Embracing humanity in the face of death: Why do existential concerns moderate ingroup humanization?

People humanize their ingroup to address existential concerns about their mortality, but the reasons why they do so remain ambiguous. One explanation is that people humanize their ingroup to bolster their social identity in the face of their mortality. Alternatively, people might be motivated to see their ingroup as more uniquely human (UH) to distance themselves from their corporeal “animal” nature. These explanations were tested in Australia, where social identity is tied less to UH and more to human nature (HN) which does not distinguish humans from animals. Australians attributed more HN traits to the ingroup when mortality was salient, while the attribution of UH traits remained unchanged. This indicates that the mortality-buffering function of ingroup humanization lies in reinforcing the humanness of our social identity, rather than just distancing ourselves from our animal nature. Implications for (de)humanization in intergroup relations are discussed.

Attributing and denying humanness to others

We review a programme of research on the attribution of humanness to people, and the ways in which lesser humanness is attributed to some compared to others. We first present evidence that humanness has two distinct senses, one representing properties that are unique to our species, and the other—human nature—those properties that are essential or fundamental to the human category. An integrative model of dehumanisation is then laid out, in which distinct forms of dehumanisation correspond to the denial of the two senses of humanness, and the likening of people to particular kinds of nonhuman entities (animals and machines). Studies demonstrating that human nature attributes are ascribed more to the self than to others are reviewed, along with evidence of the phenomenon’s cognitive and motivational basis. Research also indicates that both kinds of humanness are commonly denied to social groups, both explicitly and implicitly, and that they may cast a new light on the study of stereotype content. Our approach to the study of dehumanisation complements the tradition of research on infrahumanisation, and indicates new directions for exploring the importance of humanness as a dimension of social perception.

Humanizing the self: Moderators of the attribution of lesser humanness to others

Three studies investigated moderators of the tendency to attribute greater humanness to the self than to others, an interpersonal counterpart of outgroup infra-humanization. Study 1 demonstrated that this self-humanizing effect is reduced when the other is the focus of comparison. Study 2 showed that the effect is reduced when the other is individuated. Study 3 indicated that empathy does not moderate self-humanizing: Self-humanizing failed to correlate negatively with dispositional empathy or perspective-taking. Study 3 also indicated that abstract construal moderates the self-humanizing effect using a temporal comparison. Participants rated their future self, but not their past self, as less human than their present self. Studies 1 and 3 also showed that selfhumanizing is greater for undesirable traits: People may view their failings as “only human.” All findings were distinct from those attributable to self-enhancement. Self-humanizing may reflect a combination of egocentrism, focalism, abstract representation of others, and motivated processes.

Phenomenology and Extreme Sports in Natural Landscapes

Husserl reminded us of the imperative to return to the Lebensweldt, or life-world. He was preoccupied with the crisis of Western science which alienated the experiencing self from the world of immediate experience. Immediate experience provides a foundation for what it means to be human. Heidegger, building upon these ideas, foresaw a threat to human nature in the face of ‘technicity’. He argued for a return to a relationship between ‘authentic self’ and nature predicated upon the notion of ‘letting be’ in which humans are open to the mystery of being. Self and nature are not conceived as alienated entities but as aspects of a single entity. In modern times, separation between self and the world is further evidenced by scientific rational modes of being exemplified through consumerism and the incessant use of screen-based technology which dominate human experience. In contrast, extreme sports provide an opportunity for people to return to the life-world by living in relation to the natural world. Engagement in extreme sports enables a return to authenticity as we rediscover self as part of nature.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Scheffleriläinen rationaalisuus ja kasvatustodellisuuden monikerroksisuus : Jännitteitä ja ratkaisuja Israel Schefflerin kasvatusfilosofiassa

