A theory of reference-dependent behavior

Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.

On ignoring scientific evidence: The bumpy road to enlightenment

It is well accepted that people resist evidence that contradicts their beliefs.Moreover, despite their training, many scientists reject results that are inconsistent withtheir theories. This phenomenon is discussed in relation to the field of judgment anddecision making by describing four case studies. These concern findings that clinical judgment is less predictive than actuarial models; simple methods have proven superiorto more theoretically correct methods in times series forecasting; equal weighting ofvariables is often more accurate than using differential weights; and decisions cansometimes be improved by discarding relevant information. All findings relate to theapparently difficult-to-accept idea that simple models can predict complex phenomenabetter than complex ones. It is true that there is a scientific market place for ideas.However, like its economic counterpart, it is subject to inefficiencies (e.g., thinness,asymmetric information, and speculative bubbles). Unfortunately, the market is only correct in the long-run. The road to enlightenment is bumpy.

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Does risk aversion or attraction depend on income? An experiment

Does risk attitude (aversion or attraction) vary with the level of the income at risk? About half of our subjects chose to insure all levels, whereas another half chose instead not to insure low levels, but to insure high levels.

The role of incidental variables of time in mood assessment

Determining what influences mood is important for theories of emotion and research onsubjective well-being. We consider three sets of factors: activities in which people areengaged; individual differences; and incidental variables that capture when mood ismeasured, e.g., time-of-day. These three factors were investigated simultaneously in a studyinvolving 168 part-time students who each responded 30 times in an experience samplingstudy conducted over 10 working days. Respondents assessed mood on a simple bipolarscale from 1 (very negative) to 10 (very positive). Activities had significant effects but,with the possible exception of variability in the expression of mood, no systematicindividual differences were detected. Diurnal effects, similar to those already reported inthe literature, were found as was an overall Friday effect. However, these effects weresmall. Lastly, the weather had little or no influence. We conclude that simple measures ofoverall mood are not greatly affected by incidental variables.

When "hope springs eternal": The role of chance in risk taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrastexperimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed tocombinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by thosewhose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greateroptimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that highlevels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although weobserved excess entry (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not beattributed to overconfidence.

When are layoffs acceptable? Evidence from a quasi-experiment

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable skills. These discussions occur without much evidence on what employment contract employees currently feel is fair. We perfomed quasi-experimental surveys to study when employees in the U.S. andCanada feel that layoffs are fair.Layoffs were perceived as more fair if they were due to lower product demand than if the result of employee suggestions. This result appears to be solely due to norms of reciprocity (companiesshould not punish employees for their efforts), rather than norms of sharing rents, as new technology was also considered a justification for layoffs.Consistent with theories of distributive and procedural equity, layoffs were perceived as more fair if the CEO voluntarily shared the pain. CEO bonuses due to layoffs lowered their reported fairness only slightly.Respondents in Silicon Valley were not more accepting of layoffsthan were those in Canada on average, although the justificationsconsidered valid differed slightly.

Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment

We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum effort game inthe presence of a third player (principal) who is the only one informed about past effortchoices and benefits from a higher minimum effort of the others. Sanctions introduced in thesecond round by the experimenter lead to more optimistic beliefs and higher efforts. This isnot true when sanctions have been imposed by the principal. The possibility that the choiceof a sanction is a signal of low effort levels causes players who chose high effort in the firstround to be less optimistic.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people chooseto punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers' rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender's intention,as is suggested by the literature on deception and proceduralsatisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charnessand Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender's perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

Measuring risk aversion with lists: A new bias

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve alist of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt andLaury (2002), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields asystematic decrease in risk aversion. This bias is quite distinct from other confoundsthat have been previously observed in the use of the Holt and Laury method. It may berelated to empirical phenomena and theoretical developments where better prospectsincrease risk aversion. Nevertheless, we have also found that the more recent elicitationmethod due to Abdellaoui et al. (2011), also based on lists, does not display anystatistically significant bias when the corresponding items of the list are removed. Ourresults suggest that methods other than the popular Holt and Laury one may bepreferable for the measurement of risk aversion.

