An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property

The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called “essential facilities doctrine,” which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an “essential facility” to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.

Análise crítica e métodos para avaliação da competição portuária entre terminais de contêineres.

Uma compreensão aprofundada da dinâmica de competição portuária é particularmente importante dado o contexto atual do setor, que orienta à outorga de novos portos e terminais no Brasil, à luz da Nova Lei dos Portos, Lei Nº 12.815 de 2013. A avaliação dos reais impactos decorrentes do aumento de capacidade portuária em cada região será atividade fundamental para que, por um lado, o poder público oriente a alocação efetiva de recursos, sem prejudicar a operação dos complexos existentes; e para que a iniciativa privada, por sua vez, possa compreender os impactos dos possíveis novos empreendimentos sobre as suas operações e delinear estratégias comerciais compatíveis com o novo cenário competitivo. A partir de extensa revisão bibliográfica e da aplicação de técnicas a casos específicos, o presente trabalho detalha a dinâmica competitiva entre terminais de contêineres e avalia criticamente seis métodos utilizados para identificar a existência de competição: correlação de market share, comparação de taxas de ocupação, sobreposição de escalas marítimas, comparação de custos logísticos terrestres, representatividade da região de influência contestável e existência de poder de mercado sobre a região de influência. Dos seis métodos analisados, dois apresentam conclusões fulminantes para a questão, embora sua aplicação demande grande volume de informações; um é assertivo em condições normais de distribuição geográfica de cargas; dois apresentam condições necessárias, porém não suficientes para a identificação de competição; e um deve ser aplicado com ressalvas, uma vez que pode levar a conclusões equivocadas.

Rentabilidad, poder de mercado y eficiencia en la distribución comercial minorista

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar la relación existente entre la estructura del mercado y la rentabilidad en el sector español de distribución comercial minorista. Como novedad, este trabajo utiliza una medida directa de eficiencia que permite contrastar distintas hipótesis alternativas explicativas de la rentabilidad minorista en el marco genérico de las teorías de poder de mercado y eficiencia. Los resultados de la aplicación empírica sobre una muestra de 42 cadenas de supermercados entre 2000 y 2002 permiten concluir que la situación competitiva que mejor caracteriza a este sector es la de poder de mercado relativo, de forma que la cuota de mercado ejerce una influencia positiva sobre la rentabilidad.

European antitrust control and standard setting. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/01, February 2012

Standards reduce production costs and increase products’ value to consumers. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the chosen technology normally lacks credible substitutes. The owner of the patented technology might thus have additional market power relative to locked-in licensees, and might exploit this power to charge higher access rates. In the economic literature this phenomenon is referred to as ‘hold-up’. To reduce the risk of hold-up, standard-setting organisations often require patent holders to disclose their standard-essential patents before the adoption of the standard and to commit to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The European Commission normally investigates unfair pricing abuse in a standard-setting context if a patent holder who committed to FRAND ex-ante is suspected not to abide to it ex-post. However, this approach risks ignoring a number of potential abuses which are likely harmful for welfare. That can happen if, for example, ex-post a licensee is able to impose excessively low access rates (‘reverse hold-up’) or if a patent holder acquires additional market power thanks to the standard but its essential patents are not encumbered by FRAND commitments, for instance because the patent holder did not directly participate to the standard setting process and was therefore not required by the standard-setting organisations to commit to FRAND ex-ante. A consistent policy by the Commission capable of tackling all sources of harm should be enforced regardless of whether FRAND commitments are given. Antitrust enforcement should hinge on the identification of a distortion in the bargaining process around technology access prices, which is determined by the adoption of the standard and is not attributable to pro-competitive merits of any of the involved players.

The gas target model for the Visegard 4 Region: conceptual analysis. OSW Report, May 2013

The similarity of issues and geographical proximity have led the Visegrad 4 countries (V4) to undertake closer collaboration in natural gas policy, notably by agreeing on a common security of supply strategy, including regional emergency planning, and a common implementation of the Gas Target Model (GTM) that European regulators have proposed for the medium-long term design of the EU gas market, and which has been endorsed by the Madrid Regulatory Forum. As a contribution to this collaboration, the present paper will analyse how the GTM may be implemented in the V4 region, with a view to maximize the benefits that arise from joint implementation. A most relevant conclusion of the GTM is that markets should be large enough to attract market players and investments, so that sufficient diversity of sources may be reached and market power indicators are kept below dangerous levels. In most cases, this requires physical and/or virtual interconnection of present markets, which is also useful to achieve the required security of supply standards, as envisaged in the Regulation 994/2010/EC.

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) 23/June 2012

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.

