Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination


Autoria(s): Loderer, Claudio; Benelli, Giuseppe; Lys, Thomas
Data(s)

01/10/1987

Resumo

If workers are wealth maximizers, codetermination should lead to less risky investments, smaller dividends, reduced firm leverage, higher and more stable salaries, and more capital-intensive production processes. Unless codetermination also increases productivity by raising wokers' morale and satisfaction or reduces information asymmetries within the firm, shareholder wealth and firm value will decline. An analysis of West Germany's case, however, indicates that codetermination has little, if any, effect on corporate operations and performance.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://boris.unibe.ch/39598/1/1987%20Labor%20Participation%20in%20Corporate%20Policy-making%20Decisions%20West%20Germany%27s%20Experience%20with%20Codetermination.pdf

Loderer, Claudio; Benelli, Giuseppe; Lys, Thomas (1987). Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination. The journal of business, 60(4), pp. 553-575. The University of Chicago Press

doi:10.7892/boris.39598

urn:issn:0021-9398

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

The University of Chicago Press

Relação

http://boris.unibe.ch/39598/

http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=25a5a74a-7db8-4bee-9118-d12947f8754f%40sessionmgr110&vid=2&hid=117

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Fonte

Loderer, Claudio; Benelli, Giuseppe; Lys, Thomas (1987). Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination. The journal of business, 60(4), pp. 553-575. The University of Chicago Press

Palavras-Chave #330 Economics
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/article

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

PeerReviewed