981 resultados para Asymmetric Information
Resumo:
Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash–Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi-concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.
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A presente dissertação parte de uma análise dos principais corpos regulatórios nacionais e internacionais da governança corporativa para buscar os traços essenciais que caracterizam tal sistema. Uma vez identificados os traços essenciais a partir dos elementos regulatórios, passa o texto a analisar os elementos caracterizadores da governança corporativa por meio das principais disposições doutrinárias sobre o tema. Após estabelecido um conceito funcional de governança corporativa, busca-se compreender as bases econômicas que originaram e auxiliaram no desenvolvimento do sistema da governança corporativa. A partir deste ponto são levantadas as principais Indagações acerca do funcionamento do mercado em um ambiente de informações assimétricas, ressaltando-se o impacto advindo dos agency costs. Finalmente, após levantados os problemas relacionados à assimetria de informação, essencialmente focados no agency problem, se propõe a dissertação a vincular o desenvolvimento do sistema da governança corporativa à mitigação dos problemas de assimetria de informação.
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Este estudo buscou investigar duas relações de interesse: a relação entre poder e cobertura de analistas financeiros no mercado acionário brasileiro, e a relação entre poder e assimetria informacional neste mercado, nos períodos de 2000 a 2010. O objetivo desta pesquisa envolveu verificar se o poder empresarial aumenta a assimetria informacional decorrentes dos custos de agência envolvidos e possibilidade de expropriação de valor (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), ou diminui a assimetria, uma vez que administração da empresa não se sente vulnerável a demissões ou possíveis embaraços a sua atuação, e opta por não omitir informações aos stakeholders (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). Ainda relacionado ao ambiente informacional impactado pelo poder empresarial, buscou-se verificar se os analistas financeiros acompanham empresas que apresentam uma maior assimetria informacional, e assim cumprindo sua função de monitoramento da gestão empresarial (Healy & Palepu, 2001), ou menor assimetria, em decorrência dos custos envolvidos em se obter informações privadas (Frankel, Kothari & Weber, 2006). Com o uso de proxies criadas pela análise fatorial para capturar as especificidades relacionadas a poder empresarial e assimetria informacional no ambiente empresarial brasileiro, foram observadas uma relação negativa entre cobertura de analistas financeiros e poder empresarial e uma relação positiva entre assimetria e poder empresarial. Pelas hipóteses esquematizadas por Jiraporn, Liu e Kim (2012), que abarcam todas as relações possíveis entre assimetria, poder empresarial e cobertura de analistas financeiros, os resultados se enquadram na Hipótese da Opacidade.
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This BEER addresses informational barriers to energy efficiency. It is a widely acknowledged result that an energy efficiency gap exists implying that the level of energy efficiency is at an inefficiently low level. Several barriers to energy efficiency create this gap and the presence of asymmetric information is likely to be one such barrier. In this article a theoretical framework is presented addressing the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to energy efficiency. Based on the theoretical framework, European policies on energy efficiency are evaluated. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the theory on information asymmetries and its consequences on energy efficiency focusing on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Having established a theoretical framework to understand the agency barriers to energy efficiency, the second part evaluates the policies of the European Union on energy efficiency. The BEER finds that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection indeed can help explain the seemingly low levels of energy. In both presented models the cost to the principal from implementing high energy efficiency outcome is increased with the informational asymmetries. The theory reveals two implications to policies on energy efficiency. First, the development of measures to enable contractual parties to base remuneration on energy performance must be enhanced, and second, the information on technologies and the education of consumers and installers on energy efficiency must be increased. This could be complemented with certification of installers and energy efficiency advisors to enable consumers to select good agents. Finally, it is found that the preferred EU policy instrument on energy efficiency, so far, seems to be the use of minimum requirements. Less used in EU legislation is the use of measuring and verification as well as the use of certifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the EU should consider an increased use of these instruments, and in particular focus on a further development of standards on measurability and verification as well as an increased focus on education of consumers as well as installers and advisors on energy efficiency.
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Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.
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The European Commission is reforming state aid rules. An important element of the reform is to prevent the granting of excessive subsidies. This paper shows that the determination of the optimum subsidy for research is difficult. What appears to be the socially optimum level of research effort depends on the benchmark of comparison and whether this benchmark is the situation before subsidies or the situation after subsidies. In the presence of asymmetric information, policy makers should induce firms to reveal their true costs and should grant subsidies to the relatively more efficient firms by allocating subsidies not on a first-come-first- serve basis but through a competitive process. However, competitive selection of subsidy recipients is not a panacea as it may not be possible to be effectively used in all cases and for all research programmes. This is because in principle public subsidies should support those programmes with the largest value for society, rather than with the lowest costs. Although this paper focuses on R&D, its findings are relevant to any subsidy whose aim is to remedy market failure caused by positive externalities.
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Performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge and to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We complement research on internal capital markets and investigate how foreign owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We find that perceived corruption and poor ICRG risk scores are associated with the appointment of parent-country executives as supervisors on behalf of the foreign owner. By contrast, a focus on retail clients, the absence of organizational routines and poor creditor rights are associated with the appointment of host-country executives. These bank and country characteristics create agency problems within the subsidiary, but not necessarily between the subsidiary and its parent. As such, they create a need for host-country executives’ superior knowledge of local markets and staff rather than for the supervisory role of parent-country executives.
