Vision-based representation and recognition of human activities in image sequences

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2013

Eine Schule für alle - Inklusive Bildung als Vision, als Label oder als Korrektur

[s.c.]

Tarnkappe Information – Arzneimittelwerbung im Internet : Eine Analyse der Webseiten gebaermutterhalskrebs.com und tell-someone.de

Die Untersuchung der beiden Webseiten verfolgte das Ziel, festzustellen, ob und inwieweit die beiden Hersteller GlaxoSmithKline und Sanofi Pasteur MSD Marketingstrategien auf ihren Informationsseiten anwenden. Es zeigte sich in beiden Fällen, dass dies in großem Maße stattfindet. Durch Gestaltung und Inhalt sind Rückschlüsse auf den jeweiligen Impfstoff möglich. Dadurch wird deutlich, dass die Seiten keine reine Informationsabsicht verfolgen. Zusammenfassend bleibt festzustellen,dass die Hersteller die ihnen eingeräumten Freiheiten zur Information auch zu Marketingzwecken missbrauchen.Der zugrundeliegende Schutzzweck des Heilmittelwerbegesetzes (HWG) wird hiermit konterkariert.

Regarding Information Systems Dependability Analysis

The article presents classification of information systems by different parameters. Factors influencing information systems dependability are also presented. The article describes the strategy of information systems dependability analysis and methods of its increase. The example of analysis of real information system is considered to show how to implement the strategy.

Targeted search engines for children : search user interfaces and information-seeking behaviour

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2015

New information on the Holocystites fauna (Diploporita) of the Middle Silurian of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana / Terrence J. Frest --, Donald G. Mikulic -- and Christopher R. C. Paul --.

v.35:no.6(1977)

Révision des champignons, tant supérieurs qu'inférieurs trouvés jusqu'à ce jour dans les Pays-Bas / par C.A.J.A. Oudemans.

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Révision des champignons, tant supérieurs qu'inférieurs trouvés jusqu'à ce jour dans les Pays-Bas / par C.A.J.A. Oudemans.

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The Natural history of Enewetak Atoll / edited by Dennis M. Devaney ... [et al.] ; prepared by Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Department of Energy.

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Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.