The study is a philosophical analysis of Israel Scheffler’s philosophy of education, focusing on three crucial conceptions in his philosophy: the conception of rationality, the conception of human nature, and the conception of reality. The interrelations of these three concepts as well as their relations to educational theorizing are analysed and elaborated. A conceptual problem concerning Scheffler’s ideal of rationality derives from Scheffler’s supposition of the strong analogy between science education and moral education in terms of the ideal of rationality. This analogy is argued to be conceptually problematic, since the interconnections of rationality, objectivity, and truth, appear to differ from each other in the realms of ethics and science, given the presuppositions of ontological realism and ethical naturalism, to which Scheffler explicitly subscribes. This study considers two philosophical alternatives for solving this problem. The first alternative relates the analogy to the normative concept of personhood deriving from the teleological understanding of human nature. Nevertheless, this position turns out to be problematic for Scheffler, since he rejects all teleological thinking in his philosophy. The problem can be solved, as it is argued, by limiting Scheffler’s rejection of teleology – in light of his philosophical outlook on the whole – in a manner that allows a modest version of a teleological conception of human nature. The second alternative, based especially on Scheffler’s later contributions, is to suggest that reality is actually more complex and manifold than it appears to be in light of a contemporary naturalist worldview. This idea of plurealism – Scheffler’s synthesis of pluralism and realism – is represented especially in Scheffler’s contributions related to his debate with Nelson Goodman dealing with both constructivism and realism. The idea of plurealism is not only related to the ethics-science-distinction, but is more widely related to the relationship between ontological realism and the incommensurable systems of description in diverse realms of human understanding. The Scheffler-Goodman debate is also analysed in relation to the contemporary constructivism-realism debate in educational philosophy. In terms of educational questions, Scheffler’s plurealism is argued as offering a fruitful perspective. Scheffler’s philosophy of education can be interpreted as searching for solutions to the problems deriving from the tension between the tradition of analytical philosophy and the complexity and multiplicity of educational reality. The complexity of reality combined with the supposition of the limitedness of human knowledge does not lead Scheffler to relativism or particularism, but, in contrast, Schefflerian formulations of rationality and objectivity preserve the possibility for critical inquiry in all realms of educational reality. In light of this study, Scheffler’s philosophy of education provides an exceptional example of combining ontological realism, epistemological fallibilism, and the defence of the ideal of rationality, combined with a wide-ranging understanding of educational reality.

Tax compliance and psychic costs: Behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker

Although paying taxes is a key element of a well-functioning society, there is still limited understanding as to why people actually pay their taxes. Models emphasizing that taxpayers make strategic, financially motivated compliance decisions seemingly assume an overly restrictive view of human nature. Law abidance may be more accurately explained by social norms, a concept that has gained growing importance as research attempts to understand the tax compliance puzzle. This study analyzes the influence of psychic stress generated by the possibility of breaking social norms in the tax compliance context. We measure psychic stress using heart rate variability (HRV), which captures the psychobiological or neural equivalents of psychic stress that may arise from the contemplation of real or imagined actions, producing immediate physiologic discomfort. The results of our laboratory experiments provide empirical evidence of a positive correlation between psychic stress and tax compliance, thus underscoring the importance of moral sentiments for tax compliance. We also identify three distinct types of individuals who differ in their levels of psychic stress, tax morale, and tax compliance.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Profligate Descent : The Cultural Transformations of Evolutionary Narrative

