Contentious Contracts

This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.

De la responsabilité individuelle aux priorités collectives. Une analyse institutionnaliste des politiques de la demande en santé

La notion d’aléa moral est le gold standard de la politique de la demande en santé et justifie les politiques de partage des coûts visant à faire payer le patient. Sous l’effet des critiques théoriques dont elle a fait l’objet, la notion d’aléa moral a été progressivement vidée de son ambition originelle pour en appeler à la moralisation du comportement du patient. Elle a débouché sur une segmentation des patients distinguant ceux qui doivent être mis à contribution financière au non de la responsabilité individuelle et ceux qui doivent être protégés de cette responsabilisation. Ce texte montre que la constitution d’ordres de priorité en matière de santé est peu compatible avec l’approche en termes d’aléa moral. Les ordres de priorité ne répondent pas à une conception instrumentale. Ils reposent sur des valeurs sociétales partagées et des préférences éthiques qui sont en opposition avec la conception standard de la responsabilité et la promotion de l’individualisme.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.

Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Una aproximación teórico-práctica para el costeo de cápitas de paquetes de salud

Metodología para la estimación de cápitas de planes de salud. Se propone un método de cuantificación de insumos a emplear, la estimación de costos indirectos asociados a las intervenciones y un método de anualización para los costos fijos que generalmente trascienden en su vida útil al período de duración de una cápita. Finalmente, a través de un ejercicio práctico de estimación de la cápita del Componente de Salud del Programa Oportunidades de México se ilustra la aplicación del desarrollo metodológico expuesto en la parte inicial.

Loan sales under asymmetric information

Loans are illiquid assets that can be sold in a secondary market even that buyers have no certainty about their quality. I study a model in which a lender has access to new investment opportunities when all her assets are illiquid. To raise funds, the lender may either borrow using her assets as collateral, or she can sell them in a secondary market. Given asymmetric information about assets quality, the lender cannot recover the total value of her assets. There is then a role for the government to correct the information problem using fiscal tools.

Seguros de desempleo: revisión de literatura y propuesta para Colombia

En este artículo se estudia la posibilidad de introducir seguros de desempleo en Colombia. En una primera parte, se propone una revisión de literatura de los seguros de desempleo en la cual se exponen las ventajas generadas por una cobertura contra este riesgo, así como sus inconvenientes. En una segunda parte, se estudian varios escenarios para introducir seguros de desempleo en Colombia. Después de haber presentado el contexto del mercado laboral y de las normas que lo vigilan, se proponen varios diseños que abordan la gestión y la administración del riesgo de desempleo en Colombia. Igualmente se presentan algunas consideraciones teóricas para la valoración del costo del aseguramiento, las cuales incorporan los efectos del riesgo moral sobre la duración y la incidencia del desempleo.

Small-area variation in health care affecting the choice of cesarean delivery: the case of a Colombian health insurer

In the midst of health care reform, Colombia has succeeded in increasing health insurance coverage and the quality of health care. In spite of this, efficiency continues to be a matter of concern, and small-area variations in health care are one of the plausible causes of such inefficiencies. In order to understand this issue, we use individual data of all births from a Contributory-Regimen insurer in Colombia. We perform two different specifications of a multilevel logistic regression model. Our results reveal that hospitals account for 20% of variation on the probability of performing cesarean sections. Geographic area only explains 1/3 of the variance attributable to the hospital. Furthermore, some variables from both demand and supply sides are found to be also relevant on the probability of undergoing cesarean sections. This paper contributes to previous research by using a hierarchical model and by defining hospitals as cluster. Moreover, we also include clinical and supply induced demand variables.

Teorías y algunas experiencias internacionales en el financiamiento de la educación superior: lecciones para Colombia

Se analizan diferentes alternativas para la financiación de la educación superior, teniendo en cuenta que la presencia de fallas de mercado -tanto por el lado de la demanda como por el de la oferta- hace de éste un sector muy particular. Las primeras se relacionan con las decisiones privadas en términos de educación de la población estudiantil, y las segundas con las asimetrías de información que caracterizan el lado de la oferta en el financiamiento de la educación. El documento hace una revisión de literatura académica y de algunas experiencias internacionales sobre las diferentes fuentes de financiación en este sector, así como sus potenciales efectos sobre ciertas variables. Así, esta revisión arroja luces sobre las alternativas para el caso Colombiano.

Unemployment insurance : severance payments and informality in developing countries

We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war

Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.

Protecting degraded rainforests: enhancement of forest carbon stocks under REDD+

The likely Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) mechanism includes strategies for the enhancement of forest carbon stocks. Recent concerns have been expressed that such enhancement, or restoration, of forest carbon could be counterproductive to biodiversity conservation, because forests are managed as “carbon farms” with the application of intensive silvicultural management that could homogenize diverse degraded rainforests. Restoration increases regeneration rates in degraded forest compared to naturally regenerating forest, and thus could yield significant financial returns for carbon sequestered. Here, we argue that such forest restoration projects are, in fact, likely to provide a number of benefits to biodiversity conservation including the retention of biodiversity, the prevention of forest conversion to agriculture, and employment opportunities for poor local communities. As with other forms of forest-based carbon offsets, there are possible moral hazard and leakage problems with restoration. However, due to the multiple benefits, we urge that enhancement of forest carbon stocks be detailed as a major component in the future negotiations of REDD+.