962 resultados para Lineal programming
Aggregate economic effects of alternative land retirement programs : a linear programming analysis /
Resumo:
Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-54).
Resumo:
Issued May 1980.
Resumo:
Prepared in cooperation with the Center for Agricultural and Economic Development. Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University.
Resumo:
On cover: Control data, 1604/1604-A computer.
Resumo:
Bibliography: p. [73]-[74]
Resumo:
Hearings held Aug. 23, 1967-July 4, 1968.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Sponsored by Office of Scientific Research of the Air Research and Development Command and held jointly by National Bureau of Standards and the Directorate of Management Analysis, DCS/Comptroller, USAF.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Shipping list no.: 97-0031-P.
Resumo:
Bibliography: p. 121.
Resumo:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06
Resumo:
Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06
Resumo:
This paper focuses on measuring the extent to which market power has been exercised in a recently deregulated electricity generation sector. Our study emphasises the need to consider the concept of market power in a long-run dynamic context. A market power index is constructed focusing on differences between actual market returns and long-run competitive returns, estimated using a programming model devised by the authors. The market power implications of hedge contracts are briefly considered. The state of Queensland Australia is used as a context for the analysis. The results suggest that generators have exercised significant market power since deregulation.
Resumo:
In this paper, we consider dynamic programming for the election timing in the majoritarian parliamentary system such as in Australia, where the government has a constitutional right to call an early election. This right can give the government an advantage to remain in power for as long as possible by calling an election, when its popularity is high. On the other hand, the opposition's natural objective is to gain power, and it will apply controls termed as "boosts" to reduce the chance of the government being re-elected by introducing policy and economic responses. In this paper, we explore equilibrium solutions to the government, and the opposition strategies in a political game using stochastic dynamic programming. Results are given in terms of the expected remaining life in power, call and boost probabilities at each time at any level of popularity.