The optimality of the Friedman rule when some distorting taxes are exogenous

This paper investigates the optimality of the Friedman rule in a two-sector small open economy. That policy prescription is found to be a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency. If a planner can select all conceivable distorting taxes, then, for some initial values of public debt, money balances and foreign assets, it is possible to decentralize a Pareto efficient allocation. If the planner can select only some of these tax rates, then second-best policies may also satisfy the Friedman rule. However, this last result depends on the set of tax instruments the planner can choose from.

A proposal for unitary taxes on the profits of transnational corporations

Includes bibliography

Differential fuel taxes and their effects on automobile demand

Includes bibliography

Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Taxes in Brazil

Objectives. We investigated whether taxing sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) would improve the diets of households in Brazil. Methods. We used household food consumption data that the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics collected in 2002-2003 from a nationally representative sample of 48470 Brazilian households. The consumption of SSBs is expressed as the total SSB calories consumed and as the SSB percentage of the total calories purchased. We investigated price elasticity with regression models, controlling for demographic variables, income, and prices of all other foods and drinks. Results. Increases in the price of SSBs led to reductions in consumption. A 1.00% increase in the price of SSBs led to a 0.85% reduction of SSB calories consumed (1.03% reduction for the poor and 0.63% for the nonpoor). Increased income had a positive effect on SSB consumption, but the effect was less than half the size of the price elasticity (0.41% increase in SSB calories consumed for every 1.00% increase in income). Conclusions. High SSB price elasticity in Brazil indicates that a tax on purchased weight or volume would lead to reductions in SSB consumption. (Am J Public Health. 2012;102:178-183. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2011.300313)

Do Taxes Matter in the CAPM?

The traditional literature on the CAPM assumes that investor's tax payments simply vanish from the model. This assumption is not at all consistent with the actual behavior of the Treasury. The theory of general equilibrium states that an interest rate rf = 0 will not affect prices if taxes are introduced. We show that this result can be extended to the CAPM if the tax payments are redistributed among investors.

Legal Implications of the Use of Export Taxes in Addressing Carbon Leakage: Competing Border Adjustment Measures

The prevailing uncertainties about the future of the post-Kyoto international legal framework for climate mitigation and adaptation increase the likelihood of unilateral trade interventions that aim to address climate policy concerns, as exemplified by the controversial European Union initiative to include the aviation industry in its emissions trading system. The emerging literature suggests that border carbon adjustment (BCA) measures imposed by importing countries would lead to substantial legal complications in relation to World Trade Organization law and hence to possible trade disputes. Lack of legal clarity on BCAs is exacerbated by potential counter or pre-emptive export restrictions that exporting countries might impose on carbon-intensive products. In this context, this paper investigates the interface between legal and welfare implications of competing unilateral BCA measures. It argues that carbon export taxes will be an inevitable part of the future climate change regime in the absence of a multilateral agreement. It also describes the channels through which competing BCAs may lead to trade conflicts and political complications as a result of their distributional and welfare impacts at the domestic and global levels.

Border tax adjustments: Can energy and carbon taxes be adjusted at the border?

Will die Schweiz mit unilateralen energie- und klimapolitischen Massnahmen ambitionierte Ziele verfolgen, dann erfahren energieintensive Sektoren Nachteile im internationalen Wett- bewerb. Produktionsverlagerungen und „carbon leakage“ sind die Folgen, was nicht im Sinne der Schweizer Wirtschaft und der globalen Klimaziele ist. Mit Grenzausgleichsmassnahmen (BAM) kann die Schweiz ihre energieintensiven Betriebe nicht vor internationalen Wettbe- werbsnachteilen schützen. Weiter kommt hinzu, dass die Einführung von BAM aus rechtli- cher Sicht „riskant“ ist und bei einem Schweizer Alleingang mit hohen Vollzugshürden ge- rechnet werden muss. Für die Schweiz macht eine Einführung von BAM nur im Rahmen ei- ner grösseren Klimakoalition Sinn (bspw. zusammen mit der EU). Alternativen zu BAM sind die einfacher und autonom umsetzbaren Ausnahmeregelungen für energieintensive Betriebe oder Output-based-allocation-Systeme.

Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.

A journey through Spain in the years 1786 and 1787 : with particular attention to the agriculture, manufactures, commerce, population, taxes and revenue of that country and remarks in passing through a part of France

Sign.: A4, B-Z8, Aa-Bb8, Cc4

A journey through Spain in the years 1786 and 1787 : with particular attention to the agriculture, manufactures, commerce, population, taxes, and revenue of that country and remarks in passing through a part of France

Contiene: "Appendix" con las equivalencias entre la moneda castellana y la inglesa y un indice de nombres geograficos