Graded literature readers

UANL

Foundation studies in literature

UANL

Myths of greece and Rome : narrated with special reference to literature and art

UANL

Outlines of a System of polítical Economy; written with a view to prove to government and the country, that the cause of the present agricultural distress is entirely artificial..

UANL

The Effect of Agricultural Zoning on Land Prices, Quebec, 1975-1981

Dans Ce Texte Nous Examinons les Effets de la Loi du Zonage Agricole du Quebec, Proclame En Decembre 1978 Sur le Prix du Sol Dans une Banlieu de Montreal. a L'aide de Donnees Sur les Transactions Normales Faites a Carignan et Saint-Mathias de 1975 a 1981, Nous Estimons, a L'aide des Moindres Carrees Ordinaires, une Equation de Determination du Prix Par Acre Avec Comme Variables Independantes la Dimension du Lot, la Distance de Montreal, les Services Disponibles (Egouts,...) et le Zonage Agricole (Ou Non) du Sol. Nos Resultats Nous Indiquent Que le Zonage Agricole Reduit le Prix D'un Acre de Sol.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Excelsior, compendium of literature and elocution

UANL

Stepping Stones to literature

UANL

Le paradis perdu suivi de essai sur la literature anglaise

UANL

Lessons in english literature with a short dictionary of bristish, iris, and american autors

UANL

English literature

UANL

Southern literature from 1579-1895 a comprehensive review with copiors extracts and criticisms

UANL

Annual Record of Homeopathic Literature 1874

UANL

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.