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This paper explores the incentives political and bureaucratic actors face in the institutional setting of EU technology policy. In examining the implications and assumptions of neoclassical and evolutionary theories of technological change, it tries to answer why certain theories do not obtain importance in the political wor1d. By focusing on the positive approach to policymaking, the paper examines why policy learning does not occur m certain institutional settings. In referring to EU technology programs, I show which conceptual and functional shortcomings limit the policies in question. As evaluation and oversight mechanisms have not been sufficiently developed and accepted within the institutional setting, there is much room for inefficiency. I discuss this setting within a simple agency model using two political actors and two firms performing R&D. It is easy to show that when asymmetric information applies, the firms receive positive rents and the political agent gains reputation. The outcome suggests changing the evaluation practices and embedding results in political decision making. Regarding this point, recent U.S. developments seem to have led to more efficiency. Moreover, the paper suggests delegating technology policy to other actors and discussing the empowerment of different principals on the political plane.
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This thesis examines the effect of rights issue announcements on stock prices by companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) between 1987 to 1996. The emphasis is to report whether the KLSE is semi strongly efficient with respect to the announcement of rights issues and to check whether the implications of corporate finance theories on the effect of an event can be supported in the context of an emerging market. Once the effect is established, potential determinants of abnormal returns identified by previous empirical work and corporate financial theory are analysed. By examining 70 companies making clean rights issue announcements, this thesis will hopefully shed light on some important issues in long term corporate financing. Event study analysis is used to check on the efficiency of the Malaysian stock market; while cross-sectional regression analysis is executed to identify possible explanators of the rights issue announcements' effect. To ensure the results presented are not contaminated, econometric and statistical issues raised in both analyses have been taken into account. Given the small amount of empirical research conducted in this part of the world, the results of this study will hopefully be of use to investors, security analysts, corporate financial managements, regulators and policy makers as well as those who are interested in capital market based research of an emerging market. It is found that the Malaysian stock market is not semi strongly efficient since there exists a persistent non-zero abnormal return. This finding is not consistent with the hypothesis that security returns adjust rapidly to reflect new information. It may be possible that the result is influenced by the sample, consisting mainly of below average size companies which tend to be thinly traded. Nevertheless, these issues have been addressed. Another important issue which has emerged from the study is that there is some evidence to suggest that insider trading activity existed in this market. In addition to these findings, when the rights issue announcements' effect is compared to the implications of corporate finance theories in predicting the sign of abnormal returns, the signalling model, asymmetric information model, perfect substitution hypothesis and Scholes' information hypothesis cannot be supported.
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Business angels are natural persons who provide equity financing for young enterprises and gain ownership in them. They are usually anonym investors and they operate in the background of the companies. Their important feature is that over the funding of the enterprises based on their business experiences they can contribute to the success of the companies with their special expertise and with strategic support. As a result of the asymmetric information between the angels and the companies their matching is difficult (Becsky-Nagy – Fazekas 2015), and the fact, that angel investors prefer anonymity makes it harder for entrepreneurs to obtain informal venture capital. The primary aim of the different type of business angel organizations and networks is to alleviate this matching process with intermediation between the two parties. The role of these organizations is increasing in the informal venture capital market compared to the individually operating angels. The recognition of their economic importance led many governments to support them. There were also public initiations that aimed the establishment of these intermediary organizations that led to the institutionalization of business angels. This study via the characterization of business angels focuses on the progress of these informational intermediaries and their ways of development with regards to the international trends and the current situation of Hungarian business angels and angel networks.
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This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.
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This dissertation comprises three individual chapters. Chapter Two examines how free riding across neighbors influenced the diffusion of color television sets in rural China. Chapter Three tests for asymmetric information between a firm’s management and other investors concerning its patent output. Chapter Four discusses how knowledge stocks influence a patenting firm’s later diversification. Chapter Two documents the existence of a type of network effects—free riding across neighbors—in the consumption of color television sets in rural China, which reduces the propensity of non-owners to purchase. I construct a model of the timing of the purchase of a durable good in the presence of free riding, and test its key implications using household survey data in rural China. Chapter Three tests for asymmetric information between a firm’s management and other investors about its patent output by examining insider trading patterns and stock price changes in R&D intensive firms. It demonstrates that management has considerable information about its patent output beyond what is known to investors. It also shows that the predictive power of insider trading patterns on patent output comes from purchases rather than sales. Chapter Four discusses two sequential channels through which knowledge stocks may influence a firm’s later diversification. One is that firms with more knowledge are more likely to enter a new industry. The other is that firms’ businesses have a better chance of surviving, conditional on being formed. By examining U.S. public patenting firms in manufacturing sectors for 1984-1996, I find that knowledge stocks predict the likelihood of new industry entry when controlling for firm size. However, this predictive power is weakened when diversification effects are included. On the other hand, a survival study of newly established segments shows that initial knowledge stocks have significant positive effects on segment survival, whereas diversification effects are insignificant.
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This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.
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Se presentan los resultados de la aplicación de una metodología integradora de auditoría de información y conocimiento, llevada a cabo en un Centro de Investigación del Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Medio Ambiente de la provincia de Holguín, Cuba, conformada por siete etapas con un enfoque híbrido dirigida a revisar la estrategia y la política de gestión de información y conocimiento, identificar e inventariar y mapear los recursos de I+C y sus flujos, y valorar los procesos asociados a su gestión. La alta dirección de este centro, sus especialistas e investigadores manifestaron la efectividad de la metodología aplicada cuyos resultados propiciaron reajustar la proyección estratégica en relación con la gestión de la I+C, rediseñar los flujos informativos de los procesos claves, disponer de un directorio de sus expertos por áreas y planificar el futuro aprendizaje y desarrollo profesional.
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Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito, 2016.