958 resultados para Former Soviet Union
Resumo:
The 1990 European Community was taken by surprise, by the urgency of demands from the newly-elected Eastern European governments to become member countries. Those governments were honouring the mass social movement of the streets, the year before, demanding free elections and a liberal economic system associated with “Europe”. The mass movement had actually been accompanied by much activity within institutional politics, in Western Europe, the former “satellite” states, the Soviet Union and the United States, to set up new structures – with German reunification and an expanded EC as the centre-piece. This paper draws on the writer’s doctoral dissertation on mass media in the collapse of the Eastern bloc, focused on the Berlin Wall – documenting both public protests and institutional negotiations. For example the writer as a correspondent in Europe from that time, recounts interventions of the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, at a European summit in Paris nine days after the “Wall”, and separate negotiations with the French President, Francois Mitterrand -- on the reunification, and EU monetary union after 1992. Through such processes, the “European idea” would receive fresh impetus, though the EU which eventuated, came with many altered expectations. It is argued here that as a result of the shock of 1989, a “social” Europe can be seen emerging, as a shared experience of daily life -- especially among people born during the last two decades of European consolidation. The paper draws on the author’s major research, in four parts: (1) Field observation from the strategic vantage point of a news correspondent. This includes a treatment of evidence at the time, of the wishes and intentions of the mass public (including the unexpected drive to join the European Community), and those of governments, (e.g. thoughts of a “Tienanmen Square solution” in East Berlin, versus the non-intervention policies of the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev). (2) A review of coverage of the crisis of 1989 by major news media outlets, treated as a history of the process. (3) As a comparison, and a test of accuracy and analysis; a review of conventional histories of the crisis appearing a decade later.(4) A further review, and test, provided by journalists responsible for the coverage of the time, as reflection on practice – obtained from semi-structured interviews.
Resumo:
Over the last three decades neoliberalism has transitioned from occupying the margins of economic policy debate to becoming the dominant approach by governments and their economic advisers, a process that has accelerated with the collapse of the former Stalinist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This thesis adopts a Marxist framework for understanding this process, beginning as it did in the realm of relatively abstract philosophical and ideological debate to the permeation of neoliberal values throughout all capitalist institutions, including the state bureaucracy. This necessarily means a focus on the dialectical relationship between the rise of neoliberalism and the shifting balance of class forces that accompanied the success of the neoliberal project in transforming the dominant economic policy paradigm. The extent to which neoliberal reforms impacted on workers and public sector institutions, along with the success or otherwise of traditional working class institutions in defending the material interests of workers will therefore be a recurring theme throughout this body of work. The evidence borne from this research and analysis suggests a major shift in the dialectic of class struggle in favour of the power of capital over labour during the period covered, with the neoliberal age being one of defeat for a labour movement that largely failed to adopt successful strategies for defending itself.
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Salaiset aseveljet deals with the relations and co-operation between Finnish and German security police authorities, the Finnish valtiollinen poliisi and the German Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) and its predecessors. The timeframe for the research stretches from the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 to the end of German-Finnish co-belligerency in 1944. The Finnish Security Police was founded in 1919 to protect the young Finnish Republic from the Communists both in Finland and in Soviet Russia. Professional ties to German colleagues were maintained during the 1920 s, and quickly re-established after the Nazis rose to power in Germany. Typical forms of co-operation concentrated on the fight against both domestic and international Communism, a concern particularly acute in Finland because of her exposed position as a neighbour to the Soviet Union. The common enemy proved to be a powerful unifying concept. During the 1930 s the forms of co-operation developed from regular and routine exchanges of information into personal acquaintancies between the Finnish Security Police top personnel and the highest SS-leadership. The critical period of German-Finnish security police co-operation began in 1941, as Finland joined the German assault on the Soviet Union. Together with the Finnish Security Police, the RSHA set up a previously unknown special unit, the Einsatzkommando Finnland, entrusted with the destruction of the perceived ideological and racial enemies on the northernmost part of the German Eastern Front. Joint actions in northern Finland led also members of the Finnish Security Police to become participants in mass murders of Communists and Jews. Post-war criminal investigations into war crimes cases involving former security police personnel were invariably stymied because of the absence of usually both the suspects and the evidence. In my research I have sought to combine the evidence gathered through an exhaustive study of Finnish Security Police archival material with a wide selection of foreign sources. Important new evidence has been gathered from archives in Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and the United States. Piece by piece, it has become possible to draw a comprehensive picture of the ultimately fateful relationship of the Finnish Security Police to its mighty German colleague.