Endogenous depth of reasoning

We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard level-k models, in this framework the player's `depth of reasoning' is endogenously determined, andit can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach,individuals act as if they follow a cost-benefit analysis. The depth of reasoning is a function ofthe player's cognitive abilities and his payoffs. The costs are exogenous and represent the gametheoretical sophistication of the player; the benefit instead is related to the game payoffs. Behavioris in turn determined by the individual's depth of reasoning and his beliefs about the reasoningprocess of the opponent. Thus, in our framework, payoffs not only affect individual choices inthe traditional sense, but they also shape the cognitive process itself. Our model delivers testableimplications on players' chosen actions as incentives and opponents change. We then test themodel's predictions with an experiment. We administer different treatments that vary beliefs overpayoffs and opponents, as well as beliefs over opponents' beliefs. The results of this experiment,which are not accounted for by current models of reasoning in games, strongly support our theory.Our approach therefore serves as a novel, unifying framework of strategic thinking that allows forpredictions across games.

Finite mixture analysis of beauty-contest data using generalised beta distributions

This paper introduces a mixture model based on the beta distribution, without preestablishedmeans and variances, to analyze a large set of Beauty-Contest data obtainedfrom diverse groups of experiments (Bosch-Domenech et al. 2002). This model gives a bettert of the experimental data, and more precision to the hypothesis that a large proportionof individuals follow a common pattern of reasoning, described as iterated best reply (degenerate),than mixture models based on the normal distribution. The analysis shows thatthe means of the distributions across the groups of experiments are pretty stable, while theproportions of choices at dierent levels of reasoning vary across groups.

Fetal testosterone (2D:4D) as predictor of cognitive reflection

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a test introduced by S. Frederick (2005) Cognitive reflection and decision making, J Econ Perspect 19(4): 25-42. The task is designed to measure the tendency to override an intuitive response that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. The consistent sex differences in CRT performance may suggest a role for gonadal hormones, particularly testosterone. A now widely studied putative marker for fetal testosterone is the second-to-fourth digit ratio (2D:4D). This paper tests to what extent 2D:4D, as a proxy for prenatal exposure to testosterone, can predict CRT scores in a sample of 623 students. After controlling for sex, we observe that a lower 2D:4D (reflecting a higher exposure to testosterone) is significantly associated with a higher number of correct answers. The result holds for both hands? 2D:4Ds. In addition, the effect appears to be sharper for females than for males. We also control for patience and math proficiency, which are significantly related to performance in the CRT. But the effect of 2D:4D on performance in CRT is not reduced with these controls, implying that these variables are not mediating the relationship between digit ratio and CRT.

Las prácticas de recursos humanos y su incidencia en el bienestar laboral de los empleados

El objetivo del presente trabajo es formular, mediante una profunda revisión documental, bibliográfica y empírica, una fundamentación teórica sobre si existe o no incidencia de las prácticas de recursos humanos sobre el bienestar laboral de los empleados, y el que grado en que esta se presenta sobre aspecto como el engagement y la satisfacción laboral. Se realizó la revisión de múltiples estudios empíricos que aportaran evidencia sobre la relación que se presenta entre las principales prácticas de recursos humanos – provisión de personal, formación y desarrollo, promoción de personal, evaluación de desempeño, compensación y pago, y balance trabajo-familia – y el bienestar laboral, representado en el engagement y satisfacción en el trabajo de los empleados. Los resultados de este trabajo indican la existencia de una relación e incidencia de las prácticas de recursos humanos, el bienestar laboral, el engagement y la satisfacción laboral. De igual forma se encontró que estas relaciones son principalmente de carácter positivo, lo cual indica que las organizaciones que desarrollan este tipo de prácticas en su interior, fomentan tanto el desarrollo y la presencia de bienestar laboral en sus empleados, como su perdurabilidad.