Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination
Data(s) |
01/10/1987
|
---|---|
Resumo |
If workers are wealth maximizers, codetermination should lead to less risky investments, smaller dividends, reduced firm leverage, higher and more stable salaries, and more capital-intensive production processes. Unless codetermination also increases productivity by raising wokers' morale and satisfaction or reduces information asymmetries within the firm, shareholder wealth and firm value will decline. An analysis of West Germany's case, however, indicates that codetermination has little, if any, effect on corporate operations and performance. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador |
Loderer, Claudio; Benelli, Giuseppe; Lys, Thomas (1987). Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination. The journal of business, 60(4), pp. 553-575. The University of Chicago Press doi:10.7892/boris.39598 urn:issn:0021-9398 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
The University of Chicago Press |
Relação |
http://boris.unibe.ch/39598/ http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=25a5a74a-7db8-4bee-9118-d12947f8754f%40sessionmgr110&vid=2&hid=117 |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Fonte |
Loderer, Claudio; Benelli, Giuseppe; Lys, Thomas (1987). Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination. The journal of business, 60(4), pp. 553-575. The University of Chicago Press |
Palavras-Chave | #330 Economics |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion PeerReviewed |