Resumo:
Mika KT Pajusen väitös "Towards 'a real reunion'?" – Archbishop Aleksi Lehtonen's efforts for closer relations with the Church of England 1945–1951 on yleiseen kirkkohistoriaan lukeutuva tutkimus Englannin kirkon ja Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon välisistä suhteista Aleksi Lehtosen arkkipiispakaudella 1945–1951. Suhteita on tutkittu kolmesta näkökulmasta: ekumeenisesta, poliittisesta ja kirkkopoliittisesta. Tutkimuskausi alkaa pastori H.M. Waddamsin joulukuussa 1944 Suomeen tekemän vierailun jälkimainingeista ja päättyy arkkipiispa Lehtosen kuolemaan pääsiäisenä 1951. Kirkollisten suhteiden kehitystä rytmittivät lukuisat vierailut, jotka osoittivat Englannin kirkon asenteen muuttumisen sodan aikaisesta neuvostomyönteisyydestä kylmän sodan aikaiseen täysin vastakkaiseen kantaan. Englantilaiset vieraat kohtasivat Suomessa sekä kirkon että yhteiskunnan ylimmän johdon. Molemmat maat olivat valmiita tukemaan hyviä kirkollisia suhteita tilanteen niin salliessa, joskaan eivät kovin suunnitelmallisesti. Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko käytti hyviä suhteita Englannin kirkkoon saadakseen tukea ja ymmärrystä omalle kirkolleen ja yhteiskunnalleen kokemaansa Neuvostoliiton uhkaa vastaan erityisesti vaaran vuosina 1944–1948. Englannin kirkko halusi tukea suomalaista sisarkirkkoaan, mutta varoi, ettei tuottaisi tuellaan enemmän haittaa kuin hyötyä suhteessa Neuvostoliittoon. Sodan jälkeinen ekumeeninen jälleenrakentaminen lähensi kirkkoja toisiinsa. Lehtonen pyrki jatkamaan 1930-luvun kirkkojen välisiä, ehtoollisvieraanvaraisuuden saavuttaneita neuvotteluita kohti täyttä kirkollista yhteyttä. Häntä motivoi sekä evankelis-katolinen teologia että pyrkimys tukea oman maan ja kirkon läntisiä yhteyksiä. Tämä haastoi Englannin kirkon ekumeenisen linjan, joka Suomen kirkon sijasta pyrki jatkamaan neuvotteluja Tanskan, Norjan ja Islannin luterilaisten kirkkojen kanssa, joilla ei vielä ollut virallista ekumeenista sopimusta Englannin kirkon kanssa. Lehtosen pyrkimyksistä huolimatta Englannin kirkko päätyi jättämään Suomen tilanteen hautumaan. Sillä se tarkoitti suhteiden koetinkivenä olleen historiallisen piispuuden leviämistä läpi Suomen kirkon ennen kuin katsoi olevansa valmis jatkamaan kohti täyttä kirkollista yhteyttä. Molemmissa kirkoissa vaikutti pieni, innokkaiden, lähempiä suhteita toivoneiden kirkollisten vaikuttajien ydinjoukko. Englantilaisia Suomen-ystäviä motivoi tarve auttaa Suomea hankalassa poliittisessa tilanteessa. Suomessa arkkipiispa Lehtonen tuki korkeakirkollista liturgista liikettä, jolla oli läheinen yhteys anglikaanisuuteen, mutta joka sai vastaansa vanhoilliset pietistit. Suomen kirkon yleinen mielipide asettui etupäässä pietistiselle kannalle, jolle anglikaanisuus näyttäytyi teologisesti sekä liian katolisena että liian reformoituna. Kirkolliset suhteet tasaantuivat vuoden 1948 Lambeth-konferenssin jälkeen, joka rohkaisi anglikaanisia kirkkoja hyväksymään 1930-luvun neuvottelujen lähempiin kirkollisiin suhteisiin tähtäävät suositukset. Lehtonen näytti tyytyvän tähän. Samaan aikaan lähempää kirkollista kanssakäymistä tukenut ekumeeninen jälleenrakennus tuli tiensä päähän. Lehtonen jatkoi läheisempien suhteiden edistämistä, mutta hänen intonsa hiipui yhdessä heikkenevän terveydentilan kanssa. Osoituksena Lehtosen linjan kapeudesta Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon piispoista ei löytynyt hänen kuoltuaan ketään, joka olisi jatkanut hänen aktiivista anglikaanimyönteistä linjaansa.
