above areas, they stand testimony to its creative and innovative response in interpreting the Constitution. If this trend is continued, it will be possible to achieve through the judicial process, maintenance of independence of the judiciary, avoidance of destruction of the Constitution through the process of amendment and realisation of social justice envisaged in the directive principles. It can be hoped that the Court would maintain its energetic and vibrant mind and rise up to the occasions and extend the same to other areas in future.

Internal Displacement, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Principles Normative Status, and the Need for their Effective Domestic Implementation in Colombia.

El artículo analiza el fenómeno del desplazamiento forzado alrededor del mundo, así como la génesis del mandato de las Naciones Unidas para luchar contra este problema. Examina las conclusiones clave del estudio de la ONU que encontró que las normas existentes del derecho internacional tienen varios vacíos y zonas grises relativos a las necesidades de los desplazados internos. También analiza los orígenes y el contenido de los principios guía del desplazamiento interno, así como el estatus normativo de los mismos. Así mismo, sugiere que, a pesar de no ser vinculante para los Estados, estos principios guía se convirtieron en la expresión más autorizada de los estándares mínimos aplicables a los desplazados internos como consecuencia de la práctica estatal, es decir, que la mayoría de estos principios se volverán costumbre internacional. El artículo también señala la necesidad de que haya una implementación efectiva en el derecho interno de estos principios guía; examina cómo las autoridades gubernamentales, la Corte Constitucional y la sociedad civil en Colombia, así como las entidades intergubernamentales, respondieron a la crisis del desplazamiento interno en el país. Observando el marco legal colombiano en desplazamiento interno, el artículo concluye que el Estado no ha tomado las medidas necesarias requeridas para prevenir futuros desplazamientos o para asegurar una protección y asistencia efectivas para resolver las necesidades de los desplazados internos.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”