Risks and Responsibilities? The Individualisation of Youth Transitions and the Ambivalence between Participation and Activation in Europe

This report provides insight on the situation facing young people in contemporary European societies in their transitions to work and citizenship. On the one hand, risks of exclusion have increased, while on the other, responsibilities for coping with such risks have been individualised, a state of affairs reinforced by the trend towards activation labour market policies. Drawing on the findings of a EU-funded study across nine European regions, the report gives evidence of the resulting biographical and policy dilemmas. Furthermore, it explores if and under what conditions the concept of participation may open new ways of reconciling systemic imperatives and individual needs in the social integration of young people.

Childrens Participation and Citizenship in a Global Age. Empowerment, Tokenism or Discriminatory Disciplining?

This article explores children’s participation and citizenship, taking its point of departure in the empirical observation of a paradox: On the hand there is a general participatory climate and a growing commitment to empowerment of children, and on the other hand some children’s experience of discrimination, disciplining and distrust. The analysis is structured into three main parts: 1) Participation, approached from Hart’s Ladder of Participation and Bourdieu’s theorizing of power dynamics; 2) Rights, using Marshall’s tripartite conceptualization, namely civil rights, political rights and social rights, supplemented by a discussion of the right to care and cultural rights; and 3) Identity, theorized using Delanty’s conceptualization of citizenship as a learning process The article concludes that children’s citizenship, and the initiatives that are accounted for as facilitating their well being and participation though social work, too often tend towards tokenism if not discriminatory disciplining and exclusion, rather than empowerment, due to political, organisational and discursively shaped power relations.

Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination

If workers are wealth maximizers, codetermination should lead to less risky investments, smaller dividends, reduced firm leverage, higher and more stable salaries, and more capital-intensive production processes. Unless codetermination also increases productivity by raising wokers' morale and satisfaction or reduces information asymmetries within the firm, shareholder wealth and firm value will decline. An analysis of West Germany's case, however, indicates that codetermination has little, if any, effect on corporate operations and performance.

Is there a ‚Depth versus Participation‘ Dilemma in International Cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.