Resumo:
Whereas it has been widely assumed in the public that the Soviet music policy system had a “top-down” structure of control and command that directly affected musical creativity, in fact my research shows that the relations between the different levels of the music policy system were vague, and the viewpoints of its representatives differed from each other. Because the representatives of the party and government organs controlling operas could not define which kind of music represented Socialist Realism, the system as it developed during the 1930s and 1940s did not function effectively enough in order to create such a centralised control of Soviet music, still less could Soviet operas fulfil the highly ambiguous aesthetics of Socialist Realism. I show that musical discussions developed as bureaucratic ritualistic arenas, where it became more important to reveal the heretical composers, making scapegoats of them, and requiring them to perform self-criticism, than to give directions on how to reach the artistic goals of Socialist Realism. When one opera was found to be unacceptable, this lead to a strengthening of control by the party leadership, which lead to more operas, one after the other, to be revealed as failures. I have studied the control of the composition, staging and reception of the opera case-studies, which remain obscure in the West despite a growing scholarly interest in them, and have created a detailed picture of the foundation and development of the Soviet music control system in 1932-1950. My detailed discussion of such case-studies as Ivan Dzerzhinskii’s The Quiet Don, Dmitrii Shostakovich’s Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk District, Vano Muradeli’s The Great Friendship, Sergei Prokofiev’s Story of a Real Man, Tikhon Khrennikov’s Frol Skobeev and Evgenii Zhukovskii’s From All One’s Heart backs with documentary precision the historically revisionist model of the development of Soviet music. In February 1948, composers belonging to the elite of the Union of Soviet Composers, e.g. Dmitri Shostakovich and Sergei Prokofiev, were accused in a Central Committee Resolution of formalism, as been under the influence of western modernism. Accusations of formalism were connected to the criticism of the conciderable financial, material and social privileges these composers enjoyed in the leadership of the Union. With my new archival findings I give a more detailed picture of the financial background for the 1948 campaign. The independent position of the music funding organization of the Union of Soviet Composers (Muzfond) to decide on its finances was an exceptional phenomenon in the Soviet Union and contradicted the strivings to strengthen the control of Soviet music. The financial audits of the Union of Soviet Composers did not, however, change the elite status of some of its composers, except for maybe a short duration in some cases. At the same time the independence of the significal financial authorities of Soviet theatres was restricted. The cuts in the governmental funding allocated to Soviet theatres contradicted the intensified ideological demands for Soviet operas.
