Axial ligand influence on geometries, charge distributions and electronic structures of iron tetraazamacrocycle [Fe((II))TIM(X)(Y)](2+) complexes assessed by Density Functional Theory

We employed the Density Functional Theory along with small basis sets, B3LYP/LANL2DZ, for the study of FeTIM complexes with different pairs of axial ligands (CO, H(2)O, NH(3), imidazole and CH(3)CN). These calculations did not result in relevant changes of molecular quantities as bond lengths, vibrational frequencies and electronic populations supporting any significant back-donation to the carbonyl or acetonitrile axial ligands. Moreover, a back-donation mechanism to the macrocycle cannot be used to explain the observed changes in molecular properties along these complexes with CO or CH(3)CN. This work also indicates that complexes with CO show smaller binding energies and are less stable than complexes with CH(3)CN. Further, the electronic band with the largest intensity in the visible region (or close to this region) is associated to the transition from an occupied 3d orbital on iron to an empty pi* orbital located at the macrocycle. The energy of this Metal-to-Ligand Charge Transfer (MLCT) transition shows a linear relation to the total charge of the macrocycle in these complexes as given by Mulliken or Natural Population Analysis (NPA) formalisms. Finally, the macrocycle total charge seems to be influenced by the field induced by the axial ligands. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Extern Web-service-lösning vid SSAB Tunnplåt i Borlänge- för kommunikation med sina distributions lager

Detta examensarbete har utförts på SSAB- Tunnplåt i Borlänge under vårterminen 2004 och omfattar 10 veckors arbete.SSAB sköter idag sin kommunikation med distributionslagren via fax, telefon eller e-post. Eftersom detta är ett ganska tidskrävande kommunikationssätt, vill SSAB ha en smidigare och snabbare kommunikationslösning. Den lösning som SSAB vill ha är en extern Web-service-lösning för att upprätta en säker kommunikation med sina distributionslager.Parallellt med byggandet av Web-service-lösningen arbetades en förvaltningsmodell fram. Den beskriver hur förvaltningsorganisationen med dess rutiner kan se ut vid implementering av lösningen.För att skapa en säker förbindelse med Web-servicen skall en webbklient användas som i sin tur anropar en COM+ komponent. Detta för att kunna skicka med certifikatet ifrån webbklienten till webbservern där Web-servicen ligger. COM+ komponenten måste få tillgång till en användarprofil när den kommunicerar med Web-servicen. Detta för att kunna upprätta en SSL-förbindelse i det inledande skedet. SSL-förbindelsen skall läggas i den VPN-tunnel som mVPN tillhandahåller via WSSAL.

Local concavifiability of preferences and determinacy of equilibrium

In this paper we consider strictly convex monotone continuous complete preorderings on R+n that are locally representable by a concave utility function. By Alexandroff 's (1939) theorem, this function is twice dífferentiable almost everywhere. We show that if the bordered hessian determinant of a concave utility representation vanishes on a null set. Then demand is countably rectifiable, that is, except for a null set of bundles, it is a countable union of c1 manifolds. This property of consumer demand is enough to guarantee that the equilibrium prices of apure exchange economy will be locally unique, for almost every endowment. We give an example of an economy satisfying these conditions but not the Katzner (1968) - Debreu (1970, 1972) smoothness conditions.

First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions case and the discrete distributions case.

Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations

This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.

On equilibrium prices in continuous time

We combine general equilibrium theory and théorie générale of stochastic processes to derive structural results about equilibrium state prices.

First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions case and the discrete distributions case.

Bubbles, collateral and monetary equilibrium

Consider an economy where infinite-lived agents trade assets collateralized by durable goods. We obtain results that rule out bubbles when the additional endowments of durable goods are uniformly bounded away from zero, regardless of whether the asset’s net supply is positive or zero. However, bubbles may occur, even for state-price processes that generate finite present value of aggregate wealth. First, under complete markets, if the net supply is being endogenously reduced to zero as a result of collateral repossession. Secondly, under incomplete markets, for a persistent positive net supply, under the general conditions guaranteeing existence of equilibrium. Examples of monetary equilibria are provided.

A general-equilibrium closed-form solution to the welfare costs of inflation (Forthcoming, Revista Brasileira de Economia)

This work presents closed-form solutions to Lucasís (2000) generalequilibrium expression for the welfare costs of ináation, as well as to the di§erence between the general-equlibrium measure and Baileyís (1956) partial-equilibrium measure. In Lucasís original work only numerical solutions are provided.

Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, finite dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compatibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder’s expected utilities. Thus for example we may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting application of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states

Radner (1968) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium for differential information economies with finitely many states. We extend this result to economies with infinitely many states of nature.