Doing which work? A practice approach to institutional pluralism

This chapter takes a social theory of practice approach to examining institutional work; that is, how institutions are created, maintained, and disrupted through the actions, interactions, and negotiations of multiple actors. We examine alternative approaches that organizations use to deal with institutional pluralism based on a longitudinal real-time case study of a utility company grappling with opposing market and regulatory logics over time. These two logics required the firm to both mitigate its significant market power and also maintain its commercially competitive focus and responsiveness to shareholders. Institutional theorists have long acknowledged that institutions have a central logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991) or rationality (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995/2001; Townley, 2002), comprising a set of material and symbolic practices and organizing principles that provide logics of action for organizations and individuals, who then reproduce the institutions through their actions (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Despite a monolithic feel to much institutional theory, in which a dominant institutional logic appears to prevail, institutional theorists also acknowledge the plurality of institutions (e.g. Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Lounsbury, 2007; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Whittington, 1992). While these pluralistic institutions may be interdependent, they are not considered to coexist in harmony; “There is no question but that many competing and inconsistent logics exist in modern society” (Scott, 1995: 130).

Is competition really bad news for cooperatives? Some empirical evidence for Italian producers' cooperatives

In this paper, we analyse the nature of the relationship between market power and technical efficiency for producers' cooperatives. More specifically we test two hypotheses: first, we evaluate the extent to which increasing market pressure may help producers' cooperatives to improve technical efficiency to guarantee positive profits; second, we test whether higher technical efficiency induces producers' cooperatives to have a larger market share. These hypotheses are tested on a sample of Italian conventional and cooperative firms for the Wine Production and Processing sector, using both frontier analysis and dynamic panel techniques. The results support the hypothesis that increasing market pressure can affect positively the cooperativeś efficiency, while gains in technical efficiency do not seem to have any impact on the cooperatives' market share. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Real choice in food grocery shopping in Britain

In the European Retail Digest, Tenbusch (2002) advised us that, "over the last decade, only discounters have been able to achieve significant revenue growth". The most casual observer of the retail scene in Europe would quickly realise that the author was most certainly not writing about Britain. Indeed he compared the situation in Germany with Britain by noting that grocery prices in the former were on average 20% lower. Interestingly, it was, at least in part, just those types of price comparison data that sparked the current British debate on the state of our market for food shopping. Soon, however, there were other factors brought into consideration. Market power of supermarket/ superstore operators, prices offered to small local farmers, the apparent permanent global summertime for food, food miles and eco-efficiency all became part of the debate. What might be the competing influence of any or all of these factors in the name of better 'choice' for consumers? Are British consumers really being offered better choice compared to what was available in the early 1980s, and might that explain the price differential with Germany and other countries? Or are we simply not comparing like with like? Indeed, as we will shortly argue, can we generalise about Britain at all when we accept, for example, that the Scottish market IS different?

Asymmetric price transmission in EU petroleum markets

This research investigates the determinants of asymmetric price transmission (APT) in European petroleum markets. APT is the faster response of retail prices to cost increases than to cost decreases; resulting in a welfare transfer from consumers to fuel retailers. I investigate APT at 3 different levels: the EU, the UK and at the Birmingham level. First, I examine the incidence of asymmetries in the retail markets of six major EU countries; significant asymmetries are found in all countries except from the UK. The market share data suggest that asymmetries are more important in more concentrated markets; this finding supports the collusion theory. I extend the investigation to 12 EU countries and note that APT is greater in diesel markets. The cross-country analysis suggests that vertical and horizontal concentration at least partly explains the degree of asymmetry. I provide evidence justifying scrutiny over retail markets’ pricing and structure. Second daily data unveil the presence of APT in the UK fuel markets. I use break tests to identify segments with different pricing regimes. Two main types of periods are identified: periods of rising oil price exhibit significant asymmetries whilst periods of recession do not. Our results suggest that oligopolistic coordination between retailers generate excess rents during periods of rising oil price whilst the coordination fails due to price wars when oil prices are going downwards. Finally I investigate the pricing behaviour of petroleum retailers in the Birmingham (UK) area for 2008. Whilst the market structure data reveals that the horizontal concentration is higher than the national UK average, I find no evidence of APT. In contrast, I find that retail prices are sticky upwards and downwards and that firms with market power (majors and supermarkets) adjust their prices slower than other firms.

The end of the shock of the new

‘Shock’ advertising is the new black and the subject of the reflection in which this article engages. We do this in particular through consideration of the (largely) British high-street fashion house French Connection’s seemingly endless ‘FCUK’ campaign. The obvious resonance between this abbreviation and perhaps the most popular word in the English language was at the heart of the campaign’s appeal and it continues today through various extensions on both slogans and logos on French Connection’s own goods and indeed those who seek to piggy back upon and/or subvert its market power. It is far from the only example of such ‘shock’ tactics. Whether discussing reproduction in graphic detail with children, joyously dismantling chastity, or merely fucking with fuck, it seems that traditional mores can no longer remain virgin territory, unsullied by rapacious marketing. Our mediated experiences of reaching ‘extremes’, it now appears, are not paralysing, mesmerising, fascinating or inspiring but simply a further prod down the path leading to (gleeful) purchase. In this paper we explore how, via a series of semiotic reversals, the new, the strange, the unfamiliar and the would-be shocking are rendered banal, and thus thoroughly comprehensible through brand association and the endless re-iteration of existing works.