Resumo:
This study of the Finns at the International Lenin School (ILS) reflects history of the Soviet Union during Stalin's era, history of the Communist International (Comintern) as well as history of Finnish communism. The life span of the ILS (1926-1938) matches up with creating and establishing the power structures of Stalinism. Both the ILS and Finnish Communism in the USSR became casualties of the Great Terror (1937-1938). After the WW2, however, the Soviet education was appreciated inside the Communist Party of Finland (CPF). If Finland would have become People's Democracy, the former ILS students would have composed the inner circle of the new "democratic" government. The Finnish teachers of the ILS were leaders of the CPF that was headquartered in Moscow. At the ILS studied in total 141 Finnish communists. The purpose of the ILS was to educate the communist parties' leading stratum of functionaries. They were supposed to internalize current values, methods and discipline of the Bolsheviks. This study evaluates the effects of the total school experience on the Finns that often ended in another total institution in Finland: prison. The curricula of the ILS consisted of theory of Marxism-Leninism, party history, political economics and themes of campaigns of Stalinism. The ILS year included participation in Bolshevik party life and practical work. During summer excursions (praktikas) the students could acquaint themselves with building of socialism in the Soviet Republics. At the ILS, intention to ideological moulding was not hidden. The students were supposed to adopt the Stalinist identity of the professional revolutionaries of the era. The ILS was saturated with ideology and propaganda. This study analyzes especially uses of history as vehicle of ideological standardisation and as instrument of power. Stalin contributed personally to shortcomings of history writing of the communist party. Later he supervised writing of the inclusive handbook of communism, "History of the All-Union Communist Party. Short Course". Special attention will be paid to the effects of Stalin's intervention at the ILS and inside the CPF. The life of the Finns at the ILS and outside the school is described at grass roots. The dividing line between personal and political is analyzed by charting emotional, intimate and bodily experiences of the Finns of the ILS. The fates of the ILS Finns after the studying or teaching period in Moscow are explored in detail. The protagonist among the teachers is Yrjö Sirola that was called "father of the CPF cadres". The Finnish ILS teachers and the formed students that had remained in the USSR were most severely hit by the Great Terror. The Soviet education had most importance in Finland of post WW2 period. The training at the ILS, however, did not contribute to revolution in Finland. The main heading of the study, "A Short Course of Stalinism", crystallises interpretation of the ILS as seat of learning of ideological unity of Stalinism. On the other hand, the title includes a statement of incompleteness of the Stalinist education if the schooling at the ILS had remained in one year.
Resumo:
The Russian mathematician, academician and former dissident Igor Shafarevich (b. 1923) is commonly mentioned in Western scholarly studies on perestroika and post-perestroika-era Russian politics as one of the most notable anti-Semites and extreme nationalists of the country. This notoriety owes to Shafarevich’s old samizdat article Russophobia, which was published in 1988. The scandal surrounding Russophobia came to a head when the president of The National Academy of Sciences in the United States asked Shafarevich, its honorary member, to resign. Nothing like this had ever happened in the academy’s history. The present dissertation discusses Shafarevich’s political activities, his texts and ideas as well as their reception. Particular attention is given to Russophobia, whose detailed examination proves very clearly that its reputation as an anti-Semitic text is groundless. The reasons for Russophobia’s hasty but fierce condemnation were many, but only one was that when the Soviet system began to tumble, it was commonly assumed that a vigorous rise in anti-Semitism and extreme nationalism in the Soviet Union/Russia would be just a matter of time. Many observers were highly sensitised to detecting its signs and symptoms. The dissertation also shows that most of those to write the first criticisms of Russophobia and to liken Shafarevich to the ideologues of Nazi Germany were the same people he had criticised in Russophobia for their deterministic view of history and irrational manner of connecting things for the purpose of fanning the flames of distrust between Russia’s Jews