Understanding Network Governance: A Case Study Exploration of Active Canada 20/20

Consistent with the governance shift towards network forms of governance, a number of new social movements have formed in response to the declining levels of physical activity in the Western world. One such movement is Active Canada 20/20: A Physical Activity Strategy and Change Agenda for Canada. Network governance is employed as the theoretical framework for this case study exploration of Active Canada 20/20 and the political landscape surrounding its development and implementation. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in addition to document/policy analysis and direct observations. Analysis of the data resulted in three overarching themes – the defining characteristics of network governance, the political landscape, and intersectoral linkages – that interconnect multifariously based the nature of the Canadian federal government and its relationship with the voluntary sector for physical activity. Despite progress in driving Active Canada 20/20 forward, entrenched dynamics of power need to be navigated within the political landscape surrounding network governance.

Brock Essay - The Political Culture of Ontario

An essay submitted by Sean O'Sullivan to Professor W.A. Matheson, 25 April 1977. The focus of the essay is stable government, "As one of the chief, if not the predominant, force in giving Confederation its political shape, Ontario helped bring about a central government designed to promote, and dedicated to preserve, stability. In the governing of their own province, the people of Ontario have been faithful to that same goal of stability. Perhaps that steadfast attitude says more than anything else about the political culture of Ontario."

México, aztec, spanish and republican : A historical, geographical, political...

UANL

A political history of modern Europe : from the reformation to the present day

UANL

Principles of political economy

UANL

Lessons on political economy

UANL

The elements of political economy : with some applications to questions of the day

UANL

Does IMF Induce Political Business Cycles? An Empirical Analysis on Latin America's Indebted Countries.

Rapport de recherche

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 1: THE ZOLLVEREIN AND RAILWAYS..

Rapport de recherche

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 2: THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY..

Rapport de recherche

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.