Modernity and the 'failure' of crime control

Rather than understanding the recurrent failure of various attempts at crime control as unfortunate and undesirable aberrations, all too familiar glitches an otherwise uninterrupted teleological march to a better society, such failures are instead positioned as part of the fabric of late modernity itself. That is, society changes not according to a predetermined logic along neatly defined and clearly reasoned tracks, rather it hurtles from crisis to crisis, from failure to failure, and it is the regulation of that failure which produces new initiatives and new forms of governance. Utilising the example of the modern prison, this chapter contends that too great an emphasis upon this institution’s ‘failure’ results not only in a neglect of the many other functions that it serves in the regulation of difference, but also, and more generally, it results in an underestimation of the importance of failure in providing new impetus for social transformation.

Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long-standing status-quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence, or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as ADHD, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention of the paper is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.

ADHD : a case study in fallacy

This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples of fallacious argument, and the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The paper divides twelve familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, psychological and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these fallacies to support their position. It is suggested that all researchers, whether into ADHD or otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments if they are not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic.

Towards a model of the institutional logics of climate change

The proliferation of innovative schemes to address climate change at international, national and local levels signals a fundamental shift in the priority and role of the natural environment to society, organizations and individuals. This shift in shared priorities invites academics and practitioners to consider the role of institutions in shaping and constraining responses to climate change at multiple levels of organisations and society. Institutional theory provides an approach to conceptualising and addressing climate change challenges by focusing on the central logics that guide society, organizations and individuals and their material and symbolic relationship to the environment. For example, framing a response to climate change in the form of an emission trading scheme evidences a practice informed by a capitalist market logic (Friedland and Alford 1991). However, not all responses need necessarily align with a market logic. Indeed, Thornton (2004) identifies six broad societal sectors each with its own logic (markets, corporations, professions, states, families, religions). Hence, understanding the logics that underpin successful –and unsuccessful– climate change initiatives contributes to revealing how institutions shape and constrain practices, and provides valuable insights for policy makers and organizations. This paper develops models and propositions to consider the construction of, and challenges to, climate change initiatives based on institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). We propose that the challenge of understanding and explaining how climate change initiatives are successfully adopted be examined in terms of their institutional logics, and how these logics evolve over time. To achieve this, a multi-level framework of analysis that encompasses society, organizations and individuals is necessary (Friedland and Alford 1991). However, to date most extant studies of institutional logics have tended to emphasize one level over the others (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 104). In addition, existing studies related to climate change initiatives have largely been descriptive (e.g. Braun 2008) or prescriptive (e.g. Boiral 2006) in terms of the suitability of particular practices. This paper contributes to the literature on logics by examining multiple levels: the proliferation of the climate change agenda provides a site in which to study how institutional logics are played out across multiple, yet embedded levels within society through institutional forums in which change takes place. Secondly, the paper specifically examines how institutional logics provide society with organising principles –material practices and symbolic constructions– which enable and constrain their actions and help define their motives and identity. Based on this model, we develop a series of propositions of the conditions required for the successful introduction of climate change initiatives. The paper proceeds as follows. We present a review of literature related to institutional logics and develop a generic model of the process of the operation of institutional logics. We then consider how this is applied to key initiatives related to climate change. Finally, we develop a series of propositions which might guide insights into the successful implementation of climate change practices.

Synthesis of orchestrators from service choreographies

With service interaction modelling, it is customary to distinguish between two types of models: choreographies and orchestrations. A choreography describes interactions within a collection of services from a global perspective, where no service plays a privileged role. Instead, services interact in a peer-to-peer manner. In contrast, an orchestration describes the interactions between one particular service, the orchestrator, and a number of partner services. The main proposition of this work is an approach to bridge these two modelling viewpoints by synthesising orchestrators from choreographies. To start with, choreographies are defined using a simple behaviour description language based on communicating finite state machines. From such a model, orchestrators are initially synthesised in the form of state machines. It turns out that state machines are not suitable for orchestration modelling, because orchestrators generally need to engage in concurrent interactions. To address this issue, a technique is proposed to transform state machines into process models in the Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN). Orchestrations represented in BPMN can then be augmented with additional business logic to achieve value-adding mediation. In addition, techniques exist for refining BPMN models into executable process definitions. The transformation from state machines to BPMN relies on Petri nets as an intermediary representation and leverages techniques from theory of regions to identify concurrency in the initial Petri net. Once concurrency has been identified, the resulting Petri net is transformed into a BPMN model. The original contributions of this work are: an algorithm to synthesise orchestrators from choreographies and a rules-based transformation from Petri nets into BPMN.