and Russians. In retrospect, it is fairly evident that Shafarevich actually managed to effectively “neutralise” the message of many of those obsessed with the Jews among his Russian contemporaries and contributed to the fact that anti-Jewish sentiments have been a great deal less popular in post-communist Russia than so many had feared and expected. The thesis also thoroughly discusses Shafarevich’s other texts and activities before Russophobia’s appearance and after it. In the 1970s, Shafarevich was one of the best-known dissidents in the Soviet Union. He worked together with academician Andrei Sakharov in a dissidents’ unofficial human rights committee and co-operated closely with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn before Solzhenitsyn’s exile. Then, during the chaotic years of perestroika, Shafarevich defended the basic rights of ordinary citizens and warned that the hype concerning democracy could become counterproductive if the most palpable result of the reforms was the disappearance of citizens’ basic security and elementary social justice. One of the conclusions of the thesis is that even if the world around Shafarevich has changed considerably, his views have remained essentially the same since the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Resumo:
In 1948, the U.S.S.R. began a global campaign of illegal whaling that lasted for three decades and, together with the poorly managed “legal” whaling of other nations, seriously depleted whale populations. Although the general story of this whaling has been told and the catch record largely corrected for the Southern Hemisphere, major gaps remain in the North Pacific. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the details of this system or its economic context. Using interviews with former Soviet whalers and biologists as well as previously unavailable reports and other material in Russian, our objective is to describe how the Soviet whaling industry was structured and how it worked, from the largest scale of state industrial planning down to the daily details of the ways in which whales were caught and processed, and how data sent to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics were falsified. Soviet whaling began with the factory ship Aleut in 1933, but by 1963 the industry had a truly global reach, with seven factory fleets (some very large). Catches were driven by a state planning system that set annual production targets. The system gave bonuses and honors only when these were met or exceeded, and it frequently increased the following year’s targets to match the previous year’s production; scientific estimates of the sustainability of the resource were largely ignored. Inevitably, this system led to whale populations being rapidly reduced. Furthermore, productivity was measured in gross output (weights of whales caught), regardless of whether carcasses were sound or rotten, or whether much of the animal was unutilized. Whaling fleets employed numerous people, including women (in one case as the captain of a catcher boat). Because of relatively high salaries and the potential for bonuses, positions in the whaling industry were much sought-after. Catching and processing of whales was highly mechanized and became increasingly efficient as the industry gained more experience. In a single day, the largest factory ships could process up to 200 small sperm whales, Physeter macrocephalus; 100 humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae; or 30–35 pygmy blue whales, Balaenoptera musculus brevicauda. However, processing of many animals involved nothing more than stripping the carcass of blubber and then discarding the rest. Until 1952, the main product was whale oil; only later was baleen whale meat regularly utilized. Falsified data on catches were routinely submitted to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics, but the true catch and biological data were preserved for research and administrative purposes. National inspectors were present at most times, but, with occasional exceptions, they worked primarily to assist fulfillment of plan targets and routinely ignored the illegal nature of many catches. In all, during 40 years of whaling in the Antarctic, the U.S.S.R. reported 185,778 whales taken but at least 338,336 were actually killed. Data for the North Pacific are currently incomplete, but from provisional data we estimate that at least 30,000 whales were killed illegally in this ocean. Overall, we judge that, worldwide, the U.S.S.R. killed approximately 180,000 whales illegally and caused a number of population crashes. Finally, we note that Soviet illegal catches continued after 1972 despite the presence of international observers on factory fleets.
