Monetary equilibrium with decentralized trade and learning

This paper analyzes the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning is decentralized. We show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information transmission in the economy. Our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money. It also provides an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is only a recent development.

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

Endogenous collateral: arbitrage and equilibrium without bounded short sales

We study the implications of the absence of arbitrage in an two period economy where default is allowed and assets are secured by collateral choosen by the borrowers. We show that non arbitrage sale prices of assets are submartingales, whereas non arbitrage purchase prices of the derivatives (secured by the pool of collaterals) are supermartingales. We use these non arbitrage conditions to establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents. Our results are particularly relevant for the collateralized mortgage obligations(CMO) markets.

A note on learning chaotic sunspot equilibrium

In this paper we prove convergence to chaotic sunspot equilibrium through two learning rules used in the bounded rationality literature. The rst one shows the convergence of the actual dynamics generated by simple adaptive learning rules to a probability distribution that is close to the stationary measure of the sunspot equilibrium; since this stationary measure is absolutely continuous it results in a robust convergence to the stochastic equilibrium. The second one is based on the E-stability criterion for testing stability of rational expectations equilibrium, we show that the conditional probability distribution de ned by the sunspot equilibrium is expectational stable under a reasonable updating rule of this parameter. We also report some numerical simulations of the processes proposed.

Essays on the general equilibrium effects of barriers to trade on economic growth, foreign trade and the location of economic activity in Brazil

This work presents a fully operational interstate CGE model implemented for the Brazilian economy that tries to quantify both the role of barriers to trade on economic growth and foreign trade performance and how the distribution of the economic activity may change as the country opens up to foreign trade. Among the distinctive features embedded in the model, modeling of external scale economies, port efficiency and land-maritime transport costs provides an innovative way of dealing explicitly with theoretical issues related to integrated regional systems. In order to illustrate the role played by the quality of infrastructure and geography on the country‟s foreign and interregional trade performance, a set of simulations is presented where barriers to trade are significantly reduced. The relative importance of trade policy, port efficiency and land-maritime transport costs for the country trade relations and regional growth is then detailed and quantified, considering both short run as well as long run scenarios. A final set of simulations shed some light on the effects of liberal trade policies on regional inequality, where the manufacturing sector in the state of São Paulo, taken as the core of industrial activity in the country, is subjected to different levels of external economies of scale. Short-run core-periphery effects are then traced out suggesting the prevalence of agglomeration forces over diversion forces could rather exacerbate regional inequality as import barriers are removed up to a certain level. Further removals can reverse this balance in favor of diversion forces, implying de-concentration of economic activity. In the long run, factor mobility allows a better characterization of the balance between agglomeration and diversion forces among regions. Regional dispersion effects are then clearly traced-out, suggesting horizontal liberal trade policies to benefit both the poorest regions in the country as well as the state of São Paulo. This long run dispersion pattern, on one hand seems to unravel the fragility of simple theoretical results from recent New Economic Geography models, once they get confronted with more complex spatially heterogeneous (real) systems. On the other hand, it seems to capture the literature‟s main insight: the possible role of horizontal liberal trade policies as diversion forces leading to a more homogeneous pattern of interregional economic growth.

Exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty: recursive equilibrium and survival

This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.

The n-dimensional bailey-divisia measure as a general-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of inflation

This paper shows that in economies with several monies the Bailey-Divisia multidimensional consumers surplus formula may emerge as an exact general-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of in ation, provided that preferences are quasilinear.

Essays in recursive equilibrium and market selection hypothesis

Este trabalho consiste em estudar modelos incluindo agentes com informação completa e incompleta sobre o ambiente econômico. Prova-se a existência de equilíbrio em que esses dois agentes coexistem e sob, algumas condições, obtêm-se que esse equilíbrio é recursivo e contínuo, ou seja, pode ser implementado por uma função contínua de transição que relaciona as variáveis de equilíbrio entre dois períodos consecutivos. Mostra-se, sob algumas hipóteses, que em equilíbrios recursivos contínuos, os agentes que cometem erros persistentes nas antecipações dos preços de equilíbrio são eliminados do mercado. Finalmente, exibimos diversos exemplos numéricos, no caso de mercados incompletos e informação completa, em que os agentes com expectativas racionais são eliminados do mercado. Usam-se métodos numéricos alternativos que possibilitam computar um equilíbrio em modelos com agentes heterogêneos.

Approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space

This paper shows existence of approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space in an environment of incomplete markets. We prove that the approximate recursive equilibrium implements an approximate sequential equilibrium which is always close to a Magill and Quinzii equilibrium without short sales for arbitrarily small errors. This implies that the competitive equilibrium can be implemented by using forecast statistics with minimal state space provided that agents will reduce errors in their estimates in the long run. We have also developed an alternative algorithm to compute the approximate recursive equilibrium with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents through a procedure of iterating functional equations and without using the rst order conditions of optimality.

Empirical measures,learning and sunspot equilibrium

In this paper we construct sunspot equilibria that arrise from chaotic deterministic dynamics. These equilibria are robust and therefore observables. We prove that they may be learned by a sim pie rule based on the histograms or past state variables. This work gives the theoretical justification or deterministic models that might compete with stochastic models to explain real data.

Bailey's measure of the welfare costs of infiation as a general-equilibrium measure

Lucas (2000) has ShO\nl t hat Baile,\"'s formula for t hc \\'elfare costs of inflatioIl caIl bc rcgardpd as an approximation to t hc gcneral-equilibriuIll IllCaSllH'S \\"hich emerge from thc Sidrauski anrl the shopping-time models, In this paper \\'c shm\' that Baile~"s mcaSllrc can bc cxactly obtairlf'd in tllf' Siclrauski geIleral-equilibri1lIn framp\\'ork under the assUIllption of quasilinpar prefpreIlC'cs, The rpslllt. based on ",heter or not \\'Palt h pffpcts are incorporatccl into t hp analysis, is also helpful in darif\'ing \\'hy Lucas' Illeasurp clerin'd from the Siclrauski model turns 01lt to be aIl upper bOllIlcl to Bailp~"s, T,,'o eXaInplcs arp used to illustratc t he main C'ondusions,

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

General equilibrium model with restricted participation in financial markets

The paper analyses a general equilibrium model with financiaI markets in which households may face restrictions in trading financiaI assets such as borrowing constraints and collateral (restricted participation model). However, markets are not assumed to be incomplete. We consider a standard general equilibrium model with H > 1 households, 2 periods and S states of nature in the second period. We show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations ia indeterminate, provided the existence of at least one nominal asset and one household for who some restriction is binding. Suppose there are C > 1 commodities in each state of nature and assets pays in units of some commodity. In this case for each household with binding restrictions it is possible to reduce the set of feasible assets trading and obtain a new equilibrium that utility improve alI those households. There is however an upper bound on the number of households to be improved related to the number of states of nature and the number of commodities. In particular, if the number of households ia smaller than the number of states of nature it is possible to Pareto improve any equilibrium by reducing the feasible choice set for each household.

Valuation equilibrium with crubs

This paper considers model worlds in which there are a continuum of individuaIs who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show that if there are a finite set of types and the commodity space contains lotteries, then the c1assicaI equilibrium results on convex economies can be reinterpreted to apply. Furthermore, in this lottery economy deterministic aIlocations (that is, degenerate lotteries) are generally not Pareto optimal, nor are they equilibria. In the interests of making the model seem more "natural," we show that the set of equilibria in a decentraIization in which individuaIs first gamble over vaIue transfers and then trade commodities in a deterministic competitive market economy are equivalent to those of our competi tive economy with a lottery commodity space.