Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
2005
|
| Resumo |
This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information |
| Formato |
2336454 bytes application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Relação |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2005-4 |
| Direitos |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
| Palavras-Chave | #Mercat de capitals #Informació privilegiada |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
