International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games.

In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.

Managing the size of the Olympic Games

The last two decades have seen dramatic increases in the size and scope of the Summer Olympic Games. In many ways, London 2012 reached even higher summits than the Beijing Games in 2008. This growth is a major challenge for the Olympics and its future organizers, as it is making the Games increasingly difficult to stage and has greatly reduced the number of cities capable of hosting them. This study shows how various participation and organization indicators have expanded over six Olympiads, from Barcelona 1992 to London 2012, and examines the reasons for this growth. It suggests ways of reducing the size of the Summer Olympic Games in order to make them more manageable and to encourage candidatures from smaller cities and countries.

Using group role-playing games with gifted children and adolescents: A psychosocial intervention model

Gifted children develop asynchronously, often advanced for their age cognitively, but at or between their chronological and mental ages socially and emotionally (Robinson, 2008). In order to help gifted children and adolescents develop and practice social and emotional self-regulation skills, we investigated the use of an Adlerian play therapy approach during pen-and-paper role-playing games. Additionally, we used Goffman's (1961, 1974) social role identification and distance to encourage participants to experiment with new identities. Herein, we propose a psychosocial model of interactions during role-playing games based on Goffman's theory and Adlerian play therapy techniques, and suggest that role-playing games are an effective way of intervening with gifted children and adolescents to improve their intra- and interpersonal skills. We specifically targeted intrapersonal skills of exercising creativity, becoming self-aware, and setting individual goals by raising participants' awareness of their privately logical reasons for making decisions and their levels of social interest. We also targeted their needs and means of seeking significance in the group to promote collaboration and interaction skills with other gifted peers through role analysis, embracement, and distancing. We report results from a case study and conclude that role-playing games deserve more attention, both from researchers and clinical practitioners, because they encourage change while improving young clients' social and emotional development.

Religions in Play. Games, Rituals, and Virtual Worlds

Often dismissed as "not serious," the notion of play has nevertheless been at the center of classical theories of religion and ritual (Huizinga, Caillois, Turner, Staal, etc.). What can be retained of these theories for the contemporary study of religions? Can a study of "play" or "game" bring new perspectives for the study of religions? The book deals with the history of games and their relation to religions, the links between divination and games, the relations between sport and ritual, the pedagogical functions of games in religious education, and the interaction between games, media and religions. Richly illustrated, the book contributes to the study of religions, to ritual, game and media studies, and addresses an academic as well as a general public.

La utilització dels "serious games" en el tractament dels trastorns mentals : una revisió

Aquest article de revisió analitza l'ús que s'està fent dels anomenats "serious games" en el tractament dels trastorns mentals. La recerca efectuada a les bases de dades Medline i PsycINFO han donat com a resultat la localització de 537 articles que fan referència als "serious games" i als "computer games", dels quals 71 ho fan a la seva aplicació en l'àmbit de la salut i 14 a l'àmbit mes concret dels trastorns mentals. S'han trobat estudis que contemplen tractaments per l'esquizofrènia, el Trastorn per Dèficit d'Atenció i Hiperactivitat (TDAH), el Trastorn per Estrès Posttraumàtic (TEPT), l'autisme, el retard mental i les fòbies. Hi ha resultats encoratjadors en quan a l'eficàcia dels tractaments utilitzant jocs d'ordinador, realitat virtual i realitat augmentada, si bé degut a ser un camp de recerca molt jove es necessita replicar molts estudis per tal de donar validesa científica als resultats provisionals obtinguts.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.