This dissertation traces a set of historical transformations the Darwinian evolutionary narrative has undergone toward the end of the twentieth century, especially as reflected in Anglo-American popular science books and novels. The study has three objectives. First, it seeks to understand the organizing logic of evolutionary narratives and the role that assumptions about gender and sexuality play in that logic. Second, it asks what kinds of cultural anxieties evolutionary theory raises and how evolutionary narratives negotiate them. Third, it examines the possibilities and limits of narrative transformation both as a historical phenomenon and as a theoretical question. This interdisciplinary dissertation is situated at the intersection of science studies, cultural studies, literary studies, and gender studies. Its understanding of science as a cultural practice that both emerges from and contributes to cultural expectations and institutional structures follows the tradition of science studies. Its focus on the question of popular appeal and the mechanisms of cultural change arises from cultural studies. Its view of narrative as a structural phenomenon is grounded in literary studies in general and feminist narrative theory in particular. Its understanding of gender and sexuality as implicated in discourses of epistemic authority builds on the view of gender and sexuality as contingent cultural categories central to gender studies. The primary material consists of over 25 British and American popular science books and novels, published roughly between 1990 and 2005. In order to highlight historical transformations, these texts are read in the context of Darwin s The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man, on the one hand, and such sociobiological classics as E. O. Wilson s On Human Nature and Richard Dawkins s The Selfish Gene, on the other. The research method combines feminist narrative analysis with cultural and historical contextualization, emphasizing discursive abruptions, recurrent narrative patterns, and underlying continuities. The dissertation demonstrates that the relationship between Darwin s evolutionary narrative and late twentieth-century evolutionary narratives is characterized by reemphasis, omissions, and continuous rewriting. In particular, contemporary evolutionary discourse extends the role assigned to reproduction both sexual and narrative in Darwin s writing, generating a narrative logic that imagines the desire to reproduce as the driving force of evolution and posits the reproductive sex act as the endlessly repeated narrative event that keeps the story going. The study argues that the popular appeal of evolutionary accounts of gender, sexuality, and human nature may arise, to an extent, from this reproductive narrative dynamic. This narrative dynamic, however, is not logically invulnerable. Since the continuation of the evolutionary narrative relies on successful reproduction, the possibility of reproductive failure poses a constant risk to narrative futurity, arousing cultural anxieties that evolutionary narratives need to address. The study argues that evolutionary narratives appease such anxieties by evoking a range of cultural narratives, especially romantic, religious, and national narratives. Furthermore, the study shows that the event-based logic of evolutionary narratives privileges observable acts over emotions, pleasures, identities, and desires, thus engendering a set of conceptual exclusions that limits the imaginative scope of evolution as a cultural narrative.

La moral y los modelos de optimización económica : una reflexión acerca de la antropología en la teoría económica neoclásica

Resumen: Luego de la crisis financiera global de 2008, el blindaje conceptual del paradigma neoclásico, edificado sobre un atractivo formalismo matemático, ha dejado entrever sus falencias. En ese contexto, este artículo plantea la necesidad de revisar sus fundamentos, en especial la concepción antropológica y la metodología que subyace detrás del modelo. El autor analiza al mainstream como un modelo reduccionista de la naturaleza humana, y postula la necesidad de modificar el rumbo de la ciencia económica hacia una dirección personalista, enfocada en el bienestar social de las personas, que considere la importancia de la moral en la toma de decisiones. Asimismo, el economista debería desarrollar su trabajo desde una perspectiva reflexiva y de diálogo con el resto de las ciencias sociales.

La estructura del orden moral : una introducción a la ética de cuño aristotélico-tomista

Resumen: El texto realiza un análisis sobre el orden moral en su objeto material (la conducta humana) y el objeto formal (el bien o la perfección). Se detiene en la experiencia moral planteando los problemas, las dudas y las dificultades tales como la naturaleza humana, el fin natural, la libertad, las pasiones, la necesidad de indigencia y la deóntica, entre otros. Luego estudia el esquema de la estructura del orden moral en el orden moral vivido, disposicional, subjetivo, normativo y de fines. Estas dimensiones se integran a través de la causalidad final.

Aportes de la Pontificia Academia para la Vida (PAV) al desarrollo de la bioética

Resumen: El autor, Oficial de Estudio de la Pontificia Academia para la Vida (PAV), detalla en el presente artículo, los aportes realizados por la Academia al desarrollo de esta nueva disciplina que es la Bioética. Su objetivo ha sido siempre salvaguardar la naturaleza y la dignidad del ser humano ante la amenaza de un mal entendido “progreso científico y cultural” que muchas veces atenta contra éstas. La Pontificia Academia para la Vida se nutre del Magisterio de la Iglesia y apuesta constantemente al diálogo fecundo entre fe y razón.

Los valores jurídicos y la bioética : hacia una nueva relación entre moral y derecho

Resumen: En este trabajo se trata de demostrar que la correcta solución de los dilemas bioéticos debe estar acompañada de una teoría de los valores objetivista. Se señala, al respecto, que el valor más importante a alcanzar en este terreno es el de naturaleza humana, lo que conlleva a estudiar su correcto significado, que se encuentra emparentado con la noción de finalidad. Se efectúan, también, apreciaciones referidas al principio de autonomía kantiano y como éste se encuentra malinterpretado por muchos autores modernos.