The European Union Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The Limitations of the Opening towards the East

This article intends to study the evolution of the European Union foreign policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Area throughout the Post-Cold War era. The aim is to analyze Brussels’ fundamental interests and limitations in the area, the strategies it has implemented in the last few years, and the extent to which the EU has been able to undermine the regional hegemons’ traditional supremacy. As will be highlighted, the Community’s chronic weaknesses, the local determination to preserve sovereignty and an increasing international geopolitical competition undermine any European aspiration to become a pre-eminent actor at the heart of the Eurasian continent in the near future.

Keynes’s "Treatise on Money" and the role of the State

Este artículo hace una reconstrucción crítica de la visión de Keynes sobre la relación entre gasto público, tipo de interés, salarios y desempleo, tal y como se formula en su Tratado sobre el Dinero. El trabajo defiende que el enfoque de Keynes lleva a propuestas de política económica que enfatizan la necesidad de intervención estatal directa en la provisión de bienes y servicios. Esta conclusión se deriva de una interpretación circuitista de su obra.

Of Marx and Makers: an Historical Perspective on Generative Justice

In Marxist frameworks “distributive justice” depends on extracting value through a centralized state. Many new social movements—peer to peer economy, maker activism, community agriculture, queer ecology, etc.—take the opposite approach, keeping value in its unalienated form and allowing it to freely circulate from the bottom up. Unlike Marxism, there is no general theory for bottom-up, unalienated value circulation. This paper examines the concept of “generative justice” through an historical contrast between Marx’s writings and the indigenous cultures that he drew upon. Marx erroneously concluded that while indigenous cultures had unalienated forms of production, only centralized value extraction could allow the productivity needed for a high quality of life. To the contrary, indigenous cultures now provide a robust model for the “gift economy” that underpins open source technological production, agroecology, and restorative approaches to civil rights. Expanding Marx’s concept of unalienated labor value to include unalienated ecological (nonhuman) value, as well as the domain of freedom in speech, sexual orientation, spirituality and other forms of “expressive” value, we arrive at an historically informed perspective for generative justice. 

Trois essais sur les banques et le pouvoir de marché

Cette thèse examine le rôle du pouvoir de marché dans le marché bancaire. L’emphase est mis sur la prise de risque, les économies d’échelle, l’efficacité économique du marché et la transmission des chocs. Le premier chapitre présente un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique stochastique en économie ouverte comprenant un marché bancaire en concurrence monopolistique. Suivant l’hypothèse de Krugman (1979, 1980) sur la relation entre les économies d’échelle et les exportations, les banques doivent défrayer un coût de transaction pour échanger à l’étranger qui diminue à mesure que le volume de leurs activités locales augmente. Cela incite les banques à réduire leur marge locale afin de profiter davantage du marché extérieur. Le modèle est solutionné et simulé pour divers degrés de concentration dans le marché bancaire. Les résultats obtenus indiquent que deux forces contraires, les économies d’échelle et le pouvoir de marché, s’affrontent lorsque le marché se concentre. La concentration permet aussi aux banques d’accroître leurs activités étrangères, ce qui les rend en contrepartie plus vulnérables aux chocs extérieurs. Le deuxième chapitre élabore un cadre de travail semblable, mais à l’intérieur duquel les banques font face à un risque de crédit. Celui-ci est partiellement assuré par un collatéral fourni par les entrepreneurs et peut être limité à l’aide d’un effort financier. Le modèle est solutionné et simulé pour divers degrés de concentration dans le marché bancaire. Les résultats montrent qu’un plus grand pouvoir de marché réduit la taille du marché financier et de la production à l’état stationnaire, mais incite les banques à prendre moins de risques. De plus, les économies dont le marché bancaire est fortement concentré sont moins sensibles à certains chocs puisque les marges plus élevés donnent initialement de la marge de manoeuvre aux banques en cas de chocs négatifs. Cet effet modérateur est éliminé lorsqu’il est possible pour les banques d’entrer et de sortir librement du marché. Une autre extension avec économies d’échelle montre que sous certaines conditions, un marché moyennement concentré est optimal pour l’économie. Le troisième chapitre utilise un modèle en analyse de portefeuille de type Moyenne-Variance afin de représenter une banque détenant du pouvoir de marché. Le rendement des dépôts et des actifs peut varier selon la quantité échangée, ce qui modifie le choix de portefeuille de la banque. Celle-ci tend à choisir un portefeuille dont la variance est plus faible lorsqu’elle est en mesure d’obtenir un rendement plus élevé sur un actif. Le pouvoir de marché sur les dépôts amène un résultat sembable pour un pouvoir de marché modéré, mais la variance finit par augmenter une fois un certain niveau atteint. Les résultats sont robustes pour différentes fonctions de demandes.