Resumo:
I have always condemned (and to do anything more was not within our power or abilities) the illegal and sometimes destructive whaling by the Soviet Union. This opinion was expressed in numerous documents, including reports and records of presentations at scientific and other meetings; these documents are the witnesses to this condemnation. However, none of these documents ever saw the light of day: all of them were marked with the sinister stamp “secret.” When necessary in this memoir, my opinion of the whaling will be supported by data drawn from these docume
Resumo:
The research on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has pointed out some controversial social and political developments since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Crucially, there is a discrepancy between the governments' commitment to creating democratic political regimes, to ensuring harmonious social relations and to accommodating the ethno-cultural diversity of the resident communities. In reflecting on the legacies of the Soviet past, the book addresses the role non-titular populations have played in the process of democratisation and the relation between the states, societies and minorities in the post-Soviet Baltic states. The argument proceeds along three lines. Firstly, the book examines the institutional dimension of democratisation in the region, thereby addressing the processes of state- and nation-building as reflected in various policy-developments. Secondly, it compares the impact of ethno-cultural diversity on the development of the respective Baltic nation-states. The discussion makes clear that the framework of Baltic political communities was designed to suit the interests of the titular groups and thus resulted in the marginalisation of the minority communities. Thirdly, the book assesses the participation of minority communities in the development, criticism and improvement of state institutions and policies since independence. The analysis points out that, two decades after independence, the post-Soviet Baltic states and societies are seen by many members of the majority groups as primarily serving the interests of their ethnic community. In this situation, the members of the non-titular communities need to adapt to the majorities' perceptions in order to benefit from the achievements of democratisation.
Resumo:
This article offers a critical reassessment of the Soviet role in the Spanish Civil War, based on recent scholarship and declassified official documents. The author interrogates the broad historiographical consensus that reduces Soviet intervention in Spain to a sinister and nefarious force. Stalin's ignominious reputation vis-à-vis the Loyalist side is present in nearly all Western scholarship on the war, whether specialized studies by Nationalist sympathizers or Republicans in exile, or general treatments of European history written in England or America. It would be difficult to locate even a brief overview of the Civil War published outside of Russia that does not in some fashion demonize the Soviet dictator and the Soviet military assistance, code-named ‘Operation X’. The author argues that the basic error in the wide-ranging literature of this topic has always been to approach Stalin's position in Spain as one based on strength rather than weakness. If framed within the context of failure, Stalin's long-standing reputation as the villain of the Civil War may appear in a strikingly different light, and Soviets’ overall contribution to the Loyalist struggle therefore deserving a nuanced revision. The author also explores the multiple strands of the Soviet-Spanish relationship, which included not only military aid but also diplomatic, cultural and humanitarian facets.
Resumo:
O período após o colapso da União Soviética foi o tempo da procura de novas identidades na nova realidade e de escolha de novos parceiros e aliados, o tempo da construção de novos estados e de formulação das regras e normas nacionais. Após o desmoronamento da ideologia soviética - um facto reconhecido oficialmente durante o período da Perestroika –, as pessoas sentiram uma necessidade de preencher o vácuo ideológico e desenvolver uma nova identidade. Foi proclamada a rejeição da estrutura política administrativa herdada da União Soviética e do sistema de economia planificada, e desenvolvida a tendência para a construção do estado democrático fundado numa economia de mercado. As expectativas relativas às transformações no período pós-soviético estavam relacionadas com o Ocidente (EUA e UE), e a construção do estado soberano foi fundada em modelos ocidentais de estado de direito, ‘boa governança’ e a economia de mercado. A UE desempenhou um papel importante na democratização dos estados da região do Sul do Cáucaso através de vários projetos e programas bilaterais e multilaterais no âmbito da Política Europeia de Vizinhança e da Parceria Oriental. Embora as reformas democráticas tenham sido realizadas com vista ao estabelecimento de uma Constituição democrática, à implementação de eleições democráticas e ao desenvolvimento da sociedade civil, fortaleceram, também, ainda mais, a natureza autoritária do poder, impediram a criação de um estado de direito, reforçaram violação dos direitos e das liberdades humanas. (NODIYA, 2003: 30; BAKHMAN, 2003: 17; BADALOV, 2003: 20). Deste modo, o processo da promoção da democracia através das reformas nos três estados do Sul do Cáucaso conduziu à criação de estados de “conteúdo autocrático misto, mas de forma democrática” (CHETERYAN, 2003: 41). Embora seja possível identificar as semelhanças entre os três estados da região do Sul do Cáucaso nas reformas do processo de desenvolvimento, os métodos e meios de implementação de reformas nas realidades dos estados regionais pela administração nacional foram bastante diferentes, por razões associadas às especificidades de cada um (DELCOUR e WOLCZUK, 2013: 3). Cada país é caracterizado pelas suas peculiaridades ao nível da situação geopolítica e diversidade do potencial económico – fatores que definem a trajetória política e económica do estado no período pós-soviético e, em certa medida, influenciam o modo como se desenvolvem as relações com a UE e, portanto, o processo de adoção das reformas e a sua introdução a nível nacional.
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The fundamental question in the transitional economies of the former Eastern Europe and Soviet Union has been whether privatisation and market liberalisation have had an effect on the performance of former state-owned enterprises. This study examines the effect of privatisation, capital market discipline, price liberalisation and international price exposure on the restructuring of large Russian enterprises. The performance indicators are sales, profitability, labour productivity and stock market valuations. The results do not show performance differences between state-owned and privatised enterprises. On the other hand, the expansion of the de novo private sector has been strong. New enterprises have significantly higher sales growth, profitability and labour productivity. However, the results indicate a diminishing effect of ownership. The international stock market listing has a significant positive effect on profitability, while the effect of domestic stock market listing is insignificant. The international price exposure has a significant positive increasing effect on profitability and labour productivity. International enterprises have higher profitability only when operating on price liberalised markets, however. The main results of the study are strong evidence on the positive effects of international linkages on the enterprise restructuring and the higher than expected role of new enterprises in the Russian economy.
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This thesis examines the impact of the Soviet Union's collapse on the Russian Symbolic as represented through popular cinema of the post-Soviet period. The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 became one of the most traumatic experiences for many Russian people. The trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union penetrated the everyday reality of the Russian Symbolic, leaving the traces-symptoms in different cultural fonns like literature, arts, television and cinema. Because popular culture usually reacts very quickly to any social, political and economical shifts in society, it is an excellent barometer for deeper changes in society. Focusing on postSoviet popular cinema, this thesis analyzes the symptoms of cultural and individual trauma occasioned by the momentous changes of the 1990's. This study is grounded in post-analytic theory of Jacques Lacan and its interpretation by Slavoj Zizek, which emphases the traumatic encounter with the Real as a "hard core" of our reality. According to this paradigm, a new chain of signifiers is structured around the traumatic breach in the Symbolic, initiating a process of fantasy construction to deal with consequences of trauma and, thus, to support our Symbolic order. This thesis examines three major fantasy constructions - drinking, traveling to a "happy land" and family reunion and money - in popular films by Alexander Rogozhkin, Yurij Mamin, Georgij Shengelia, Dmitrij Astrakhan, Valerij Todorovskij, Alexej Balabanov, Sergej Bodrov Jr. and Petr Buslov. According to Zizek, enjoyment underlies any fantasy constructions, and that is why after the intrusion of the Real every individual and culture should go through the process of fantasizing about some substitutes which can help to minimize the traumatic effect and which can lead to a partial enjoyment. By analyzing the fantasies about drinking, "happy land", reconstruction of the family bonds and money in Russian popular cinema since 1991, this thesis demonstrates how the traumatic engagement with the Real affected the everyday lives of Russian people, and how individuals tried to fill the gap, the lack, in the post-Soviet Symbolic and "return" the lost feeling of unity and plenitude.
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Esta investigación se centra exclusivamente en la relación que se dio entre Cuba y la Unión Soviética durante la década de los sesenta, situándolas no sólo en un marco estructural de dependencia, en el ámbito económico, sino también en un contexto de autonomía política en relación con dicha dependencia. Lo anterior servirá para exponer una alternativa a la idea de considerar a Cuba como un país satélite de la ex URSS, como un subordinado de la superpotencia, y más bien identificará los aspectos claves de su política exterior que permitan afirmar que efectivamente Cuba poseía autonomía política, a pesar de depender enormemente de los acuerdos comerciales con la URSS y el resto del bloque socialista.